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Issue Introduction

Post-Animal Studies:
The Future(s) of Critical Animal Studies

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Over the last summer, we had the honor of presenting at a symposium in Utrecht, The Netherlands entitled "The Future of Critical Animal Studies." We would humbly suggest that the same title could serve as title of this issue as a whole, as it constitutes, in a partial and incomplete manner, part of our shared answer to that collective challenge. Our fundamental question, which began even before this roundtable in the Netherlands, was "What would a Critical Animal Studies look like that thought itself *beyond the animal*?" Let us immediately clarify the misunderstanding we can already hear coming from this question. Both of us are committed vegans and animal rights activists, and we have jointly worked (along with many others) for the last decade to create the field of Critical Animal Studies precisely to force the field of Animal Studies to confront the reality of the suffering of the actual animal herself. So, what do we mean, when we say we want to think of a critical animal studies *beyond the animal?* Certainly what we do not mean is that we wish to further hide the suffering of the tens of billions of animals in the abattoirs, the laboratories, the "zoological parks," or any of the multiple of arenas in which speciesism and anthropocentric privilege are daily enacted and performed. What we do mean is: How can we begin to think of a Critical Animal Studies which calls into question the division between the human (animal) and the nonhuman (animal) which, we would argue, *underlies* anthropocentric privilege in the first place? What would a world look like that went beyond terms such as "animal" and "human" to an understanding of living and grieving in a shared, and precarious, life?

The first area, we discovered, would be that of performativity and normativity. Since humans are always and already animals, ritualistic scenes of violence are enacted against both literal nonhuman animals and humans rendered as only animals in order to performatively define, via the specter of violence, where the "lines" between "human" and "animal" lie. Lines, we would suggest, that are traced in the blood of both human and

nonhuman animal alike. Richard Iveson raises precisely this claim in the first essay of our issue entitled "Domestic Scenes and Species Trouble - On Judith Butler and Other Animals." Iveson takes seriously the claim raised (but never fully explored) by Judith Butler that since **"**there is no firm way to distinguish in absolute terms the *bios* of the animal from the *bios* of the human animal" that "humanness is itself a regulatory norm." We could not agree more. As such we see Iveson work in the same vein as scholars such as Kelly Oliver (in *Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human),* Mark Roberts (in *The Mark of the Beast: Animality and Human Oppression*), Chloe Taylor's (in "The Precarious Lives of Animals: Butler, Coetzee, and Animal Ethics) and James Stanescu (in "Species Trouble: Judith Butler, Mourning, and the Precarious Lives of Animals*"*). All these scholars help us to chart the manner in which a performative need to create the human always and already entails a violent refusal of the animal bodies that constitute the human herself. As Iveson phrases it, in our favorite passage from his essay:

> [T]he production of the human is based upon the death or nonexistence of the animal – the human, in other words, begins where the animal ends. In the second, the human remains in a constant struggle with his or her own animality, which must be repeatedly overcome in being-human. Both of these determinations, it should be noted right away, thus fallaciously define the nonhuman animal only by what he or she lacks within a dialectic that therefore marks every nonhuman animal as sub-*human*…

In opposition to the "zero-sum" between the performative "animal" and the performative "human", Iveson helps to articulate a new vision which seeks to extend Butler-beyond-Butler in order to perceive a "precarity and a grievability that is shared among the living in general." We agree. If we can be forgiven this aside, to use language Iveson does not, we would say that we must end what Agamben refers to in *The Open* as the "anthropological machine" which simultaneously defines the "human" and the "animal" while at the same time defining the excluded human and nonhuman as "subhuman" or "nonhuman." In Butler's work we have always seen (and been called by) a play - a fluidity - in gender and sexuality, race, and nationhood that extends into any of these normative definitions of these terms (for us this has always held the greatest importance for queer studies). For us we see in Iveson's important and significant article the

articulation (which we share) that "queer" studies does not need to be "combined" with "critical animal studies" (as though somehow they were separate in the first place), since CAS has, since it's inception" been premised on "queerness" in all its possible forms including the queering of the human and animal divide. Perhaps, we believe Iveson argues, and we certainly hope, we can render the terms of "human" or "animal" as performative descriptions, terms that we do not even need (other than historical markers) and can begin to think beyond (if you see the traces of Matthew Calarco in the argument you are certainly correct and we greatly acknowledge the intellectual debt). Building on Iveson's work, we would argue, what we need now is not so much a space that is "posthumanist" as one that is "postanimalist."

We found another "application" for this new "postanimalist studies" in one of the essays from this issue, John Miller's article: "*In Vitro* Meat: Power, Authenticity and Vegetarianism." Like Miller, we too, have long been disquieted by the growing popularity of in vitro meat even among animal rights activists (such as PETA which offered a million dollar prize to help spur it's research). And yet, from any other traditional model of animal rights such as utilitarianism (ala Singer) or deontology (ala Regan) how can we articulate a critique of a practice which both promises not to harm any animals and, in fact, helps to mitigate the harm (via factory farms) that is already occurring? Miller's article is, as far as we can tell, the first article to begin to answer back these charges. He argues that in vitro meat still operates within a system of "carniculture." As Miller writes **"**carniculture— namely, the operation of the various goods and benefits it promises as the get-out clause of consumer capitalism and therefore as the endeavour to sustain (as much as to render sustainable) the systems of relations it relies upon". In other words, far from a critique of factory farming, anthropocentric privilege, and human chauvinism (as PETA and others would have us believe), in reality, the fabrication of in vitro meat serves merely to hide the reality of both capitalism and speciesism, promising, although never delivering, a world in which the instrumentality of nonhuman life has become rendered "sustainable." As Miller again articulates it "Carniculture may be read as a coherent continuation, perhaps even a culmination, of this logic of efficiency that represents a kind of ultimate capitalization of animal bodies through *the isolation of the value of animals from the animals themselves" (emphasis*

added). Miller argues precisely what is wrong with the advent of in vitro meat is that it takes the lie inherent in all animal consumption (the "meat" is somehow separate from "an animal"), and renders this Cartesian division even greater (i.e. the belief that in vitro "meat" is even less from an animal than other meat) even as, ironically, it proclaims this very entrenchment of animal/body divide as the essential for the liberatory effect on the nonhuman animal world. Or as Miller phrases it "Carniculture's ostensible triumph is that it materializes and literalizes the well-noted ethical disconnection between meat-eaters and animals so that in the moment it fulfills its instrumentalist vision, it paradoxically pledges to liberate animals from conditions of absolute objectification." And, secondly, that it only helps to further steer veganism from the wider intersectional struggles against both capitalism and human chauvinism inherent in the original articulation of the term "vegan"–since now "vegan" could encompass the active endorsement of biotechnology produced animal flesh rendered purely for human consumption. Or again as Miller phrases it (in our favorite line from the article) "The necessity of retaining this outsidership should extend to a refusal to be normalized and brought into the pale of a dominatory techno-capitalist complex by embracing the arrival of real, fake meat, a product which serves only to inscribe vegetarianism [and veganism] in the worldview it contests."

For us the singular brilliance of this article is that thought through purely on the level of "the animal" (in isolation) in vitro is rendered immune from critique. However when anthropocentricism is rethought in terms of a wider system of sign, as a type of power dynamic serving to create a certain type of subjectivity, the flaws of in vitro meat become apparent—it is embedded in the same subjectivity, the same view of "instrumentality" of all other life, and the same techno-capitalist fantasy of limitless consumption and human privilege. Cultured meat is therefore, we would argue, pro "animal rights" in only the weakest, and apolitical, sense of that term Moreover, to connect Miller to Iveson, what is precisely so troubling to us about all of the supposed techno fixes (not only in vitro meat but also the "enviropig" et al) is that it denudes the very point of an authentic vegan/CAS critique, of a human animal acknowledgment of our shared interdependence. What, ultimately, in vitro meat promises, under the flag of "animal welfare" is not less human "mastery" of the natural world and animal flesh but

more. (To extend beyond Miller for a second, we see an analogy here with projects to save endangered species through animal cloning which we would like to bring into question via a post animal studies perspective.). And, therefore, we read from Miller the argument that vitro meat, far from a critique, in fact, represents the ultimate dream inherent in the "factory" system itself — the techno-capitalist dream of rendering the animal body into merely a "machine" generating an infinitely reproducible "product" of human consumption. Such a move toward in vitro meat would represent, we believe, not a "victory" for a non-anthropocentric and human chauvinist world view but only it's continued, only less visible, re-entrenchment.

This same argument is continued in Tim Terhaar's article "The Animal in the Age of its Technological Reducibility." Terhaar wishes to consider another techno-utopian "fix" to the factory farm system – one which, inconveniently, still has the animal attached. Specifically Terhaar wishes to consider the advent of attempts to remove pain receptors from animals in factory farms so that they can no longer "suffer." Again, from a utilitarian perspective, such as Singer (or even , Terhaar suggests, Gary Francione) such a position is difficult to argue against since it would result in less suffering in industrial animal agribusiness. And again, as with in vitro meat, Terhaar points out that this techno fix, too, has its apologists such as the Mardi Mellon, the director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Food and Environment Program. And again, as Richard Twine and Miller have argued, such a move serves to merely hide (indeed *worsen*) the very anthropocentricism that all such technofixes attempt to solve. As Terhaar documents:

> "Interestingly," writes Shriver, [an author in favor of removing pain receptors from farmed animals] "studies have shown that that [sic] ablation of the anterior cingulate causes mother mammals to stop responding to the cries of their young," which he deems a promising sign (Shriver, 2009: 119). Genetic deletion is capable of destroying what little sociality our domesticates have managed to steal from their prisons.

Indeed. It is hard (at least for us) to understand how a genetic manipulation which causes mothers to stop responding to the call of pain from their own children represents much in the way of "progress" for any authentic effort to combat anthropocentricism, speciesism, and human chauvinism. Indeed, Terhaar takes his title (we think insightfully) from

Benjamin's essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility." So too, we believe that both Terhaar and Miller essay's challenge us to think what does the animal now mean in her age of its technological reproducibility? For (to extend beyond both Terhaar and Miller for a moment) the truth is that, separate from as of yet unenacted "innovations" such as in vitro meat or genetically engineered farmed animals (who can no longer even respond to cries of pain from their own children) we, already, live in society fully committed to the fully techno-reproducibility of all animals (for example turkeys have already been engineered for breasts so large that the very act of mating can produce death and therefore all turkeys are conceived via artificial insemination). This very infinite "reproducibility" underlies much of the defense of the animal industrial complex since it is a common superficial argument that the animals would not be alive at all if it were not for their being bred for the factory farm complex. Therefore, as both Miller and Terhaar point out, what we are witnessing in cultured meat and painless farmed animals is merely an intensification of the original Cartesian dualism inherent in the factory farm system between human-as-person and animals-as-machine. As such, current techno capitalism treats Cartesian dualism not as an unethical position of human chauvinism but instead as a factual error—animals may not be machines yet, but that does not mean that we cannot make them into machines. As such, both in vitro meat and removing pain receptors from animals suggest that what is wrong with the factory farm system is not the system of treating living being as machines, but, instead the animals themselves who have failed to become enough like machines—as such, both moves shift what is, in reality, a factory farm system problem into an "animal problem." Again we can note an analogy with animal science responses to climate change. There it is not the industrialized system of animal production to blame but the animal body which further becomes the object of techno-efficiency projects, for example, to produce an animal body that emits less methane. As Terhaar phrases this same critique "Changing the animals, rather than the system, is the less *ethical* response."

Terhaar's important paper helps us to understand not only Miller's piece but, we would argue, Iveson's piece as well. Specifically, Terhaar (as with Iveson) helps us to see political stakes inherent in perpetuating a more than performative "division" between the

human and nonhuman animal as likewise the need to take the position of the animal as a starting point for all articulations of either the ethical or the political for any actually liberatory movements. As Terhaar puts it (in our favorite passage from his essay):

> Althusser was convinced that unless philosophers succeeded in working from a proletarian class position (through much hard work and with strong social discipline, we might add in paraphrase), their work would necessarily reflect and reproduce their petty bourgeois class conditions. In the same way, unless philosophers consciously work from a vegan political position…, their work will necessarily reflect and reproduce the conditions of their society, most significantly its exploitative drive.

All that we might add to this already perfectly phrased insight is that the "machine" like nature of in vitro meat and animal's bereft of pain receptors is not coincidental. It is, as we have argued, only the continuation and intensification of the "anthropological machine" of difference between human and animal that we wish to draw into question. And as such we would suggest that Iveson is correct that the violence all of us wish to call into question can only be successfully challenged when the ontological difference between (to paraphrase Derrida) the "so called" human and the "so-called" animal is itself challenged. As long as this difference continues unabated, as both Miller and Terhaar have so effectively documented, the solution of "animal welfare" and even "animal rights" will be only a further rendering of the animal into the mechanistic structure of Cartesian dualism. As odd as it must sound for two committed vegans to say, in defiance of Bentham, the "problem" is not, in fact, that "animals suffer" (with the "solution" of rendering animals that no longer suffer via either cell cloning or genetically modifying animals to no longer feel pain), the "problem" is that transformative moment of "suffering" in which the veil of the performative distinction between the human and animal might, perhaps, have been transcended ---that the ontological experience of "suffering" renders as shared vulnerable and living beings of a precarious life—is missed in a technofix of the "animal problem" in an aura-less system of unending "reproducibility."

Terhaar's work continues, for us, one more singularly important sentence—namely, "It is almost tautological to say that as long as animal communities

remain feral, they possess no rights." For Terhaar this is almost a "throw away" sentence in that it is not an idea to which he returns in the essay. However, for us, it too represents an area in which CAS must think beyond animal rights. For, from Hanna Arendt's work on the figure of the refugee, to Agamben's work on the *homo sacer* we are keenly aware of the seeming impossibility of granting human rights to those who might be viewed as "feral humans." How then, we may fairly ask, can a subject so doubly marked as existing beyond the bounds of the political, as both "feral" *and* "animal" ever be authentically included in a system of animal "rights?" It is for this question that we segue into our forth article, a fascinating piece by Carol Thompson, entitled "The Contested Meaning and Place of Feral Cats in the Workplace." As Thompson documents in, for us, the most insightful part of the essay:

> Unlike dogs, the domestication of cats can be seen as incomplete inasmuch as cats resist human attempts to dominate and control them. Correspondingly, domestication as a conferred status for cats refers more to where they are located *vis-à-vis* humans than how they relate to humans. The lack of categorical certainty becomes even more complicated, problematic and injurious when considering feral cats who are technically "domestic" cats that are considered to have "gone wild." The feral qualifier itself imposes an outlaw status upon cats because it dramatizes the fact that such cats are outside the control and domination of humans. Thus the feral domestic cat's status is liminal, in between domestic and wild…

While Thompson herself does not explicitly make this argument, what we love so much about her piece is how it draws into question the work in animal studies by such authors as Donna Haraway and Kathy Rudy which seem to place such a singular emphasis on domesticated dogs as the template for human and nonhuman relations. How would, one might fairly ask, their conclusions have been different if their starting place had been not the doubly marked domesticated (living with humans) dog (bred for humans) but instead the "feral" cat? Particularly when Donna Haraway (we would say problematically) ends *When Species Meet* with her eating a feral pig—in part because of its very "feralness?" What we find so uniquely fascinating in Thompson's work is the contention that what troubles humans about "feral" cats is simply their freedom from explicit human control:

> The notion of being born into "the wild" in descriptions of feral cats disguises the fact that such "wild" areas are typically found in human built, planned, managed and tamed environments, and it stigmatizes any cats who are not themselves tamed and under the control of human masters. Thus, it appears that the problematic status of feral cats is rooted in their existence outside of their assumed proper place and apart from human control. That "problem," as such, frames the everyday discourse about such cats, even among their protectors, and can have very real consequences for the cats. As Arluke and Sanders have pointed out, a species or an individual animal's worth or moral status to humans is directly related to the willingness or ability of the animal to accept subordinate positions to humans and to conform to human expectations. Domestic cats are seen as wild, out of place, and out of control. They are outlaws …

We love the notion of feral animals as "outlaws" and, drawing from both Arendt and Agamben, we could not agree more. The prisoner, as opposed to the refugee, still possesses, at least theoretically, certain rights because she is still within a system of law and as such "under the care of the state." So too, as "out of place" animals, feral animals are rendered as ontologically fully outside of even the meager anti cruelty laws granted to domesticated animals kept, both literally and metaphorically, "in their place."

Again, though, we feel that Thompson's article achieves it's fully intellectual impact only when combined again with Iveson's insights with which we began this issue. Yes, the idea of humanness is itself a regulatory mechanism. But one that not only regulates the "so-called" human, but equally the "so-called" animal. Dogs, as Haraway and Rudy would have us notice, possess a certain kind of special standing in the West, but what they fail to see is that this special status is not from their "animalness" but from their conferred, and partial, "humanness." Hence while both Haraway and Rudy would have us take the domesticated dog as a type of template of possible "human" and "animal" relations we would suggest that the feral cat would serve as a far better model. If we are to understand the queerness inherent in the creation of Critical Animal Studies we would suggest that beginning with "man's best friend" may not be the most unproblematic space to begin. How can we structure our ethical relations to those "animals" who are out of our control? Whom no one legally, or socially, owns? Crossing

our borders, "invading" our space, living "without papers" among us? How can we disturb the anthropological machine working on not only "humans" but also "animals?" To extend the ethical to include both "feral" humans [the immigrant, the homeless, the refugee, the orphan, the "stateless" person] and "feral" animals? These are not yet questions that animal rights, or even traditional animal studies, yet would seem to answer. But they are, we think, one that lay in the future(s) of CAS.

Those of you who have followed the development of critical/animal studies during the last decade or so will be familiar with various deployments of the work of philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. The final two papers of this issue continue this work albeit in different ways. In the fifth paper of the issue Jonathan Clark specifically adds to CAS work that evokes Foucault's notion of biopower as it may be thought in terms of the farmed animal body. Clark is concerned to understand the emergence of purported 'green' innovation in the factory farm system. In examining the multiple strands of the biopolitics of farmed animals Clark focuses on the science, commerce and administration of animal feed and nutrition as a means to try and mitigate some of the negative environmental impacts of factory farming. Large scale factory farming faces many threats to the success of its own capitalization. One such threat centers around how to manage the vast quantities of excrement produced by farmed animals and their associated eco-impacts. The productivist story began in earnest during the 20th century (though Clark is careful to point to earlier important examples) and may be viewed as a series of animal science strategies – genetics, feed science etc – for maximizing profit but retaining the viability of the animal body and to a lesser extent the environment (the former will directly impact capitalization though the latter can be externalized and forgotten about at least in the short term of this 'logic'). As Clark says as an example "the pork industry has long been aware that is it possible to maximize production without maximizing bone strength". Thus the animal body can be weakened to the extent that enough capital is yielded. Yet Clark broadens this out to focus on animal feed and regulatory attempts to limit the amount of harmful nutrients, especially phosphorus that end up in the environment. A key argument of his paper is that the eco-biopolitical management of the animal diet serves partly to absolve environmental policy

makers from arguing for biopolitical changes to the *human* diet (vegetarianism & veganism most obviously). This could be seen as a type of scapegoating where the animals themselves are seen as the causes of environmental impacts rather than the human devised system of food production. Any moral responsibility that producers and consumers may have for changing their practices is absent from the productivist and capitalist frame of this alliance between animal science and commerce. We found Clark's paper to be insightful and important, making both serious conceptual and political advances to the literature.

We turn, finally, to what is one of our favorite articles we have read in some time, Chloe Taylor's article entitled *Abnormal Appetites: Foucault, Atwood, and the Normalization of an Animal-Based Diet.* Taylor' essential argument is that, much as Foucault traced out in terms of sexuality, normalization practices equally operate in terms of diet particularly as it attempts to exclude, as abnormal, actions of vegetarians or veganism. As Taylor phrases it:

> What I would like to do in what follows is to take up these suggestive ideas from Foucault's writings on nineteenth-century psychiatry and pursue them into the present. I will argue that alimentary appetites, like sexual appetites, continue to be sites of normalization, or that how we eat is a target of what Foucault calls disciplinary power. Moreover, as I have suggested elsewhere, just as the sexual and alimentary monsters were frequently fused in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century popular imaginary, so today the abnormalities of eating and sex are often conflated, with male vegetarians in particular suspected of being "queer." The normalization of sex and eating are thus not only analogous but inter-related and mutually reinforced.

As vegans we have all had the experience: we carefully catalog and explain all the logical reasons that one might wish to avoid the eating of animals' flesh, we cite statistics, we show undercover videos, we quote United Nations reports, perhaps (in a moment of desperation) we even appeal to famous celebrities who have adopted the diet. And yet–*nothing*. Or we can't, in all fairness, say "nothing." Perhaps they try and consume "humane meat" perhaps it is "local meat" maybe they even try and eat a little less meat

("meatless Mondays!") maybe all their eggs are now labeled "free range." What does not change, what we would argue *cannot* change in a system of human chauvinism, is they *give up eating meat all together*. To do would be "crazy." To do so would be (and here we are channeling Chloe explicitly) profoundly "queer."

In a system of patriarchy, to be "queer," is far more than choice in sexual partners, it is to challenge a whole system of rights and privileges, division, and socially agreed upon understandings. Why else the closet? Why else the seemingly endless need to reinscribe the performative invisibility of the queerness such as "Don't Ask Don't Tell?" What has always seemed to be at stake is less the sexual act than what the social recognition of such act would entail. So too, we would argue, that in a system of human chauvinism, to be "vegan" is far more than a simple dietary choice. It instead has to do with a whole system of human privileges and rights, of a system of human supremacy, that such a political act begins to draw into question. What seems to matter is not the dead flesh we choose not to consume but our public act of announcing our opposition to a system of "anthroparchy" in other words, our "veganism."

What Taylor helps us to see is that, much as "queerness" before, the response of the system anthroparchy can only be to render this decision into mindless madness. We must not only be wrong—we must be *crazy*. We must suffer from the "delusion" that people are animals and that animals are people. (Taylor even informs us that there is a diagnoses for our "eating disorder"—vegan's now suffer from "orthorexia!") But not to worry. There is a "cure." Like those horror shows of "camps" to turn homosexuals "straight," we can be "cured" of our madness and our delusion by the simple act of eating meat. As Taylor phrases it in her trenchant critique of Margaret Atwood's texts:

> Various kinds of delusion that, for Atwood, seem to particularly afflict women—delusion that one is a victim, delusion that a fetus is an animal or that an animal is a child—result in vegetarianism, and vegetarianism is just a quick slide from insanity…By eating meat again, these women not only avoid becoming "freaks" or "cranks" who eat in Health Bars, they also avoid death by starvation or institutionalization in "a hospital or a zoo." In more than one case, a female character's return to eating meat also enables the reconciliation of a marriage or other heterosexual relationship.

> As Foucault argues of modernity more generally, abnormalcy in Atwood's fiction is conflated with mental illness, and abnormal appetites are indicative of pathology, while the "norms" of normalcy are political and oppressive (in this case speciesist and masculinist) though passed off as natural and inevitable. What this consideration of Atwood's fiction suggests is that Foucault's arguments about normalization are as true of alimentary appetites as they are of sexual appetites.

Taylor's piece therefore represents a perfect "bookend" of the issue. As Iveson attempted to extend Butler beyond Butler, Taylor succeeds in extending Foucault-beyond-Foucault. (The newness of what CAS is doing to all of critical theory is heady stuff indeed. As Derrida argued in *The Animal That Therefore I Am* to include the "animal question" into critical theory is not simply a matter of the "addition" of now the animal but a rethinking and rewriting of the entire genealogy of western philosophy). Moreover, what for us is so particularly intellectually invigorating, is to combine the intellectual insights of both Iveson and Taylor (and why so particularly we wanted to be able to combine them in the same issue). For Iveson, too, discussed the issue of insanity. As he phrases it

> In the first, the production of the human is based upon the death or nonexistence of the animal – the human, in other words, begins where the animal ends. In the second, the human remains in a constant struggle with his or her own animality which must be repeatedly overcome in being-human…This has extremely serious implications, insofar as it is a production which simultaneously serves to ground, in its appeal to an evolutionary *tēlos*, the reconfiguration of "other" humans *as* irrational, that is, *as* subhuman animals – be they primitives, idiots, or lunatics – in opposition to normative speciesist rationality.

The point is that when we combine the insights from Iveson and Taylor what we see is that, since the production of the human depends upon the death of the animal, in the act of renouncing the "privilege" of this death the vegan becomes inscribed as first "crazy" and then therefore herself not fully "human." [we might add in the word "monstrous"] To us, creating Soylent Green-esque vats of cloned animal flesh seems "crazy" and genetically breeding mothers to not respond to the cries of pain from their children

"monstrous." And, moreover, these insights seem fairly *prima facie*. Who hears about the suffering of animals in factory farms and thinks that the solution is just to breed animals that no longer even feel pain? Why the desire to breed cloned animal flesh even exist when a plenitude of "meat" substitutes already exist? What all of the articles (taken together) shows us is that the appeal of what we would term an actual "insanity" is its ability to perpetuate the ritualistic appeal of human dominance via animal consumption. It is not the case that the appeal of cloned animal meat is that it tastes better than any number of vegan burgers (we *strongly* doubt that it does), or that consumed farmed animals denuded of pain receptors are more "natural" then a vegan diet ('naturalness' is not the point, but exploitation may well be) or any other of a multiple of supposed reasons provided to justify a meat-centric over a vegan diet. However what such a promissory of techno-fix meat *does do* (and this is indeed the only 'appeal' we can find) would be to keep its consumers from being read as "abnormal" "queer" "crazy" –in a word "vegan." And therefore it is our greatest hope and desire, to repeat the final quotation from Taylor, that in our speciesist society we can stay "maladjusted" and continue to contest various food norms as performative of the 'human'.

Cary Wolfe, in *What is Posthumanism?* talks in some detail about the difference between the "posthuman" and "posthumanism". The "posthuman" (as defined by Wolfe) represents a scientist-esque technofix of human frailty such as, for example, human consciousness downloaded into androids bodies. While referred to, at times, as "posthuman" such views are not less humanistic but, ironically, more "humanistic" (in the sense of the Cartesian divide between body and mind) in that they render via technology the human as pure mind wholly bereft of the need for a physical body. In contrast, Wolfe wishes to articulate a vision for "posthuman*ism*" that critiques not the fragility of the human body, nor endorses the promotion of technological "fixes" for the human body, but offers a philosophical critique of the basic ideas of Cartesian dualism that underlie both humanism and "the posthuman". Likewise we have assembled these essays to suggest that a similar divide is coming in terms of the post-animal which will force us to rethink not only (but also) traditional issue of animal rights but also the traditional frameworks of critical animal studies. Will we follow the "postanimal" path of genetically modified animals who can no longer even feel pain and in vitro meat where

the animal herself has now completely been removed from the equation? Such moves are certainly "postanimal." However, we would suggest a different solution: a *postanimalities* that critiques the divide not only between the mind and the body but also the human and the animal and. In other words, our vision for the future of critical animal studies is a socially and critically engaged veganism committed to ending the anthropocentric distinction between the "so called" human and the "so called" animal.

The Other Future(s) of CAS

We chose the title The Future(s) of Critical Animal Studies for a second and, for us, a sadder reason as well. Namely, the leaving of our friend and college Richard White from the position of editor of JCAS as well as the end of the "Editorial Collective" governing structure of JCAS. We have known Richard for over five years and to be honest we simply have never known someone who we enjoyed working with or respected more. Under Richard's "direction" (a term, as an anarchist, Richard might protest against), we witnessed JCAS grow into an internationally known and respected journal consistently on the critical vanguard of animal studies. Indeed we have watched, with pleasure, as a host of new journals and sub-disciplines ["humanimal studies" "animalitity studies" etc] have grown. Far from rejecting such innovations we are glad that ever more people are considering "the animal question" (even if, at times, we are concerned about their apolitical nature) which JCAS first helped to raise. And this broader academic success can, in large part, be attributed to Richard White. Indeed, under Richard White's direction (dare we say "leadership?") we even witnessed JCAS referenced in an article from the *New York Times*. For a journal based in the most radical forms of intersectionality such mainstream acceptance has been, for us, frankly shocking. What is most remarkable is that this degree of international and mainstream acceptance came even as Richard and the collective held to the radicalness that underlies every aspect of JCAS. Under Richard and the collective, JCAS not only included academic articles but also speeches from animal rights activist, interviews, poetry, drawing and in every other form demonstrated a commitment to merging animal rights activism and critical theory. However, what we most admired, and will miss, is simply Richard as a person. As a true and functioning radical collective we had to interact with Richard on a nearly daily basis.

And we, without exception, found Richard to be kind, patient, ever helpful, thoughtful and erudite in his responses: a "leadership" (and now you see why we gravitate towards that word) in the best anarchist sense—based on personal care and competence instead of arbitrary hierarchical ideals. Likewise, with the leaving of Richard form the journal, we must also note the leaving of several other people from the journal including Matthew Cole and Richard Twine. All of them have been key in creating JCAS, all of them are irreplaceable, and all of the will be deeply missed. As a "collective" we achieved more than the sum of our parts and it was our dynamic synergy, our long drawn out multilayered and palimpsest debate on the future(s) of CAS which never, directly, saw the light of day that underpinned our remarkable success.

However, at the same time as we are sorry to lose so many of our comrades in the journal, we are glad that John Sorenson (Brock University) has agreed to take over as the new "Editor-in-Chief" (a position which previously did not exist). John was our, mutual, first choice to take over the editorship of the journal and we cannot think of anyone to take over who could better uphold the ideals for which Richard White and the Collective fought. For John, too, displays this same ethical commitment to merging animal activism and academic research, this same commitment to intersectional and revolutionary analysis, and this same vision that is both resolutely anti-speciesist and anti-classist. However, what most draws us to John is, again, him as a person and the way that he responds to everyone regardless of what position they may, or may not, hold in or out of the academy with the same kindness, thoughtfulness, and respectfulness that were the hallmark of the editorial collective style pioneered by Richard White. And John will be assisted by many of our closest friends who are continuing on with the journal, such Carol Glasser and Adam Weitzenfeld who will serve as the book and film editors for the journal. [We know particularly how difficult a position this represents as it was one we held for several years before joining the collective.] And Susan Thompson and Vasile Stanescu who will continue with the journal as "Associate Editors." With a certain degree of sadness and nostalgia, we (collectively) hand over JCAS to everyone (both incoming and continuing) who are taking over JCAS with equal measure of excitement towards where they will help to bring the future(s) of Critical Animal Studies—perhaps even to a place beyond the "so-called" animal herself.

Domestic Scenes and Species Trouble - On Judith Butler and Other Animals

Richard Iveson[1]

Abstract

In this paper I seek to illuminate the obscure region within which other animals dwell in the philosophy of Judith Butler and, in so doing, demonstrate why the inclusion of nonhuman animals is fundamental to the ethical domain, as without it the normative privileging of the white Western heterosexual human male is inevitably reinforced. Through a critical engagement with Butler's work, it soon becomes clear that the constitution of the human subject in fact depends upon the inculcation of a normative network of 'killing ideals' that excludes animals, women, and people of color. In contrast to Butler, however, I argue that 'the human' is never the simple effect of regulatory reproductive power, but rather that 'humanness' is itself a regulatory norm—a norm, moreover, through which all other norms must pass in order to reproduce themselves as 'natural.' As a result, I argue, ethical responsibility demands that an 'I' open its self to the risk of being judged socially non-viable and thus nonhuman. To respond ethically, in other words, necessarily entails the risk of becoming-unrecognisable within structures of meaning reproducing viable ways of being, as exemplified here by the life—and untimely death—of Venus Xtravaganza.

Keywords: animals; performativity; nonhuman ethics; transgender sexuality; queer theory; intersectionality.

Introduction: Crossing out the Animals

In the film *Paris is Burning* (1990), director and producer Jennie Livingston vividly documents the Harlem drag balls between 1987 and 1989, in which African-American and

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Latino men compete in a variety of categories such as "executive," "schoolboy/girl," and "town and country," all of which are judged according to the single criterion of "realness." One of the balls' participants defines this as the attempt to become "a real woman, or a real man – a *straight* man" – by "erasing all the flaws, the mistakes." "Realness" in this context thus rests on an ability to "pass" as "the real thing," that is, the ability to attain a certain believability through the reiteration of various social norms that together produce the *effect* of naturalness. At the same time, however, the very possibility of passing *as* real, that is, of artfully reconstituting an apparently natural effect, inevitably serves to *de*naturalize those very same norms which otherwise compel belief and thus apportion "realness." It is here, at this intersection of the natural and the unnatural, of the real and the artificial, that the figure of Venus Xtravaganza emerges as a compelling focal point of what is a problematic but nonetheless fascinating film.[1]

A light-skinned Latina who "passes" as both white and female, Venus desires above all a comfortable white domesticity. White girls, she says, get everything they want. For Venus, the only way of accessing this idealized domestic scene is by transforming herself into a "complete" woman: "I want a car, I want to be with the man I love, I want a nice home, away from New York where no one knows me [i.e., in middle-class white suburbia]. I want my sex-change. I want to get married in church in white." It is not enough, in other words, for Venus to pass as white and female only at the Harlem balls. Rather, if this domestic ideal is to be realized, she must be able to pass all the time and in the most intimate of situations. This desire to be, and to desire the desires of, a wealthy white heterosexual woman is precisely the desire not to be excluded as foreign or unnatural. A passionate yet mundane desire that contrasts shockingly with the revelation of her murder as an addendum to the film.

As a prostitute presumably killed by a male client upon discovery of her male sexual organs, Venus is thus murdered for her supplemental "incompleteness," for the foreignness that has always already invaded both the dream of the domestic and the domestic itself, the manifestation of which puts at risk her viability as a human being at the hands of a patriarchal order. Indeed, it is by no means incidental that her strangled body was eventually discovered stuffed *under* a bed – the place of an animal – in a cheap hotel room. Her murder thus all too clearly bears on the gap between the phantasmatic "realness" performed during the balls, and the equally phantasmatic morphological ideal produced by the inculcation of hegemonic norms within society at large.

In order to better understand this process by which hegemonic norms either constitute, or refuse, a certain effect of "realness," the *oeuvre* of feminist philosopher Judith Butler is indispensible. Moreover, her core notion of *performativity* offers much for the emerging domain of Critical Animal Studies. Despite this, however, her work has been largely overlooked in this area – in the main, I believe, due to the erroneous belief that performativity refers only to human verbal language, leading many to dismiss it as some sort of linguistic constructionism which therefore ignores all "natural" material and biological strata.[2] Given that the opposite is in fact the case, I hope the following goes some way toward rectifying this error.

Having said this, however, Butler's own ambivalence regarding the place, or otherwise, of nonhuman animals does not make this task any easier. The aim of this paper is thus twofold: first, to illuminate this obscure region in which other animals dwell within Butler's philosophy and, second, to thereafter further elucidate how the reproduction of "killing ideals" function to deny the humanness of Venus Xtravaganza and, in so doing, open the space for an apparently "morally legitimate" putting to death. In this, we will also see why, in any critical engagement with the so-called "question of the animal," *humanness* too must be put into question, as only then does it become possible to understand how speciesism – marked fundamentally by the *killing*, rather than the *murder*, of nonhuman animals – forms the excluded support of myriad other structural exclusions, from racism and sexism to homophobia and classism.

I begin by considering Butler's important early text *Bodies That Matter* (1993), in which she lays out her political philosophy of the performative. Therein, Butler argues that the apparently "free" subject of secular humanism is rather the result of a regulatory network of inculcation which – by way of various "phantasmatic" ideals that serve to exclude women, people of color, and the poor – thus ensures the continuing hegemonic privilege of the white "Western" heterosexual male. Butler's list of constitutive exclusions, however, is *itself* marked by exclusion, that is, by the exclusion of nonhuman animals. Indeed, this exclusion is made all the more ironic insofar as it is in large part thanks to the theoretical interventions of Butler, among others, that we now find ourselves in a position to recognize that the critical reinscription of nonhuman animals within those very places where admittance has thus far been refused is absolutely crucial if we are to transform the current regime of exploitation.[3]

To this end, I focus throughout on the contestation of one particular claim, initially proposed by Butler in *Bodies That Matter* and reiterated in a number of later texts: that the "human," being neither substance nor specie, is simply the aggregate *effect* of regulatory reproductive power. Against this, I argue that "the human" is never a cumulatory effect, but it is rather that "*humanness*" is itself a regulatory norm constituted through species difference, just as "whiteness," for example, is a regulatory norm constituted through racial difference. "Humanness," moreover, is a norm through which all other norms – of race, gender, class, sexuality, and so on – must pass in order to reproduce themselves as "natural." Think, for example, of the privileged sexuality accorded to the ideal of "whiteness" so desired by Venus Xtravaganza, a privilege that can never be fully understood without recognising the concomitant displacement that shifts *non*white sexuality toward "animality." Only then can we understand the fatal "crossings" performed by Venus, and only with this understanding might we thenceforth begin to dismantle the racist, sexist, and speciesist network of privilege that resulted in her death. While a redress of this exclusion clearly points to the importance of thinking (with) animals for radical thought, it should also be noted from the outset that, in a very real sense, Butler herself calls for the clarifications contained herein, as we shall see when considering the ever-increasing ambivalence toward other animals that marks her later texts. As such, this paper is itself ambivalently positioned somewhere between critique and dutiful response.

Phantasms, the Human-effect, and Ineffectual Animals

To begin, it is necessary first of all to understand the process by which "phantasmatic ideals," imposed by the reiteration of regulatory norms, come to be naturalized. Take, for example, the *activity* of gendering. As Butler explains in *Bodies That Matter*, such an activity both precedes the willing subject of the secular humanist tradition, and is at once "the matrix through which all willing first becomes possible" (1993: 7). Consider, she continues, the medical interpellation which –

> shifts an infant from an "it" to a "she" or a "he," and in that naming, the girl is "girled," brought into the domain of language and kinship through the interpellation of gender. But that "girling" of the girl does not end there; on the contrary, that founding interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and throughout various intervals of time to reinforce or contest this naturalized effect.

> The naming is at once the setting of a boundary, and also the repeated inculcation of a norm (1993: 7-8).

The subject, according to Butler, is the singular yet ventriloquized nexus of a network of such inculcations, constituted in the intersection of various phantasmatic ideals reproduced by regulatory norms with the result that the very materiality of the body "will not be thinkable" apart from the materializ*ation* of these norms (1993: 2). Furthermore, each of these norms "require and deploy each other for the purpose of their own articulation" (1993: 18). Hence, the practice of gendering, to stay with Butler's example, requires that it simultaneously deploy racialising and heterosexualizing practices. Mutually supporting, there exist no independently articulated norms but only imbricated "hegemonies of oppression" (1993: 132). As a result,

> [a] convergent set of historical formations of racialized gender, of gendered race, of the sexualization of racial ideals, or the racialization of gender norms, makes up both the social regulation of sexuality and its psychic articulations. … Hence, it is no longer possible to make sexual difference prior to racial difference or, for that matter, to make them into fully separable axes of social regulation and power (1993: 181-2).

In short, reiterated practice is productive power: "the power to produce – demarcate, circulate, differentiate – the bodies it controls" (1993: 1). It is this regulatory activity which, insofar as it both precedes and enables the materialization of the willing subject, leads Butler to claim that "the matrix of gender relations is *prior to* the emergence of the 'human'" (1993: 7, emphasis added). The "human," by contrast, is merely the aggregate *effect* of regulatory reproductive power. It is here, however, that Butler's analysis loses its cohesion, in that such a claim actually effaces the relations of power it seeks otherwise to disclose.

It is rather the case, as Butler in fact gestures toward in her discussion of Plato's *khōra*, that "humanness" is itself a regulatory norm, a reiterated practice of *human-ing* which similarly requires and deploys every other norm for the purpose of its own articulation. Hence, equally important in the discussion of gendering activity is the imperative to also consider – and not as something external or separate – that "other" matrix through which the majority of nonhuman animals are rather *refused* that shift to gendered being. Only once consideration is extended in this way does it become possible to understand the meshed machinery that opens the possibility of a *refusal* or *withdrawal* of gender, and which at the same time necessarily relegates the "improperly" gendered human being to the status of an animal. Hence, only

when "humanness" is understood as a regulatory norm imposing murderous, phantasmatic ideals through the mechanism of species difference can we understand the enactment of the specific withdrawal or withholding of recognition from Venus Xtravaganza, a withdrawal which ultimately serves to neutralize the subversiveness of her "crossing."

In practice, the naturalization of speciesism in Butler's text both traces and effaces an unmarked-but-marking receptacle through which all other norms must pass – an effacement that serves precisely to *produce* this apparent effect of "the human." This is not, however, to make species difference prior to, or more fundamental than, sexual, racial, or any other regulatory difference. Rather, as we shall see, species difference serves to "ground" all the other norms at the same time as it is reciprocally "grounded" by them. For this reason, it is necessary to extend Butler's convergent sets of historical formations beyond the imbrication of gender, sexuality, and race, so as to include such convergent sets as the animalization of racialized gender, the racialization of human norms, the normative sexualization of animality, and so on. Indeed, unless we attend to this imbrication of a speciesist reproduction of difference along and within racist, sexist, homophobic, and classist norms, those "hegemonies of oppression" which critical discourse seeks to challenge may instead be unwittingly reenforced.

While Butler does subsequently touch upon the mechanism of negative displacement whereby a targetted human or human grouping is "relegated" to animal status, her repeated invocation of the human as an aggregate effect ensures that the economy undergirding this displacement remains frustratingly obscure. Thus in *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* from 2004, Butler once again claims that "there are racial and ethnic frames by which the recognizably human is currently *constituted*" (2006: 90, emphasis added), while simultaneously arguing that it is imperative that we ask how "the human" works, "what it forecloses, and what it sometimes opens up" (2006: 89). Indeed, on occasion Butler even refers to a "norm of humanness" (2006: 98), acknowledging too that the reproduction of the "enemy" as "less than human" involves "a reduction of these human beings to animal status" (2006: 78). Butler, however, all too quickly glides over this issue, one result of which being that her analysis of the mechanism by which those illegally imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay come to be constituted as "dangerous" remains – like her analysis of the murder of Venus Xtravaganza – necessarily incomplete.

Similarly, in her recent book *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* (2009), Butler yet again writes of the "the civilizational and racial norms by which the human is constituted" (2010: 93). Nevertheless, by now the specter of the excluded animal is increasingly making its (non)presence felt from within the margins of her discourse. Butler acknowledges, for example, that "there is no firm way to distinguish in absolute terms the *bios* of the animal from the *bios* of the human animal" (2010: 19). This fundamental insight is immediately disqualified, however, insofar as Butler concludes from this only that "animality" is therefore "a precondition of the human" (2010: 19). With this, she thus reinstitutes the very distinction just dismissed as untenable in that, given that the human has animality as its *pre*-condition, its animal status is therefore that which is *transcended* in becoming human, an event synonymous with the emergence of the human into the realm of pervasive social relations that form its actual, and thus exceptional, conditions. Put simply, Butler is here reiterating a central tenet of humanist dogma in claiming that the human comes to be only in transcending the state of (animal) nature.

Ultimately, the vacillation between aggregate effect and constitutive norm reveals itself in the uncertainty with which Butler views her own theoretical position, as when she states in *Precarious Life* that "I may seem to be positing a new basis for humanism. That might be true, but I am prone to consider this differently" (2006: 42). This hesitancy, put simply, can only be resolved by recognizing as fundamental the place and status of nonhuman animals. In order to fully appreciate the stakes involved, it is necessary to return once more to the founding principles as laid down in *Bodies That Matter*.

To begin with, insofar as Butler refuses to think with nonhuman animals, she is thus compelled to invoke the empty yet foreclosed domain of "the *in*human" as the constitutive outside of the human, an invocation that remains more or less constant throughout her work.[4] Instead of a simple and narcissistic reversal, however, it is rather the indecipherable *non*human animal, traditionally synonymous with irrationality, with dumb nature, with the *alogon*, who haunts the boundaries of the properly human "as the persistent possibility of their disruption and rearticulation" in both producing and threatening "the more and the less 'human'" (1993: 8). This latter, it is clear, requires some sort of continuum that the inhuman simply cannot provide. Indeed, particularly telling in this regard is Butler's later claim that once a body is produced as less than human, and is thus no longer apprehended as a "life," the *murder* of such a body can thereafter never take place (2006: 147). Put simply, killing ceases

to be murder only when the murder involves a "mere" animal – the "enemy" to be slaughtered may indeed be figured as "inhuman," but it is always as animals that they are killed.

This becomes even clearer when we consider Butler's claim that "the examples of those abjected beings who do not appear properly gendered" serve to demonstrate that "it is their very humanness that comes into question" (1993: 8). This is indeed a crucial point. However, if the human is only ever the result or *effect* of the appellation and inculcation of gender and other norms, as Butler also claims, then an improperly gendered being (as cause) can never in fact result in the effect of humanness, meaning therefore that humanness can neither be *questioned* nor *withdrawn*, neither allocated nor retracted, degraded nor elevated, in that such a body can never have *appeared* human in the first place.

Rather, it is only once we realize that "humanness" is also a regulatory norm which, through the inculcation of viable ways of being, reproduces itself by way of the constitutive outside of "the animal," that the coincidence of improper gender and questionable humanity can be understood. Similarly, it is only by way of the constituted opposition between the human and the animal that we can understand, and thus question, the sexualization mutually articulated by the "killing ideals" (1993: 125) of race, for example, as with the privileged sexuality accorded to the ideal of whiteness as noted above.

In her introduction to *Bodies That Matter*, it might seem that Butler in fact pre-empts just this criticism when she states that "any analysis which foregrounds one vector of power over another will doubtless become vulnerable to criticisms that it not only ignores or devalues the others, but that its own constructions depend on the exclusion of the others in order to proceed" (1993: 18). She then counters this future criticism with the point that "any analysis which pretends to be able to encompass every vector of power runs the risk of a certain epistemological imperialism which consists in the presupposition that any given writer might fully stand for and explain the complexities of contemporary power. … [T]hose who claim to offer such pictures become suspect by virtue of that very claim" (1993: 18-19). Here, however, I make no such claims to certainty and/or completeness, but aim only to demonstrate that, if one wishes to even *begin* to approach the complexities of contemporary power, one cannot *not* include the question of speciesism, the inscription as excluded of nonhuman animals being necessarily indissociable from gendering, racialising, and sexualising activities. Indeed, Butler herself cannot continue without recourse to the animal, and it is this which raises the ambivalence that threatens to explode her discourse from within.

The animal, in other words, is essential to the hierarchical functioning of "the more and the less," in that "the animal" is always the least of the less, the negative pole to be transcended – more and less – along a humanist teleology which reaches its apotheosis in the phantasmatic ideal of the white human male. Only once this is recognized does it then become possible to understand how the machinations of power legitimize the slaughter of human animals by way of the prior "animalization" of a specifically targetted human or human grouping, a reconfiguration that strips its target of a fully human status and, in so doing, constitutes a non-subject that can thereafter be killed with impunity. One thinks here of the Nazi demonisation of Jews as *Saujuden* ("Jewish swine"), or again of Lynndie England parading around Abu Ghraib with an Iraqi prisoner on a dog leash. Indeed, to reduce a singular, nonsubstitutable living being to an essential identity which is in turn reconfigured as "animal" is precisely the process that Butler describes as the reductive imposition of an *unlivable* identity.

Ultimately, the complex differential articulation of regulatory norms necessarily constitutes women, people of colour, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transsexuals, the poor, and so forth, as "more" and "less" human, and thus at once as "more" and "less" animal. The naturalization of heterosexuality, for example, depends upon the normative sexualization of animality (paradoxically utilising an unremarked biological continuism). Or again, the alleged mis*andry* of the lesbian – in which "a lesbian is one who must have had a bad experience with men, or who has not yet found the right one" (1993: 127) – crosses with the alleged mis*anthropy* attributed to anyone concerned with the exploitation, torture and extermination of nonhuman animals (animal activists, it is invariably alleged, must hate humans as a result of social deficiency). Following Butler, such diagnoses presume, on the one hand, that lesbianism "is acquired by virtue of some failure in the heterosexual machinery, thereby continuing to install heterosexuality as the 'cause' of lesbian desire" (1993: 127) and, on the other, that animal concern is acquired by virtue of some failure in the machinery of anthropocentrism, thereby continuing to install human exceptionalism as the "cause" of animal concern. One thinks here, for example, of love for a nonhuman companion animal being reconstrued as deflected desire for a (human) child.

In this way, both humanist and heterosexual desire are thus always constructed as "true," whereas animal concern and lesbianism are "always and only a mask and forever false" (1993: 127). Within this economy too is found the reactive subordination in which

concern for nonhuman suffering is deemed offensive to man – as degrading to both his exceptionality and his interiority – and dismissed as an immoral deflection of "more pressing" human concerns. Here then, one can clearly perceive the importance of critical animal studies in that, by way of its central notion of intersectionality, it thus seeks to challenge the "hegemonies of oppression" in all of its articulations.

We should not be surprised, therefore, that in Butler's text the displacement and denigration of species difference to that of a mere "effect" has serious consequences – as acknowledged by Butler herself, albeit only negatively in the context of *sexual* difference. It is the claim of a fundamental priority for sexual difference over racial difference which, she writes,

> has marked so much psychoanalytic feminism as white, for the assumption here is not only that sexual difference is more fundamental, but that there is a relationship called "sexual difference" that is itself unmarked by race. That whiteness is not understood by such a perspective as a racial category is clear; *it is yet another power that need not speak its name*. Hence, to claim that sexual difference is more fundamental than racial difference is effectively to assume that sexual difference is white sexual difference, and that whiteness is not a form of racial difference (1993: 181-2, emphasis added).

In the same way therefore, to claim an equal and fundamental primacy of human differences presupposes that the relationships named in this way are themselves unmarked by species, thus effectively assuming that sexual and racial differences are *human* sexual and racial differences, and that humanness is not a form of species difference. It is to assume, in other words, that the constitution of "the more or the less" human (and simultaneously of "the more or the less" animal) is itself unmarked by racial and sexual differences. In short, the humanist ideals of the "West" are assumed to be prior to, and thus untouched by, racial, sexual, and species differences – an assumption which, as we will see in the next part, thus reiterates the Platonic economy of xenophobic masculinist reason. We can also see that Butler's attempt to preempt criticism by way of the impossibility of completeness does not, by virtue of her own logic, apply here.

The Foreign in Place and the Madness of Power

The stakes of this exclusive operation are disclosed most clearly by Butler herself in her critique of Luce Irigaray's reading of the *khōra* in Plato's *Timaeus* (not by chance the only

place in *Bodies That Matter* where, to my knowledge, Butler attends – if only briefly – to nonhuman others). Whereas Irigaray identifies the "elsewhere" of the *khōra* with the founding exclusion of the feminine, Butler points out that Irigaray must therefore exclude all those "other" others similarly excluded from the economy of masculinist reason:

> Plato's scenography of intelligibility depends on the exclusion of women, slaves, children, and animals, where slaves are characterized as those who do not speak his language, and who, in not speaking his language, are considered diminished in their capacity for reason. … This domain of the less than rational human bounds the figure of human reason, producing that "man" as one who is without a childhood; is not a primate and so is relieved of the necessity of eating, defecating, living and dying; one who is not a slave, but always a property holder; one whose language remains originary and untranslatable (1993: 48).

For Plato, as Butler makes clear, it is the speechless – and thus irrational – being who must be excluded in crafting the "imaginary morphology" of masculinist reason. In this, the dumb animal – embodied, enslaved, and without property – is thus the utterly other, the absolute outsider. The spectre, in other words, of an indecipherable and unmasterable materiality, a dreadful eating, dying, living, and defecating unintelligibility. Terrifying, monstrous, "the animal" never stands before "the human" in the relation of a simple *reversal* of intelligibility (i.e., as the inhuman), but rather marks its very limit and, as such, constitutes the site of a terrifying potential identity which, in being imposed, ultimately renders the Other both indecipherable (and thus outside of "civilized" sociality) *and* monstrous (and thus outside of "the human").

In this way, the undecidable limit that is "the animal" falls back upon those "other" human animals, an economy indissociable from the constitution of the property of the liberal humanist subject. Thus, while Butler points out that the "materialization of reason … operates through the dematerialization of other bodies," the feminine being that which is itself undifferentiated but which contributes to the contouring of things (1993: 49), the figure of the abject nonsubject without which this dematerialization could not be reproduced rather remains always that of "the animal" as undifferentiated Nature. It is this, moreover, which always again reserves the potential to animalize "other" humans and thus render them killable or, in Butler's terms, nonliving and thus non-grievable.

Here, it is essential to attend to the crucial distinction between the two teleological determinations that figure the dominant metaphysical forms of the human-animal relation.[5] In

the first, the production of the human is based upon the death or nonexistence of the animal – the human, in other words, begins where the animal ends. In the second, the human remains in a constant struggle with his or her own animality which must be repeatedly overcome in being-human. Both of these determinations, it should be noted right away, thus fallaciously define the nonhuman animal only by what he or she lacks within a dialectic that therefore marks every nonhuman animal as sub-*human* – a dialectic which, as we have already seen, Butler reiterates insofar as she makes animality a precondition of humanity. This has extremely serious implications, insofar as it is a production which simultaneously serves to ground, in its appeal to an evolutionary *tēlos*, the reconfiguration of "other" humans *as* irrational, that is, *as* subhuman animals – be they primitives, idiots, or lunatics – in opposition to normative speciesist rationality.

This mention of primitive idiocy or subhuman lunacy thus brings us into the vicinity, the proximity, of madness, and here too we share our concerns with Butler. However, it is the animal, even more than the idiot (with whom the animal nonetheless retains an intimate relation), who points to a privative relation to language. In her examination of stupidity, philosopher Avital Ronell describes the idiot as a being who "unleash[es] only muffled signals of original erasure" (2003: 253). Yet, there can be no idiot without the animal who, with her alleged lack of language and thus ontological memory disorder, is the most idiotic of idiots, the constitutive outside of reason and thus also of idiocy – the idiot representing a deprived relation *to* language, rather than a deprivation *of* language. Hence, it is not idiocy, as Ronell contends, but rather the animal who fallaciously "commences in disfigurement, as the mutilation over which the philosophers tried to write in an attempt to restore the proper, the literal, what is proper to man" (2003: 253). The notion of idiocy, of the subnormal or subhuman, thus employs regulatory norms constituted through species difference in ways that mutually articulate other regulatory norms such as "whiteness" and "maleness." Think, for example, of the institution of racialized Intelligence Quotient tests as a method of regulating immigration into the US, the application of which being so designed as to ensure that a high percentage of nonwhite, non-European applicants would register at the "moron," "imbecile," or "idiot" levels – categories in turn overdetermined with notions of overt and perverse sexualization, including incest and bestiality, resulting from an alleged animal primitiveness that supposedly leaves people of color at the mercy of their "uncivilized" drives.[6]

Outside, yet undecidably so, of the exclusive property of the human, the absolute idiocy of the instinct-driven animal – the irrationality of the beast – thus relates at once to the domain of the domestic, to "animal" reproduction and to the foreigner who contaminates that properly civilized domesticity. The xenophobic Platonic exclusion, writes Butler, operates through the reproduction of "those considered less rational by virtue of their appointed task in the process of laboring to reproduce the conditions of private life" (1993: 49). Here, Butler thus draws attention to the animalization of both reproductive and domestic labour. In the former category, we find the exclusion from masculinist reason of women thus confined within the domain of the domestic figured by the "animality" of reproduction. In the latter, masculinist reason excludes all those other beings who, outside *within* the domestic, are thus construed as foreign to reason, i.e., slaves, immigrant workers, and children, as well as certain other so-called "food" and "working" animals. Labouring only to reproduce the same of masculinist reason – albeit without leaving their mark – , the twinned categories of the domestic and the domesticated are thus, by way of nonhuman animals, constituted as that which improperly and unintelligibly reside within the domain of the properly human precisely as the condition of its reproduction.

As we have seen, the unintelligible animal marks the constitutive outside of the human norm, and thus the site of an identification which, when *externally* imposed, is always to be dreaded.[7] At the same time, however, the animal must remain within the properly human as the trace of "its" denial. Animals remain, in other words, as the foreign residing within human property, inscribed as excluded within the uniform and calculable reproduction of the Same. Already within the domestic scene through which the human is reproduced, "man" has no choice but to share his home, his place, with "the animal" and, indeed, with other animals. Exceeding all recognition and yet sharing our space and taking our time, animals are thus the most distant in the closest proximity: the always with us that are not "us."

It is for this reason that the question of ethics must *begin* with nonhuman animals. In part, I would suggest, Butler is ultimately unable to fully articulate the normative mechanism of exclusion as a result of the influence of Emmanuel Levinas's ethical humanist philosophy on her own thought subsequent to *Bodies That Matter*.[8] The problem, as I see it, rests with the fact that Levinas limits his thought to the two poles of humanization and dehumanization, when it is only by admitting the "animal" that critical thinking stands a chance to interrupt the

process by which life is withdrawn from the living. It is here, in this indecipherable domain, where we will discover those beings to whom, and perhaps first of all, we owe a responsibility and a response to the shared precarity that marks the community of the living *in general*. It is, in short, to affirm our being-together outside of any exclusive hierarchy by which the value of other beings is unthinkingly rejected and abjected, and thus to resist as far as possible the imposed violence of the subject-formation that necessarily precedes every "I." By contrast, an ethics which presupposes "the human" as at once its condition, effect, and unmarked category is an error which in practice ensures that ethics can never begin.

Crossing out the human: Venus, the slaughter of an animal body

Having understood the necessity of "admitting" other animals within the ethical domain, we are now in a position to reconsider the mechanism through which the death of Venus Xtravaganza is articulated.

In essence, the murder of Venus Xtravanganza offers to view a "limit case" of the human and, in so doing, renders perceptible the otherwise habitual hegemonic operation of normative frames. As Butler writes, this is a "killing that is performed by a symbolic that would eradicate those phenomena that require an opening up of the possibilities for the resignification of sex" (1993: 131). Nevertheless, it is never *only* a question of sexuality:

> If Venus wants to become a woman, and cannot overcome being a Latina, then Venus is treated by the symbolic in precisely the ways in which women of color are treated. Her death thus testifies to a tragic misreading of the social map of power, a misreading orchestrated by that very map according to which the sites for a phantasmatic self-overcoming are constantly resolved into disappointment. If the signifiers of whiteness and femaleness – as well as some forms of hegemonic maleness constructed through class privilege – are sites of phantasmatic promise, then it is clear that women of color and lesbians are not only everywhere excluded from this scene, but constitute a site of identification that is consistently refused and abjected in the collective phantasmatic pursuit of a transubstantiation into various forms of drag, transsexualism, and uncritical miming of the hegemonic (1993: 131).

For the reasons already discussed, Butler thus leaves unmarked the question of what constitutes viable ways of being *human*. However, given the mutual articulation of regulatory norms, the de-naturalization of both race and gender enacted by Venus must at once de-

naturalize the constructed domain of the properly human. Paradoxically, Venus here falls prey to the murderous judgment, both homophobic *and* misogynistic, of "*un*naturalness" (of being a "freak of nature"), which thus falls back upon an unremarked biological continuism. As we know, the naturalization of human heterosexuality depends upon the normative sexualization of animality (long used by men to excuse anything from rape to hunting), hence the exclusion of homosexuality from the activity of "human-ing" moves by way of a constructed "unnaturalness" that depends upon an apparently "natural" human animality or, rather, upon the reproduction of sexual activity as essentially *animal*, and thus in a sense not "human" at all.

The reproduction of Venus as "unnatural," in other words, paradoxically depends upon her exceptional humanness so as to withdraw from her that very status of "humanness." At the same time, however, the conservative judgment which ends with her murder-slaughter depends equally upon a human-animal distinction which *denies* to humans another putatively "natural" animal sexual and reproductive activity, that of the potential retained by certain nonhuman animals to change their "biological" sexuality so as to gain social advantage. In this way, Venus Xtravanganza finds herself doubly displaced between the "naturalness" and the exceptionalism of "the human."

Venus is thus murdered for both her unnaturalness *and* her animality, an "unnatural animality" which fatally crosses with white, masculinist notions of her being a prostitute and both (and neither) a Latina and a woman. In potentially putting into question what it means to be properly human and, consequently, properly *animal*, Venus – described by her House mother as being too *wild*, as always taking too many risks – thus at once risks performing an abject and "unnatural animality" which, displacing her inside the "outside" of the human domain, withdraws from her all human rights and protections. As Butler writes,

> The painfulness of her death at the end of the film suggests as well that there are cruel and fatal social constraints on denaturalization. As much as she crosses gender, sexuality, and race performatively, the hegemony that reinscribes the privileges of normative femininity and whiteness wields the final power to *re*naturalize Venus's body and cross out that prior crossing, an erasure that is her death (1993: 133).

Such a displacing renaturalization, however, one which moves Venus from unequal sexual partner to dead animal stuffed under a bed, cannot be performed by the constituted abjection

of race and sexuality alone. Rather, its "crossing-out of the crossing" must simultaneously cross, must pass through and cross out, the nonhuman animal.

Becoming-unrecognisable: challenging frames

Insofar as the various regulatory norms all deploy each other for the purpose of their own articulations, putting "humanness" into question necesarily poses a challenge to the entire network of hegemonic oppression – a question which is nothing less than the question of *recognition*. However, in thus exposing one's being to the unintelligible outside in such a way as to interrupt the conservative machinery of recognition, in that very same moment the body necessarily undergoes the profound risk of becoming *un*recognizable. To affirm one's kinship with that which hegemonic norms habitually foreclose is, in other words, to risk the withdrawal not only of a viable subject status, but also the withdrawal of one's race or gender, one's class or sexuality, even one's membership of a species – a withdrawal that marks the effective neutralization of any such "crossing" within and by a given state of affairs.

Regulatory practices, in that they are necessarily aimed both *at* everyone and *to* no one (there being no preexisting subject of will), are thus general, structural, and therefore recurrent, requiring endless reiteration in order to naturalize their power and efficacy. Yet that which guarantees the ongoing efficacy of such regulation – that is, the recontextualization that defines its *practice* – is also that which already undermines it, insofar as the very excess of this iterability ensures that the context of an utterance is never fully determined. Put simply, every reiteration of a norm, in being repeatedly forced to function in a different context, inevitably brings with it the risk of misinterpretation and revaluation resulting in an "improper" inscription. This risk, moreover, is further compounded by its mutual deployment of other norms, which always presupposes the possibility of a radical interference. It is this *structural* excess which thus opens up the possibility of challenging the normative framework insofar as its reproduction always runs the risk of a violent, unforeseeable transformation.

In being always *subject* to recognition, therefore, the singularity of any given interpellation necessarily retains the potential to put to work otherwise the machinery of materiality, violating the proper limit of identification and opening instead the ethical space called for by an encounter that challenges the frames of recognizability. Such then, is the site

of the bodying of Venus Xtravaganza, a "limit case" that allows us to recognize and thus move beyond the nomative framework insofar as she denaturalizes the founding-conserving network of regulatory norms. As such, however, the already existing state of affairs is for the same reason compelled to seek its neutralization – a neutralization that always involves the refusal or withdrawal of the rights and protections of personhood.

Hence, in placing oneself outside of a given state of affairs, one simultaneously places one's self at risk. As Butler says in her reading of Michel Foucault from *Giving an Account of Oneself*,

> To call into question a regime of truth, where that regime of truth governs subjectivation, is to call into question the truth of myself … [It also] involves putting oneself at risk, imperiling the very possibility of being recognized by others, since to question the norms of recognition that govern what I might be, to ask what they leave out, what they might be compelled to accommodate, is, in relation to the present regime, to risk unrecognizability as a subject or at least to become an occasion for posing the questions of who one is (or can be) and whether or not one is recognizable (2005: 22-3).

This risk, moreover, not only concerns the refusal or withdrawal of recognition by society at large, but it is also to risk becoming unrecognizable to *oneself*. At its extreme, one finds oneself incapable of continuing to exist and thus risks falling prey to enforced cessation, be it suicidal or murderous. Being responsible, argues Butler, is to open oneself to this risk. Indeed, this is precisely what it means to *respond*.

Following Butler then, the ethical imperative concerns those unrecognizable others who already take place within our most intimate property and to whom we must respond no matter the risk to our selves. In *contrast* to Butler's position, however, such an imperative must remain excessively and vigilantly *non*human, as a brief consideration of the concluding paragraph of Butler's *Giving an Account of Oneself* makes clear. Here, Butler offers an important and succinct description of the ethical imperative. Ethics, she writes,

> requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of unknowingness … To be undone by another is a primary necessity, an anguish, to be sure, but also a chance – to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be moved, to be prompted to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the self-sufficient "I" as a kind of possession. If we speak and try to give an account from this place, we will not be irresponsible, or, if we are, we will surely be forgiven (2005: 136).

The problem, however, lies hidden behind that innocent-looking ellipsis in the first line, wherein Butler qualifies that such risky moments – moments "when what forms us diverges

from what lies before us" – are specifically those moments "when our willingness to become undone in relation to others constitutes *our chance of becoming human*" (2005: 136, emphasis added). Such encounters, in short, are the proper and the property of human animals alone. However, if the human is simply a cumulative effect of intersecting praxes of power, as Butler contends, how then can ethics be restricted to the level of effect? Rather, I argue, "the human" is precisely what the ethical encounter tears apart.

In fact, Butler here opens herself to the very same critique which, as mentioned above, she levels at Luce Irigaray in *Bodies That Matter*. Irigaray, we recall, idealizes and apropriates "the 'elsewhere' as the feminine," and in so doing "fails to follow through the metonymic link between women and these other Others" (1993: 49). Here then, the question Butler poses to Irigaray must in turn be posed to Butler herself: what or who is the "elsewhere" of Butler's "elsewhere"? What or who is excluded in the course of Butler analysis? Given her idealization and appropriation of the "elsewhere" that are "moments of unknowingness" as the uniquely human, the answer is all too obvious. But in what sense, it must be asked, can a properly human ethics authentically constitute an ethics of the unrecognisable other, that is, an address that risks forming and transforming an "I" outside of all dominant structures of meaning?

If ethics is the becoming of the human, then the human is simply an animal + ethics, whereas "other" animals are therefore pure or simple being without supplement – ontologically deprived of ethics and thus essentially outside of the ethical domain. In this, Butler simply repeats Emmanuel Levinas's very traditional claim that the "ethical peculiarities" that determine the humanity of man constitute "a rupture of being" – that is to say, that only the human animal can be ethical because only the human breaks with the pure animal being of instinctive self-preservation (Levinas, cit. Butler 2006: 132). Here, Butler is once again arguing that "the human" comes to be only in dialectically overcoming and thus ceasing to be an animal, that is, in transcending its animal *pre*condition, in what is a variant of the all too familiar, all too human ascension from "base nature" to "higher culture." As such, rather than positing a "new basis" of humanism, she is in fact instaurating a very old one indeed.

In summary, Butler impels us to recognize ethics as risking "our" selves in a moment of unknowingness and undoing that puts into question the norms of recognition. Simultaneously, however, she reproduces perhaps the most proper of recognisable norms: that

of ethics, and thus the capacity to respond, as the limit and the proper of the human. Indeed, it is as an inevitable result of refusing to admit animals into one's self or one's philosophy that Butler remains helpless but to reinscribe the unrecognisable call and indecipherable demand of the other within the domain of the properly – similarly, familiarly – narcissistic.

Only once we break with the limitations that impose themselves on Butler's notion of a precarity and a grievability that is shared among the living in general can the norms that reproduce other lives as nonliving thenceforth be effectively challenged – only then might we recognize that killing an animal is murder, and only then might Venus Xtravaganza have survived her crossing. If, however, we instead continue to exclude the animal, then the only traces left by a seemingly infinite number of other animals – both human and nonhuman – will be the mark, unremarked and unmourned, of their erasure.

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Notes

1. On the problems of Livingstone's "phallic" position of promise behind the camera see bell hooks "Is Paris Burning?" *Z*, Sisters of the Yam (June 1991), which in turn is further discussed by Butler in *Bodies That Matter*, pp.133-7.
2. There are, to my knowledge, a couple of notable exceptions: Kelly Oliver's *Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), which briefly deals with Butler's work in relation to nonhuman animals; and Chloe Taylor's "The Precarious Lives of Animals: Butler, Coetzee, and Animal Ethics" in *Philosophy Today* (2008), 52, pp.60-72 (I thank the anonymous reviewer at JCAS for drawing my attention to this latter paper).
3. On the explosive transformative potential that resides in such a reinscription, see Andrew Benjamin *Of Jews and Animals* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p.19.
4. Subsequent to *Precarious Life*, in *Giving an Account of Oneself* (2005) Butler fleshes out – so to speak – the concept of "the inhuman" to some degree through an engagement with Theodor Adorno. Nonetheless, it remains conveniently empty of specific content and thus open to the mutiple valences Butler finds in Adorno – an emptiness which in

turn reveals the violence undergirding its instrumentalized relation. In *Frames of War*, Butler again maintains that the inhuman functions as the constitutive outside through which the human, understood as both value and morphology, may be both "allocated and retracted" (2010: 76).

5. On this, see Benjamin's *Of Jews and Animals*, pp.113-118.
6. On this, see Stephen J. Gould *The Mismeasure of Man* (New York: Norton, 1981).
7. In the *Republic*, for example, Plato claims that the "despised" manual workers are "apes" insofar as they are naturally weak in reason and thus condemned to serve their most base and beastly instincts (590a-591c). Interestingly, according to Plato the biggest threat to the security of his plutocratic *Republic* is the emergence into the *polis* of the "instinct" or "urge" for democracy that is naturally shared by all those foreign to reason, the most dangerous symptom of which is a "sensitivity" toward the enslavement and exploitation of other animals. On this, see my paper "Cannibals and Apes: Revolution in the *Republic*," which can be accessed at: http://zoogenesis.wordpress.com/2012/07/03/cannibals-and-apes-revolution-in-the-republic/
8. Levinas's ethical philosophy of the "face" is considered in detail in the concluding part of *Giving an Account*; in the concluding essay of *Precarious Life*; and again in the concluding essay entitled "The Claim of Non-Violence" in *Frames of War*. Moreover, immediately following Butler's analysis of the human as a "shifting prerogative" in the long essay "Torture and the Ethics of Photography" in *Frames of War*, Levinas's notion of the face is yet again invoked.

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In Vitro Meat: Power, Authenticity and Vegetarianism

John Miller[1]

Abstract

Produced by culturing animal tissue in a laboratory cell culture, in vitro meat is drawing an increasing amount of media coverage. While it is still some way from commercial productivity, significant strides are being made towards an innovation that promises to radically alter meat's relationship to animal liberation and environmental movements. In vitro meat's promise is meat without suffering, with a greatly diminished ecological footprint and significant potential for addressing global food shortages. A common theme of the emerging commentary on this possible new food source is its connection to vegetarianism. This essay explores the ramifications of 'vegetarian meat' by analysing its involvement with existing discourses of carnivoracity, particularly in relation to ideas of power (over animals and between humans) and authenticity (a 'natural' way of living in the world). The argument proceeds in three stages. The introduction sets out the key contexts for my analysis of in vitro meat, charting some initial journalistic and scholarly responses to the ethical issues it raises and dwelling, in particular, on Erica Fudge's discussion of the relation of meat (including cultured meat) to the "conception of the subject". Following this, I offer a critical summary of the arguments for and against in vitro meat. While for many commentators such an explicitly denatured product evokes an instinctive horror, cultured meat has also received much favourable notice for its potentially beneficial ethical impacts. I argue, however, that such optimism overlooks the wider situation of in vitro meat as an aspect of a still prevalent instrumentalist approach to other species. Rather than spelling an end to current animal husbandry practices, in vitro meat may instead ultimately add value to them by facilitating nostalgia for conventional meat as an integral component of a 'natural' diet. At the same time, the technical sophistication in vitro meat requires may also stand to militate against autonomy and self-sufficiency in food production within communities, increasing the already considerable influence of global food corporations. The essay's final section returns to the theme of the 'vegetarian subject' and to a widespread discourse of the vegetarian as outsider or deviant. Drawing on Derrida's formulation of carnophallogocentrism, I investigate the

extended meanings and politics of vegetarianism as part of a discourse of alterity that might form a promising starting point from which to challenge what David Wood describes as "schemata of domination". I conclude by calling for the rejection of in vitro meat as a renewal of dominatory power relations that stands only to inscribe vegetarianism in the worldview it contests.

Keywords: in vitro meat; vegetarianism; biopower; carnophallogocentrism; biotechnology.

Introduction

Since the start of the twenty-first century research has been underway to develop in vitro meat for large-scale human consumption; that is to say meat that is grown by proliferating cells in a nutrient-rich medium without the necessity of an animal's slaughter.[2] To put it another way, we appear to be on the cusp of meat without suffering, derived from an immediate source without sentience. While the commercial availability of such products is still some way off, studies are advancing rapidly. The Telegraph's science correspondent Nick Collins cites the claim of a team of Dutch scientists that in September 2011 we may be just six months from a prototype test tube sausage and less than a year from the first burger. As things stand, the production of these early versions is limited by financial considerations— The Telegraph's headline claims the "[f]irst artificial burger [is] to cost £250,000" (Collins, 2011). There are also restrictions about the kinds of meat that might be produced using existing techniques. While replicating boneless, processed meats appears within current technological reach, more complex structures like steaks and chops are further away. Nonetheless, the future addition of mass-produced cultured meat to the repertoire of carnivoracity is a prospect that evokes remarkable possibilities. As New Harvest, a non-profit organization at the forefront of in vitro meat, announce on their website, "[c]ells are capable of multiplying so many times in culture that, in theory, a single cell could be used to produce enough meat to feed the global population for a year" (new-harvest.org). Moreover, despite the current financial drawbacks, a key part of in vitro meat's appeal is the potential cost-effectiveness of its solution for world hunger. 'Theoretically', New Harvest suggest, 'cultured meat could afford higher resource and labor efficiencies, which could translate into lower costs' (new-harvest.org).

Whether in vitro meat might justifiably be considered to be vegetarian is a moot point. For some, it just feels all wrong. As Rina Deych asks in an article on the Animal Liberation Front website, "how can we promote any meat, even meat that doesn't involve cruelty, when we have been pushing for vegetarianism/veganism for all these years?" (www.animalliberationfront.com) To others, the development of meat without suffering might be seen to release vegetarians from self-denial into the possibility of participating guiltlessly in the pleasures of flesh. As Carol Midgley, herself a vegetarian, writes of cultured meat in an article in The Times under the headline "Is in vitro meat the future", "If it supported an industry that would eradicate the need to keep animals in factory conditions, then I'd not only eat it, I'd buy shares in it" (Midgley, 2008). PETA's controversial offer of a million-dollar prize for the first company to bring in vitro meat, specifically chicken, to large-scale commercial productivity reaffirms the profound appeal of what has been termed 'carniculture' (Hopkins and Dacey, 2008) to those disapproving of meat-eating and committed to a broader agenda of animal liberation.

In reality, it should be noted that in vitro meat may not be as cruelty free, at least in its development stage, as many would like to think. As Susan McHugh reminds us, cultured meat relies heavily on "animals and animal products", perhaps most notably in that the cell-growth medium normally contains a serum "harvested" from animals, usually calves (McHugh, 2010: 187).[3] That said, there is a clear aspiration among researchers to move away from the use of animal products by deploying growth media derived from alternative sources, particularly fungi. As New Harvest rather defensively point out, "a growing number of media are animal-free" (new-harvest.org). But even if in vitro meat were to dramatically improve its credentials in this regard, removing from the process all animal products but the vital cells which can, as it stands, be gathered relatively harmlessly, the vegetarian or even vegan approval of carniculture remains in need of careful thought.

Erica Fudge in her combatively titled essay "Why it's easy being a vegetarian" turns briefly to in vitro meat in her conclusion and asks the pointed question of New Harvest, "[w]hy is this research organisation not simply promoting vegetarian alternatives to meat?" For Fudge this failure along with PETA's million-dollar prize are evidence of "the hegemonic power of meat" which "reveals our unwillingness to give up one of the things that makes us who it is

we think we are" (Fudge, 2010: 161). Fudge's reflections on the connections between meat and subjectivity draw on Jacques Derrida's late work on animals, particularly, as Fudge summarises, on his contention that the "'sacrifice' of animals is central to the conception of the subject". Indeed, Derrida contends that given the centrality of animal flesh in western discourse (what he terms carnophallogocentrism), even vegetarians "partake of animals" (Fudge, 2010: 161). Developing this critical context, Fudge ends with the strident observation that "if we were all vegetarians that would bring with it a radically new sense of who it is that we imagine ourselves to be" (Fudge, 2010: 162). Such remarks invite reflection on the broader stakes and meanings of vegetarianism. Derrida in his seminal essay "The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)" returns to Jeremy Bentham's all-important determinant of a duty of care to animals, "can they suffer?" (Derrida, 2008: 27) The affirmative answer to this remains the heart of vegetarian ethics, but there are also significant extended issues concerning the identity politics of abstaining from meat. In vitro meat is particularly interesting in this context because it hinges not just on how conceptions of the human involve an ingestion of the animal other, but also on the ways in which conceptions of the human are entwined with and/or challenged by technicity.

My purpose in this essay, then, is, following on from where Fudge leaves off, to explore some of the subjectival questions that emerge at the confluence of vegetarianism and carnivoracity as it is embodied in cultured meat with specific reference to ideas of power (over animals and between humans) and authenticity (a 'natural' way of living in the world). Like existing meat substitutes (such as Quorn or TVP), in vitro meat (not of course in the same way a substitute) tacitly affirms the cultural centrality of meat and its vital (although as Fudge shows ambivalent) role in producing an ideology of human self-empowerment.[4] If we decide that we cannot have meat as it is currently produced, we must have something that reproduces the experience of it, which is, of course, why the promotion of vegetarianism or veganism seems a less appealing path than investment in cultured meat. As Patrick D. Hopkins and Austin Dacey bluntly put it in their enthusiastic response to the prospect of 'vegetarian meat', "veganism is not a live option for actual human societies as they now stand and the real choice is therefore between cultured meat and slaughtered meat" (Hopkins and Dacey, 2008: 593). In sharp contrast, a critical animal studies perspective necessarily maintains a commitment to veganism as a 'live option' and insists on Hopkins and Dacey's

"real choice" as a false dilemma. From this standpoint, I argue, in vitro meat appears not as a radical solution to the violent subjection of nonhuman animals within industrial capitalist cultures, but rather as a further symptom of the remarkable extent of this violence. Consequently, carniculture serves merely to reinvigorate existing power relations and to recruit vegetarians into a dominant discourse in which nonhuman others are routinely objectified. The vegetarian and vegan rejection of in vitro meat is necessary, therefore, if the radical political potential of these diets is to be retained. My argument towards this point proceeds firstly through a fuller engagement with the emerging discourse of carniculture that illustrates its complicity with wider ideological and economic systems. Secondly, I investigate (and re-appropriate) a dominant discourse of the vegetarian as outsider or deviant in order to posit the value of the 'vegetarian subject' (if such a conception is tenable) as a privileged position from which to contest the hegemonic ideals of identity that carniculture leaves untroubled.

For and Against Carniculture

It is hardly surprising that so evocative a subject should have attracted a steady stream of newspaper and journal reports. Not only does cultured meat potentially present a technological fix to shortages in the global food supply and to the environmental and ethical detriments of conventional meat production, it also participates in the mixture of anxiety and optimism that has accumulated around the broader theme of biotechnology. Unforeseen catastrophes issuing from biotechnological experimentation have been something of a science fiction staple for some time with recent developments in bioengineering providing extensive new source material. Vincenzo Natali's 2009 film Splice, for example, unsurprisingly casts the genetically hybrid animal creation of pharmaceutical research as the monster on the rampage. More recently, Rupert Wyatt's 2011 Rise of the Planet of the Apes shows tests for a cure for Alzheimer's unwittingly giving rise to a culture of super-apes and a deadly human virus. The popular cultural trope of a generalised science reversing the order of nature (as in the carnivalesque figuring of the ape as the master of man) has significant bearing on the initial reception of in vitro meat. A New Scientist opinion piece titled "Credible or Inedible?" describes an "instinctive visceral revulsion many people feel when scientists appear to go against nature" (New Scientist, 2011). In less measured terms, Midgley cites the unrestrained

reaction of a colleague to such a prospect: "It's perverted […] It's a disgusting, freakish idea" (Midgley, 2008). Although it does not necessarily involve genetic modification and is, New Harvest assert, no more unnatural than cheese or wine (new-harvest.org), such insistence on the 'yuck factor' indicates cultured meat's intimate involvement with complex questions concerning a perceived opposition of authenticity and technicity. In vitro meat seems to some to belong in a terrifyingly postmodern future in which the natural has disappeared under layers of simulation. The neologism 'Frankenfoods' that often figures in discussions of genetically-modified foodstuffs neatly captures the discourse of monstrosity cultured meat is embroiled within. To think back to Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, in vitro meat may be read as the "hideous progeny" of a Promethean society that has sacrificed the wholesome and the organic to immoderate technological ambition (Shelley, 1993 [1831]: xx).

The meaning and ideological function of ideas of 'the natural' have, of course, been under interrogation for some time now in various strands of critical theory. To dismiss a new innovation for its infringement of a supposed standard of naturalness risks a re-investment in outdated essentialist modes of reasoning that turn to 'nature', or perhaps more appropriately 'Nature', as a knee-jerk reassertion of patriarchal or hetero-normative (for example) orthodoxies. Moving beyond ideas of Nature as a privileged category of 'the essence of things' or 'the way things are meant to be' allows for a recognition of the centrality of hybridity, impurity and even monstrosity to evolutionary mechanisms and consequently to ontological questions as they pertain to humans, animals and even vegetables. The gradual erosion of the idea of 'the natural' has been prominent in the development of a number of liberatory discourses. As Timothy Morton puts it, "[t]here is no essence called race, or gender or species" (Morton, 2010: 6). That in vitro meat might seem a "freakish idea" is not any reason in itself to turn away from it; indeed, in our cyborgian era we might even, provocatively, wish to embrace the idea of in vitro meat specifically as a sign of freakery and as another challenge to reactionary ideals of Nature.

Developing this theme, the denunciation of in vitro meat by some omnivores on the grounds of 'yuckiness' provides a pause in which to reflect on some of meat-eating's dominant myths which, thoroughly contested though they have been, still exert a powerful sway. Eating a meal produced by proliferating muscle cells in a laboratory growth medium is troubling to a

mainstream discourse of carnivoracity in which meat operates as a natural expression of human biological programming and predatory subjectivity that can not be truly fulfilled by an ersatz menu of cultured protein; as if eating an animal unconsciously re-enacts a primal scene of human origins. Meat's "hidden message", in the terms of Nick Fiddes' influential account, is "that we only became civilised when we began to exercise our ability to dominate other creatures by killing and eating them" (Fiddes, 1991: 226). What is 'natural' about current intensive meat production practices is extremely questionable and, of course, a 'natural' product is not automatically good for you. Nonetheless, a mythic residue inheres in meat-eating that identifies it as the organic sign of human ascent and places it precisely on the cusp of nature and culture. Meat is an emblem both of our existence within nature and our transcendence of it. Conversely, the technological accomplishment represented by in vitro meat might be understood to reinforce notions of human superiority, even more potently perhaps than the original, 'natural' product. If, as Fiddes contends, "[c]onsuming the muscle flesh of other highly evolved animals is a potent statement of our supreme power", then cultured meat is the supreme gesture of this supremacy (Fiddes, 1991: 2). Eating an animal serves as a gesture of mastery over that being and others like it, but dispensing with the need for an animal altogether expresses a wider mastery over the planet and wider still over the idea of life. Consequently, reflections on the ideological and emotional charge of in vitro meat in relation to the product it simulates hinge to a large extent on the intersections of questions of human pre-eminence, nature and horror, or to put it another way, on questions of power and authenticity. Such issues are likely, at least in the short term, to determine the success of in vitro meat as companies engage with consumer resistance to an explicitly denatured product.

Yet, it is important not to lose sight of the pragmatics of the issue and, despite the instinctive discomfort of many at the notion of in vitro meat, there are numerous very good practical reasons for thinking it a very good idea. Conventional meat-eating, it hardly seems necessary to say, has been implicated in a host of problems both in relation to the environment and the human body, not to mention to the animals themselves. Tuomisto and Teixera de Mattos in an article on the "Environmental Impacts of Cultured Meat Production" begin with some statistics to prick the conscience of omnivores:

Currently livestock raised for meat use 30% of global ice-free terrestrial land and 8% of global freshwater, while producing 18% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which is more than the global transportation sector. Livestock production is also one of the main drivers of deforestation and degradation of wildlife habitats, and it contributes to the eutrophication of waterways (Tuomisto and Teixera de Mattos, 2011: 6117).

Add to this the numerous health scares associated with mass-produced meat from BSE to bird flu to the obesity epidemic and it is clear that meat production as it currently exists is unsustainable on a number of levels. Given the expectation for meat consumption to double between 1999 and 2050, largely related to economic growth in China and India, this is an issue that needs urgent attention (invitromeat.org). As the In Vitro Meat Consortium summarise on their website:

It is a tremendous political and economic challenge to change this grim scenario into a more sustainable one if we continue to base our meat consumption solely on production of animals. It will demand sacrifices that are probably well beyond what will be accepted by the majority of citizens in developed countries (invitromeat.org).

A key promise of carniculture, therefore, is to alleviate the need for consumer sacrifice while contributing to a more sustainable future. Tuomisto and Teixera de Mattos calculate that large-scale cultured meat production would involve substantially less greenhouse gas emissions for all meat but poultry, adding the proviso that since cultured chicken is likely to use less land than poultry production it may ultimately prove more energy efficient than existing poultry production facilities (Tuomisto and Teixera de Mattos, 2011: 6121).

When these ecological bona fides are attached to the evident, if currently problematic, animal welfare credentials what results is something approaching an everyone's-a-winner scenario. Hopkins and Dacey whose 2008 article "Vegetarian Meat: Could Technology Save Animals and Satisfy Meat Eaters?" is a useful starting point for consideration of the pros and cons of carniculture from the standpoint of moral philosophy, offer a list of in vitro meat's obvious benefits:

Meat-eaters have real meat; those who oppose animal suffering reduce animal suffering; those who promote animals' rights to life keep animals alive; and most importantly, the animals themselves are no longer subjected to painful and life shortening food production practices (Hopkins and Dacey, 2008: 582).

Countering these advantages in the spirit of devil's advocates, Hopkins and Dacey then engage with thirteen possible objections to in vitro meat, including some spicy ethical ground such as the possibilities of in vitro cannibalism and associated fears concerning "slippery slopes to twisted fetishes" (2008: 586).[5] They conclude, however, in resolutely upbeat mood:

The development of cultured meat, then, is not merely an interesting technological phenomenon, but something we may be morally required to support. In doing so, we recognize that morality is not something that must simply respond to new technologies as they arrive, throwing us into confusion, but rather that morality may champion and assist in the development of new technologies, as a step toward the production of a world that in fact, and not merely in ideal, mirrors the moral vision we possess for it (2008: 595).

The chain of moral cause and technological effect envisioned here seems somewhat naïve, particularly in its erasure of the market forces so central to the creation of new technologies. Earlier in the essay, an overview of their position announces an enthusiasm for 'the hopeful outlook of a technological fix' that they expand into the following cheerful dictum: "[t]echnology can allow us to change the physical constraints of the world so that we can better avoid the bad and pursue the good" (2008: 585). Cultured meat in this analysis constitutes an aspect of a benevolent technotopia in which the world's finest minds work altruistically for the general good, as neo-liberal capitalism is brought suddenly, miraculously even, into alignment with careful ethical thinking.

Cary Wolfe's discussion of bioethics in What is Posthumanism? provides a far subtler and more realistic account of the relationship of Hopkins and Dacey's "moral vision" with technology. "[T]he functions of conscience", Wolfe argues, "and those of establishing policies palatable to both state and economic power do not always or even often go hand in hand" (Wolfe, 2010: 53). The close cohesion of biotechnological innovation with a

determining ethical schema that Hopkins and Dacey fantasise collapses in the face of "Real Ethik"— the logic explained by one critic cited by Wolfe that "[i]f it can be done, it will be done" (Wolfe, 2010: 54). 'Morality' is far more likely to be playing catch-up with innovations proceeding from a combination of market forces and scientific possibility than setting the agenda for these. Richard Twine's trenchant Foucauldian study Animals as Biotechnology: Ethics, Sustainability and Critical Animal Studies provides another salutary corrective to Hopkins and Dacey's depoliticised account. While Twine gives only a brief passing mention to in vitro meat (Twine, 2010: 170), his discussion of biotechnology in relation to a "capitalist desire to reinvent itself […] through the biotechnological trumping of ecological and material limits" (Twine, 2010: 14) powerfully reasserts the ideological contexts of carniculture— namely, the operation of the various goods and benefits it promises as the get-out clause of consumer capitalism and therefore as the endeavour to sustain (as much as to render sustainable) the systems of relations it relies upon. Since to a great extent the acceleration of the world's environmental problems is related to a failure to recognise terrestrial limits, a "trumping" of these may be just what we are looking for, but such faith would seem to demand a thorough amnesia concerning the historical relationship of capitalist desire and material limits.

The advent of intensive farming, if not quite a trumping of limits, constituted a revolution in maximised productivity the ethical costs of which are well known. Carniculture may be read as a coherent continuation, perhaps even a culmination, of this logic of efficiency that represents a kind of ultimate capitalisation of animal bodies through the isolation of the value of animals from the animals themselves. The development of the meat industry in the metropolitan west is a narrative of advancing disassociation of products from their animal origin and a familiar topic in vegetarian/ omnivore debates. Indeed, the term 'meat' itself with its absenting of the sentient animal from the food product forcefully illustrates this dissociative pattern. As Joan Dunayer reminds us, 'meat' would be considerably less appetizing if marketed as "'flesh', 'muscle', 'remains', or 'corpse portion'" (Dunayer, 2001: 138). Ultimately, an animal's apparent absence from its processed and packaged remains facilitates a conceptualisation of animals as resource and of the body as factory. More than just a passive state of collective forgetting, the moment of disconnection that brings processed meat from the supermarket shelf to the table without a pang of conscience

comprises an active position that Fiddes summarises as "the very taken-for-grantedness of values implicit in the meat system" (Fiddes, 1991: 44). Animal consciousness is not to be thought of in that moment because the underlying conception of animals as meat-objects has become so resolutely normalised. Biotechnological innovations advance this logic through what Twine calls the "technoscientific construction of animal bodies" (Twine, 2010: 83). From the trope of the body as factory we move to that of the body as information, what Eugene Thacker identifies as "informatic essentialism" (Thacker, 2003: 86). As Carol Gigliotti summarises, "[a]s information, animals are now able to be reconfigured, recoded and most importantly redesigned for … commercial enterprises: food, health, military, even 'eco-friendly' or 'sustainable' undertakings" (Gigliotti, 2009: xvii). In this model there seems little space for a meaningful engagement with animals as sentient beings. Nonetheless, the development of in vitro meat within this context still promises a new ethical dawn in human/animal relations. Carniculture's ostensible triumph is that it materialises and literalises the well-noted ethical disconnection between meat-eaters and animals so that in the moment it fulfils its instrumentalist vision, it paradoxically pledges to liberate animals from conditions of absolute objectification. Without ignoring this potentially huge practical benefit, it is irresponsible not to probe further the wider ramifications of the continuing conception of human/animal relations in instrumentalist terms that cultured meat resolutely fails to contest.

Instrumentalisation is a theme addressed by Hopkins and Dacey under a number of headings, most directly in the section titled "A Lack of Moral Regard, Dignity and Respect". Their response to these ventriloquised objections is adroit but unsatisfying. "In using in vitro meat", they argue, "one would not be instrumentalizing an animal but would be instrumentalizing cells and tissues". Hopkins and Dacey's analogy for this (they admit it is a partial one) is wool: "we can shear sheep and use their wool for fabrics while showing all due regard for their well-being" (2008: 593). Their bucolic register is evidently gauged to be comforting, tempering what they call "neophobia" towards carniculture's brave new world with something homely and traditional, expressing a continuous relation between what Twine discusses as old and new biotechnologies (breeding on the one hand; GM on the other, for example) that leaves ample space for good stewardship (Twine, 2010: 14). Reservations concerning the use of cells and tissues are criticised sharply as "fetishistic": these "have no good of their own but exist normally in relation to a greater organismic structure" (Hopkins

and Dacey, 2008: 593). Here Hopkins and Dacey might benefit from engagement with the provocative, experimental work of the Australian artists Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr whose use of "tissue technologies as a medium for artistic expression" revolves around the "construction/growth of a new class of object/being— that of the Semi-Living" (tcaproject.org). What constitutes the living and what it might mean to care for something that is only nearly alive are challenging and involved questions I will leave to haunt the margins of this paper. But Hopkins and Dacey's implication that it is the instrumentalisation of the part that frees the whole merits further consideration. In a much-quoted observation made as early as 1931, Winston Churchill, it seems prophetically, anticipated a future in which humanity can "escape the absurdity of growing a whole chicken in order to eat the breast or wing, by growing these parts separately under a suitable medium" (Churchill, 1931). Divorcing the whole animal from what we want from it has the undeniable ring of good sense and sound economy, but what does this mean for the animals? Does technotopia correspond to a zootopia, with animals set free from human desire able at last to pursue their natural lives without interference? Approaches to this question are necessarily speculative, but nonetheless helpful in elucidating carniculture's political framework.

Before vegans and vegetarians (specifically perhaps PETA) get too optimistic about the animal liberationary potential of in vitro meat, it should be stressed that it does not mean an end to conventional meat production, although it may, if some commentators are to be believed, result in an improvement (a word with a hollow ring for vegetarians and vegans) in the conditions under which it is practiced. The In Vitro Meat Consortium hypothesises that:

If this production strategy were to replace a substantial part of the current meat production regime, this may allow development of a downsized animal production industry which can acquire a competitive edge in the upper-level meat market by documenting that it is ecologically sound and meets basic animal welfare requirements (invitromeat.org).

Perhaps the most striking thing about such conjecture is the dichotomy it imagines (which is one of course which already exists) between upper-level and lower-level markets. As the cost effectiveness of cultured meat improves, it stands in this argument to add a new ingredient to the manifestation of social inequalities in diet. Meat produced by slaughter might thus

(speculatively) become the preserve of the privileged elite who can afford to pay for the inflated produce of a 'downsized' industry while the socially disadvantaged make do with a more economic cultured version. If the aspiration towards mass-produced, low-cost in vitro meat materialises we could face a scenario of 'real' food for the rich; simulated food for the poor. This division evidently valorises conventional meat production technologies over the biotechnological future and implicitly reveals a continuing ideological investment in rural traditions.

Consequently, and somewhat counter-intuitively, carniculture might well be a positive development for rural economies. A reduction in the size of herds and a substantial increase in the revenue they are able to generate might well be beneficial across the board— to the health of the countryside, the welfare of animals (with the obvious proviso that this welfare is framed by impending slaughter) and to the bank balances of farmers. But what is being valued in this scenario is not specifically the conventional meat product itself (at least if we are to imagine that in vitro meat ultimately advances enough to reach a comparable gastronomic standard); rather it is the broader context of production that benefits from what might be called, after Walter Benjamin's discussion of the 'aura of the work of art' (Benjamin, 1936), an 'aura' of authenticity. We return here once again to problematic ideas of nature and to a suspicion of any modification of life as we know it. Central to this is an aesthetic discourse that sees conventional agriculture as part-and-parcel of a pastoral mise-en-scène closely tied to conceptions of nation. Traci Warkentin, for example, cites one commentator's objection to the idea of genetically modifying chickens to be happy under battery conditions that the "chicken sitting in a nest is a powerful aesthetic image" (Warkentin, 2006: 96). Such aesthetics function as a mythographic cover-story for the objectification of animals. Paradoxically, it is a cover-story given further credence by the prospect of in vitro meat as animal husbandry becomes established as the locus of a nostalgic desire that offsets the prospect of a denatured future.

A striking development in this context is the recent explosion of culinary texts and TV shows that evince what Jovian Parry calls the "deep nostalgia for the rural golden days of yesteryear" by explicitly representing rather than concealing the inherent violence of carnivoracity, a trend Julia Moskin in the New York Times summarises as "looking dinner in

the eye" (Parry, 2007: 251; Moskin, 2008). Both Parry and Moskin cite, for example, Jamie Oliver's "avian snuff video" in which he kills and cooks a chicken in front of a reported four million viewers. This new fetishization of meat comprises in part a backlash against vegetarianism and veganism that has given rise to the 'ethical omnivore' as a new category of the environmentally aware. If in vitro meat taps into and is even to an extent premised upon the desire to alleviate animal suffering, countervailing displays of violence like Oliver's insist on suffering, appropriately moderated, sanitised and established in a wider discourse of sustainable living, as part of meat's natural order: "nature red in tooth and claw" or in this case, beak and foot. There is a lot more to be said about this new paradigm of postmodern carnivoracity, but its robust emergence should certainly temper any expectations for in vitro meat to deliver a silver bullet to animal exploitation. Instead, cultured meat as a part of the continuing discourse of meat-eating serves only to add prestige, and market value, to the product it replicates, which is why it absolutely is not, as Deych hopes, "an interim compromise, and, hopefully, a stepping stone to veganism" (www.animalliberationfront.com). In reasserting meat as the culinary object of desire par excellence, and buttressing Hopkins and Dacey's argument that 'veganism is not a live option for actual human societies', carniculture entrenches the conceptualisation of animals as resource and adds credence to existing practices widely condemned by vegetarians and vegans.

We should read cultured and conventional meat, therefore, in intimate involvement with one another. In a sense, despite the opposition of some meat-eaters to the prospect of in vitro products, these two manifestations of carnivoracity nourish each other. Conventional meat's ethical and environmental costs construct the necessity of a more morally palatable and efficient alternative which, in turn, provides the possibility for a determined restatement of the original, 'authentic' product's value system. Eat your fake meat if you like, but this meat is real, its reality displayed in blood and pain. So, enthusiasm for in vitro meat should be tempered by careful analysis of the value system it is inscribed within. This extends not just to its immediate and associated consequences for animal lives, but also to a larger realisation of the power relations in vitro meat seems likely to invigorate.

Foucault's analysis of biopower provides a vital framework for discussions of our biotechnological revolution. From the eighteenth century there was a shift, Foucault argues,

from a juridical regime with power to take life, to a strategic regime that regulates the life of the social body. As a power bent on "generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them" (Foucault, 1984: 259) there is a literal echo of biopower in the development of technologies for culturing animal protein in vitro, notwithstanding the restricted focus of Foucault's work to human biology. Carniculture represents an intensified regulation of life, both human and animal. As a technology at the service of a medico-administrative complex it enables a more thorough engagement with public health through its structuring of nutrition, specifically the development of meat products that lack the physiological disadvantages of conventional meat. New Harvest suggest, for example, that with cultured meat, "[f]at content can be more easily controlled" (www.new-harvest.org). No doubt a lower cholesterol diet would be a notable benefit to society, but this is not the only issue. A widespread reliance on cultured meat, should it transpire, risks amplifying the power of large corporations through their control of patented and trademarked commodities. The development of carniculture militates against autonomy and self-sufficiency within communities and for an ever more globalised economy of food production. Conspiracy theories will no doubt abound if in vitro meat becomes commonplace, like the unhinged General Ripper in Stanley Kubrick's Dr Strangelove who sees in the fluoridisation of water the advance of international communism. Beyond the inevitably reductive internet rumour-mongering we might anticipate, there is a serious political and ethical point about the control of global food resources and its relation to profit motives that should not be overlooked in debates surrounding in vitro meat. Thinking about carniculture in terms of biopower foregrounds a questioning of its effect on the flows of power through global food supply with corporate benevolence as the familiar mask of vested interests.

An awareness of distributions of power is a key determining factor, therefore, in gauging how in vitro meat may or may not participate in a commitment to skilful ethical living. Biotechnology as a broad term encompassing a variety of procedures need not be considered ethically problematic per se, but rather it is the political situatedness of specific biotechnologies that should present cause for caution. Indeed, an automatic antipathy to biotechnology is itself a problematic position. David Wills in his study of technology and politics, Dorsality, provides a pointed reminder of the ultimate logic behind an insistence on a return to the natural:

At the moment in which the human appears to be moving inexorably toward a biotechnological future, it is strategically important to recognise … the fact of a relation between bios and tekhne so complex and so historic that any presumption of one over the other can be sustained only by means of an appeal to a metaphysics of creation (Wills, 2008: 5).

Accordingly, the commonplace cultural privileging of the organic or the natural, the limitations of which are also thoroughly exposed in Morton's recent work, fails to acknowledge the imbrication of the idea of the human within the technological.[6] As Wills comments earlier, the "human is … understood to become technological as soon as it becomes human" (2008: 4). While contemporary biotechnology is certainly a very different order of manipulation of the world than the slower processes of breeding and domestication, critique that is founded on an attachment to the authentic world may well serve only to obscure power relations while presenting an over-simplified account of the place of humans in nature. As the narrator of Margaret Atwood's biotechnological dystopia Oryx and Crake summarises, the "whole world is now one vast uncontrolled experiment— the way it always was" (Atwood, 2003: 228). Clearly, in an age of accelerating, radical biotechnological advances careful vigilance about the potential material consequences of various innovations is a necessity. But it is carniculture's inscription in economies of power, both concerning animals and more broadly, that makes it an uncomfortable item on a vegetarian menu. A more detailed statement of the reasons for this (or my reasons at any rate) returns us to Erica Fudge's speculation of vegetarianism's potential connection to a "radically new sense of who it is that we imagine ourselves to be".

Vegetarianism 'In the Shadow of a Mighty God'

To think through the ramifications of what it might mean to be a vegetarian beyond the semantic bottom line of abstaining from meat, the 2009 remarks of Giles Coren under a heading in The Times "Do a pig a favour! Ban vegetarianism now!" provide a compelling starting point (and one that is too provocative an exposition not to bring to a critical animal studies readership). Coren's high-profile article comprises some of the most interesting recent

commentary on vegetarianism from an antithetical standpoint and ebulliently encapsulates many of the most familiar suppositions of a dominant, omnivorous culture, namely that vegetarianism and veganism are legitimate targets for ridicule and that those practising these diets are, to quote Matthew Cole and Karen Morgan's comprehensive survey of the representations of vegans in UK newspapers, "variously stereotyped as ascetics, faddists, sentimentalists, or in some cases, hostile extremists" (Cole and Morgan, 2011: 134). Coren states his case as follows:

Vegetarianism is a cry for help. A sadly transparent attempt to exercise control over your body, which you feel the need to do for psychological reasons of which you are probably unaware. It's why so many vegetarians have tattoos and exotic piercings (you know it's true). It's why anarchists, squatters, G20 protesters and art students are usually vegetarians. Frustrated that they cannot, and never will, control the world, or anything else of any significance, they starve themselves and carve holes in their bodies. It's as primitive a lifestyle as there is. It's why the very oldest religions eschew meat altogether, and others eschew some forms of it— because one exercises what control one can in the shadow of a mighty God with miserable little gestures of abstinence (Coren, 2009).

Coren is no stranger to controversy and may perhaps justly be thought of as the enfant terrible of British food journalism, although A. A. Gill is another contender for that mantle. If this passage seems provocative enough, it gets worse. Following the well-trodden path of Hitler's vegetarianism, Coren ends with the disconcerting pronouncement that the "ideological road from nut cutlets to Belsen is straight, and short" (Coren, 2009). A detailed refutation of Coren's inter-implication of vegetarianism and the holocaust is hardly necessary,[7] but for all his bluster the situation of vegetarianism in relation to power networks is intriguing, if disturbing.

In an uncannily precise way Coren's reading of vegetarianism as automatically the sign of a cultural periphery reproduces the terms of Derrida's discussion of carnophallogocentrism. At the heart of this schema is a notion of "carnivorous virility" that constitutes the "determinative center" of the conception of the subject (Derrida, 1991: 113; Calarco, 2004: 190). Vegetarians, therefore, in Matt Calarco's phrasing "mark the outer limit of being-a-

subject" (Calarco, 2004: 195). Coren's roll call of the tattooed, the insurgent and the generally woebegone implicitly supplies an answer to Derrida's rhetorical question from "'Eating Well,' or the Calculation of the Subject": "who would stand any chance of becoming a chef d'Etat (a head of state), and of thereby acceding 'to the head,' by publicly, and therefore exemplarily, declaring him— or herself to be a vegetarian?" (Derrida, 1991: 114) Vegetarianism for Coren is inevitably situated in a nexus of deviance and disempowerment that bolsters the centrality of meat-eating masculinity. The connections of gender and carnivoracity that emerge in this context are neatly explicated by Hilary Malatino's recent summary in an article on Carol Adams of the way carnophallogocentrism "imbricates acts of meat eating and animal sacrifice as key to the discursive construction of subjects of Reason. Masculinity and carnivorism work together to support the virility, power and authority of one who argues, dialogues and speaks reasonably" (Malatino, 2011: 131). Or to put it in Coren's words later in the same article, articulating a mainstream popular cultural association of vegetarianism with feminization and/or a failure in masculinity: "[i]t's why vegetarians are mostly girls" (Coren, 2009). [8]

Whether he has read Derrida or not is uncertain (having read English at Oxford, one might hazard a yes), but the remarkable consanguinity between Coren's willfully outré comments and the late philosopher's formulation of carnophallogocentrism perhaps more than anything reveals the pertinence of Derrida's analysis. The figure of the mighty God Coren imagines casting a shadow over his cast of modern primitives fits coherently with the sacrificial structure of subjectivity carnophallogocentrism involves. Try as they might with "miserable little gestures of abstinence", vegetarians remain fundamentally out of kilter with a divine law that might allow them access to the world, or anything of significance. In Heideggerian language vegetarians to Coren are denied world-forming potentiality; instead, like animals, they are weltarm— poor in world. Vegetarians are characterized by an inner lack (identified by Coren as both hunger— starving themselves— and perversion— carving themselves) that can be followed back through the constituent parts of carnophallogocentrism— the lack of meat, the lack of the phallus, the lack of a voice. It is the sacrifice of the animals and the ingestion of its flesh that forges the fullness of being that Coren's vegetarians are so pitifully deprived of.

For all his reductive crudity and naughty-schoolboy shock tactics, Coren's situation of vegetarianism as the outside of a hegemonic discourse of the western subject provides a powerful statement of the force of abstaining from meat as a marker of alterity. If Coren buys into a hyper-conservative identitarian ideal, vegetarians need not. The positive political potential of this marginality has been eloquently expressed by David Wood:

Carnophallogocentrism is not a dispensation of Being toward which resistance is futile; it is a mutually reinforcing network of powers, schemata of domination, and investments that has to reproduce itself to stay in existence. Vegetarianism is not just about substituting beans for beef, it is— at least potentially— a site for proliferating resistance to that reproduction (Wood, 1999: 33).

It should be noted that Wood is far more optimistic than Derrida was himself about the possibilities of resistance to carnophallogocentric structures. "We can no more step out of carnophallogocentrism", Derrida writes, "to some peaceable kingdom than we can step out of metaphysics" (Derrida, 1991: 115). There are also some significant provisos to add to Wood's sanguine statement of vegetarian resistance. The focus on vegetarianism rather than veganism may well sound alarm bells (and may well have been doing so throughout this essay). The risk here is that vegetarianism may constitute a limited and therefore compromised gesture of good conscience that stops short of engaging meaningfully with the ethical problems surrounding dairy farming, for example. This in turn comprises a literal way in which vegetarians "partake of animals" in Derrida's terms, to which might be added subtler symbolic forms of sacrifice, the blood and body of Christ, for example, which indicate the extension of the discourse of carnivoracity beyond the material practice of eating meat.

The key part of Wood's statement, however, is his identification of a "network of powers" and "schemata of domination" which reminds us of the intersectional involvement of apparently discrete forms of exploitation. Here too, there is a proviso to add. There is a danger that for all the strategic value of reading the connections between theatres of oppression, specific histories might be erased in the process. Nonetheless, vegetarianism comprises a point from which to start to contest the self-evidence of dominatory structures that meat-eating routinely authenticates; or to return to Wood's terms, it can "spearhead a

powerful, practical, multidimensional transformation of our broader political engagement" (which is why Coren, ironically, is right to signal the connection between G20 protestors and vegetarians) (Wood, 1999: 32). A requirement for making this politics meaningful is the nurturing of a self-reflexive vegetarianism, or as Calarco puts it, bringing "deconstructive thinking to bear on the undisclosed anthropocentric and carnophallogocentric limits of dominant discourses in animal ethics and vegetarianism" (Calarco, 2004: 197). Elucidating how this might proceed is too large an undertaking to tackle here, but the vital point to emphasise in conclusion is the way in which vegetarianism might initiate an engaged approach to domination, both of nonhuman animals and more broadly. As Fudge writes, "we in the west need to have dominion represented, legitimated by animal flesh to be who we currently think we are" (Fudge, 2010: 161-62). Moving away from this hegemonic subjectification through domination should not be read as an insistence on a vegetarian subjectivity as a homogeneous and static end point (and indeed as Malatino writes, neither does carnophallogocentrism "fabricate a concrete subject", 2011: 131) . Rather, vegetarianism might be read as a positionality outside mainstream identity positions. The necessity of retaining this outsidership should extend to a refusal to be normalized and brought into the pale of a dominatory techno-capitalist complex by embracing the arrival of real, fake meat, a product which serves only to inscribe vegetarianism in the worldview it contests.

Notes

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[2] In thinking about this question in relation to vegetarianism rather than veganism I am following both Hopkins and Dacey (2008) and Fudge (2010) who initiates the debate in these terms. Clearly, as I indicate later in the essay (albeit very briefly), vegetarianism is a more morally compromised practice than veganism so there are evident problems in the recurrent presumption that vegetarianism constitutes a privileged ethical position. Although, I don't go into it here, it may well be precisely vegetarianism's situation as a point *between* veganism and carnivoracity that makes it so interesting in respect of cultured meat and such a key strategic location in developing debates about biofabricated meat.

[3] Fudge argues through an analysis of Yann Martel's novel *Life of Pi* that Pi's turn to meat-eating while adrift in the Pacific signals not 'his dominion, but the end of his previous life of secure humanity'. (2010: 155)

[4] The objections listed by Hopkins and Dacey come under the following headings: Danger; Cannibalism; Reality of Meat; Naturalness; Yuck Factor; Technological Fix is Moral Cowardice; Wrong Moral Motivations; Delay Moral Change; The Lives of Food Animals are Better than Nothing; Taint of the Source; Animal Integrity; A Lack of Moral Regard, Dignity and Respect; Dominion Versus Reverence.

[5] See McHugh (2010) for a discussion of Catts and Zurr's work. See also Catts and Zurr's "Disembodied Cuisine" project: http://www.tca.uwa.edu.au/disembodied/dis.html

[6] Morton writes of 'Nature' as a 'damaged and damaging' concept 'almost useless for developing ecological culture'. For Morton, of 'far greater benefit would be concepts that ruthlessly denature and de-essentialise' (2010: 1).

[7] As Derrida comments in "Violence against Animals", "The argument strikes me as crudely fallacious" (Derrida, 2004: 68).
[8] For a discussion of the relationships between meat, diet and patriarchal constructions of gender from a critical animal studies perspective, see Cole and Morgan, 2011: 144-45.

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The Animal in the Age of its Technological Reducibility

Tim Terhaar

Abstract

This paper begins with a consideration of Adam Shriver's argument for genetically engineering livestock to knock out their affective pain pathway. I identify his proposal as a technique of domestication and seek to explain why reason is insufficient, both for effecting radical change in our relationships to nonhuman domesticates and for combating the mentality that assumes the former is impossible. I go on to consider the demands of capitalist growth on the body of the cow in relation to the life and work of Temple Grandin, an autistic slaughterhouse engineer, as part of my wager that more is salient to animal rights activism than incremental improvements in the quality of domesticate suffering. Finally, I discuss Althusser's preoccupation with the ideological character of philosophy, and from the insight that philosophy is essentially temperamental, I end with an appeal to the importance of effects. Where the lives of animals are concerned, we must not only be right; we must be effective.

Key terms: autism, capitalism, domestication, ethics, reason, rhetoric

1. Techno-rationality and the Techno-tope

In April 2009, Adam Shriver, a PhD candidate in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program at Washington University in St. Louis, published a paper in the journal *Neuroethics* called "Knocking Out Pain in Livestock: Can Technology Succeed Where Morality has Stalled?" His thesis:

> I argue that there might be a technological solution to the problem of animal suffering in intensive factory farming operations. In particular, I suggest that recent research indicates that we may be very close to, if not already at, the point where we can genetically engineer factory-farmed livestock with a reduced or completely eliminated capacity to suffer. In as much as animal suffering is the principal concern that motivates the animal welfare movement, this development should be of central interest to its adherents. (Shriver, 2009: 115-16)

The "recent research" Shriver refers to includes several studies conducted on mice—in which the mice suffer, of course—that Shriver believes demonstrate the existence of two distinct pain dimensions, the affective and the sensory. In an op-ed for the *New York Times*, Shriver explains that the sensory pathway registers the location, quality, and intensity of pain, whereas the affective pathway registers its unpleasantness.

The public response to Shriver's proposal was largely outraged, but I'm less interested in condemning it outright than in looking further into why it's a live option. It seems to me Shriver's argument hinges on the premise that "[w]e are most likely stuck with factory farms, given that they produce most of the beef and pork Americans consume" (Shriver, 2010). I'm not sure why he highlights cows and pigs in particular; factory farms produce most of all animal products Americans consume. The point is the same, though: ours is an industrial society, and there's nothing to be done. Mardi Mellon, the director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Food and Environment Program, writes in her response to Shriver, "Given that our current system for producing meat inflicts pain on animals, the sensible response is to change the system, not the animals." In other words, ours is an industrial society, and there's plenty to be done. While I share Mellon's sentiment, I find her statement unconvincing as an argument. If we can disable the affective pathway in animals, then ostensibly the pain inflicted by the industrial food system will cease to be ethically salient. We'll still be hurting animals, but they won't be suffering. It's obvious that this is a less sensible response if we understand "less sensible" to mean "less sensitive," "more absurd," or "more repulsive," but I can see how those charges might look like knee-jerk reactions on the order of what Slavoj Žižek has called the "conservative ideology" of ecology (Taylor, 2008).

There is plenty to critique in Žižek's treatment of ecology, but I think we can let the term "conservative ideology" pass, even if Žižek clearly means to denigrate efforts to decelerate the destruction of ecosystems and the eradication of species. Preservationist or conservationist efforts are, in a sense, conservative—even reactionary. Anyone who resists teleological development—in this case neoliberal, technocratic, and so forth—should not be shocked to be called "conservative." Ecological advocates and activists resist certain kinds of radical change. The vulnerability of Mellon's position in this regard—it fails to adequately address why we shouldn't *go all the way* rather than *turn back* (a false opposition)—is one we can hope to correct with a less anthropocentric expression of her gut reaction. Changing the animals, rather than the

system, is the less *ethical* response. It's crucial we don't confuse ethics with rationality, the ethical with the sensible. Although, in the sense not intended by Mellon, *sensibilities* and *sensitivities* are exactly what ethics should work from and toward.

But I want to slow down and retread on Mellon's feet, to sound out why it's insufficient to invoke reason or reasonability in debates about the human use of nonhuman animals. Jos de Mul claims that "[t]he biotope in which we used to live in the modern age has been transformed entirely into a techno-tope" (De Mul, 2009: 174). I'm inclined to agree with him on this, given the elasticity of global capital and the (inextricably related) exponential rate of human population growth. While the use of "entirely" is conspicuous and might sound like a provocation, it's valid as long as we make a distinction between two readings of *topos* in "biotope" and "techno-tope." It's not the case that the entirety of *topographical* space has been transformed into a techno-tope—although the window of the room I'm sitting in offers no recourse to refutation on this point—but if you'll allow me to play allegorically with topology, I think we could say that all of *topological* space has been so transformed. We can imagine technological intervention at every point. There no longer remains a part of the world foreclosed from techno-topic transformation, which is why it strikes me as sheer fantasy to imagine a return to the biotope, which is to say a turning toward a topographic and topological relation that preserves some spaces as closed to the kinds of exploitative manipulations and interventions relevant to the present discussion. Sheer fantasy unless, that is, the human race experiences subtotal apocalypse. Suspending that possibility, the qualms about "playing God" that are often aroused in discussions about genetic engineering, especially regarding animal recombinant intervention, are unhelpful—conservative in the pejorative—especially if one accepts that those technologies are continuations of millennia-old technologies of domestication and selective breeding. The Holstein cow, or the chicken whose breast is so large she can't walk, are arguably no more natural than the affectless pig, unless by "natural" we simply mean "sentient." Industrialized cows and chickens are not much better suited for survival in the biotope than the GM pig, in any case.

Suppose, then, we can't return to the biotope. Again, this supposition is equivalent to bracketing the potentiality of radical structural effects produced by the compound "natural" disasters now always on the horizon. We are afraid the techno-tope is going to destroy us; it looks like we need some sort of strong meta-technological regulatory mechanism to swerve the trajectory of global economic progression (what capitalists call "progress"). Morality is one such

mechanism, a *techne* more than an *episteme*, that takes the form of a rational system of prescriptions for action. One of the most elegant moral polemics against the consumption of animal products is Gary L. Francione's argument from necessity, which goes something like this (Francione, 2008). First premise: It is wrong to inflict unnecessary suffering on sentient beings. Second premise: Nonhuman animals suffer in order to make possible various forms of human pleasure. Third premise: The pleasures that humans derive from nonhuman animals are unnecessary. Conclusion: It is wrong to perpetuate the suffering of nonhuman animals. The second premise is self-evident, and while the third premise obscures the complexities of the concept of necessity, it is relatively intuitive given the slew of viable alternatives to animal products available in techno-topic society. The first premise is the linchpin. While you'd have to be pretty callous to express indifference about whether animals suffer, acceptance of the premise has no necessary relation to action. Human beings are inconsistent, if not incoherent.

The failure of morality as a social regulatory mechanism can be located in what I think is the source of a number of perennial problems in philosophical ethics: the practical deficiency in the structure of logic. (We might want to generalize this as the modern discontinuity between theory and practice.) Lewis Carroll represents this deficiency with a variation on Zeno's paradoxes. In "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles," the Tortoise tells Achilles to write down the First Proposition of Euclid, which is a syllogism. (Syllogism is the form of logical argumentation Aristotle worked with, involving a quantified statement like "All Fs are Gs," an instantiation, "X is an F," and a conclusion, in this case "X is G.") The Tortoise refuses to accept the conclusion even after he's accepted the major and minor premises, and demands that Achilles record the notion of logical entailment itself in the form of an infinite series of premises. In other words, the Tortoise collapses the semantics into the proof system. (Or, in our analogy, theory into practice.) When the Tortoise says, "I accept *A* and *B* and *C* and *D*. Suppose I s*till* refused to accept *Z?*" Achilles replies, "Then Logic would take you by the throat, and *force* you to do it!" (Carroll, 1995: 692-3). Reason finds itself unable to compel the unreceptive, a psychological and material failing that motivated reason's alliance with terroristic force in the formation of the modern State. As a form of rationality, morality is exemplary in this regard. In his *Confessions*, St. Augustine expresses the rationalist's longing/delusion for the possibility that "hearing them is no mere hearing but leads to doing" (Augustine, 2008: 291).

In this light, we can view Shriver's proposal as part of what I'm tempted to call *material polemics* or *externalized reason*. The latter name especially appeals to me because of the debate in analytic philosophy about the existence of external reasons for action. If there are only internal reasons, then if a person doesn't already have reason to do something, she can't be forced to acknowledge *a priori* reasons for doing it. Externalized reason, then, is any material implementation of a conceptual structure. Let's not mince words, though—the terms I just coined are synonymous with science. In its contemporary phenotype, techno-rationality, science succeeds where mere reason fails by *performing* algorithms as opposed to *thinking* them. If morality is sort of like a conversation about a utopian algorithmic humanity in which everything that *should* be done *is* done, science is the practice of actually *writing* algorithmic reality. In Astra Taylor's documentary *Examined Life*, Žižek suggests that in response to impending ecological catastrophe, "We need more alienation from our life-world, from our, as it were, spontaneous nature. We should become more artificial. We should develop, I think, a much more terrifying new abstract materialism—a kind of a mathematical universe where there is nothing, there are just formulas, technical forms, and so on" (Taylor, 2008). Elimination of the enzymes AC1 and AC8 or the peptide P311 is an experiment that brings us one formula closer to a mathematical universe, a universe in which affectivity has quite literally been excised.

"Interestingly," writes Shriver, "studies have shown that that [sic] ablation of the anterior cingulate causes mother mammals to stop responding to the cries of their young," which he deems a promising sign (Shriver, 2009: 119). Genetic deletion is capable of destroying what little sociality our domesticates have managed to steal from their prisons. We manipulate food animals in an industrial architecture, and it is now almost within our power to convert them into machines not only with respect to functionality but with respect to their essential nature. Of course, we evacuate the meaning of the phrase "essential nature" because it is precisely nature that we delete. Consider Clint Burnham's observation that "[e]rasure, then, or the production of gaps, is where we are actually located" (Burnham, 2009: 18). This statement is even truer out of context because all of the instances of erasure Burnham discusses are textual, whereas we can take *text* in its broadest signification as the name for any material entity accessible within the techno-tope. We might, then, entertain the possibility that the ontological category of the human is a constellation of subjectivities proceeding from material discontinuities. (Note that "materiality" is a term that encompasses texts in the stricter sense.) Perhaps we become human

through our erasure of the biotope and our production of gaps in microbes, plants, and animals—ourselves included.

Žižek would have us believe that "[t]he problem is not science and technology." He explains, "They may be part of the problem in the sense that they are causing problems. But at the same time, they are the only solution. [...] We are already within technology. We should remain open and just patiently work. Work how? Also with much stronger social discipline" (Meerman, 2010). How patiently do we have to work? How much longer can we afford to be patient? Who will discipline whom, and how?

2. Capitalism and Autism

In revising Walter Benjamin's "The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility," we observe: "What [can] be expected [from capitalism], it [has] emerged, [is] not only an increasingly harsh exploitation of [the animal[1]] but, ultimately, the creation of conditions which [will] make it possible for [the animal] to abolish itself" (Benjamin, 2008: 19).[2] The seemingly perfect adaptability of capitalism is at odds with the biological limitations of living organisms. Capitalism is an acquisition drive, a system for producing surplus value, a metastatic machine.[3] Domestication converts plant life entirely into such a machine.[4] Soma responds unnervingly well to domestication, but it demands qualification. Markets can crash, but after adjustments, usually in the form of failures—economic deadweight loss, if you will—they rebound. Animals have this chemical, or reactionary, metabolism, but they also have an affective metabolism that can be taxed by overextensions and other imbalances in the form of anxiety, depression, and panic. Franco "Bifo" Berardi claims in *Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the pathologies of the post-alpha generation*, "The individual psychic depression of a single cognitive worker is not a consequence of the economic crisis but its cause" (Berardi, 2009: 37). The incommensurability of the economic demand for a constantly increasing rate of productivity and the animal worker's biological speed limit has historically been resolved on the side of the economy, as slowdown. But it's hard to overestimate capitalism's capacity for plasticity and innovation, so it shouldn't come as a surprise that semiocapitalism has extended the fractalization of labor-time into fractalization of the body of the laborer. Now that selective breeding is beginning to create serious efficiency problems within the context of Concentrated

Animal Feeding Operations, the segment of the animal that hinders performativity will simply be dispensed with.[5] These developments are witnessed in the work of Temple Grandin.

In *The Woman Who Thinks Like a Cow*, a biographical documentary about Grandin—whom the BBC calls "the most famous autistic woman on the planet"—Chloe Silverman, an Assistant Professor in the Science, Technology, and Society Program at Penn State University, says, "In the 1940s a child displaying the kind of symptoms that Temple had, of emotional withdrawal and very, very little language or no language at all, would have in all likelihood been placed in an institution, removed from their family" (Harrison, 2006). Grandin's symptoms sound strikingly similar to those of domesticated animals, and the institutionalization of children like Grandin was likely more a logical consequence of the ontological hierarchism human/animal than a practical measure. In the documentary, Grandin remarks, "My theory is that there are similarities between my autistic mind and animal thinking" (Harrison, 2006). Her thinking is primarily sensory, rather than linguistic, which determined her childhood behavior in such a way that she occupied an interstitial position in the framework that locates human expressiveness somewhere between algorithmic rationality and the unclarifiable affectivity of nonhuman animals. The logic of institutionalization begins with two observations: that autistic children bear an uncanny resemblance to nonhuman animals; and that nonhuman animals are institutionalized. It concludes from these that autistic children should be institutionalized.

How could Grandin spend her life working in an industry that slaughters animals with whom she shares such a close affinity?[6] Regarding a responsibility to promote the welfare of livestock, Grandin explains, "Things that I've been working on, I've been trying to just make things better for cattle in a real practical sort of way. I'm not into ideology, I'm into what are real practical things that make improvements on the ground" (Harrison, 2006). A refusal to acknowledge ideology might as well be an admission of entrapment. While Grandin is not *into* ideology, she is, of course, *in* it. And it's capitalism that Grandin serves "in a real practical sort of way," because her work is essentially recuperative. In a paper titled "Genetics and Animal Welfare," Grandin writes, "The problem is that the animal's appetite far exceeds its basic metabolic needs," which I would read as an astute allegorical description and biting criticism of the system that produces such an animal (Grandin, 1998). The capitalistic ethos is one of interchangeable reflexivity, as in "growth for growth's sake," "innovation for innovation's sake," "art for art's sake," even, or, I would suggest, "welfare for welfare's sake."

Grandin notes in "Animals Are Not Things" that "[i]ronically, ownership of animals on the African plains may motivate the local people to take care of them and improve their welfare" (Grandin, 2002). In fact, this is not the least bit ironic. It is almost tautological to say that as long as animal communities remain feral, they possess no rights. Jurisprudence is everything. Once the bodies of animals on the African plains have been designated formal property, they can be managed by the state; they can be brought into "harmony" with the human community. But jurisprudence is also nothing. Once the animal has been incorporated—as a corporate asset, as a digit of the body politic—its body becomes open to the fractalization of genetic recombination.

Francesca Happé, a professor in cognitive neuroscience at King's College London, remarks in *The Woman Who Thinks Like a Cow*, "You can see why an individual with autism might prefer to study railway timetables or astronomy or some other *facts* that fit a neat and orderly regularity, instead of the chaos that is the world of people" (Harrison, 2006). We are now in a position to recognize that the better description of our increasingly techno-topic world is not "chaos" but rather "a neat and orderly regularity." This is a world in which Temple Grandin is best suited for the job of death administrator not only because of the demands of an automated socioeconomic structure (mass production, mass-mediated consumption), but because of the effects of that structure on human styles of being-in-the-world. I have tried to articulate some ways in which reason—the impulse toward orderly regularity—is deployed against animals in service of maintaining and streamlining the system that oppresses and objectifies them. But the greater insight is that techno-rationality is an anti-socializing (rather than merely counter-socializing) force, a force that slowly but definitely razes the biotope in order to erect an architecture that posits all of us, autistic or otherwise, as asocial. It progresses counter to ethics.

Two years after the publication of "Genetics and Animal Welfare," Grandin asserts in her paper "Is it Time to Look at Changes in Swine Genetics?" that "[t]he first step" in solving the problems that arise from the disparity between appetite and environment "is getting rid of the stress gene." Grandin reassures us: "Fortunately some integrated systems have already done this" (Grandin, 2000). Why is this genetic intervention—or rather integration—necessary? Who cares, really, if the cows experience stress as they shuffle onto the killing floor? The owners who worry that glycogen depletion or lactic acid buildup will adversely affect the rate of pH decline in the corpses? The consumers who deny that cows have minds? The welfare activists whose principal concern is to reduce suffering? PR specialists?

3. Philosophy and Rhetoric

To even begin to formulate an answer to the question "What is to be done?" we will have to return to Mellon's appeal to the category of the sensible. Consider the following line from an interview Maria Antonietta Macciocchi conducted with Louis Althusser: "In principle, true ideas always serve the people; false ideas always serve the enemies of the people" (Althusser, 2001: 8). What I like so much about this principle-in-principle is that its truth value is self-fulfilling, in a sense, and in the same sense as applies to the converse statement: true ideas always serves their investors; false ideas always serve the enemies of the investors, which is to say the people. These two claims about true ideas—as if *ideas*, like propositions, could be *true*—speak to the fundamentally temperamental nature of philosophy—to its *ideological origin*—and can be neither proven nor disproven, only affirmed or disaffirmed.

It will be helpful to quote Althusser at length on the issue of truth and philosophical inquiry:

> But we must therefore go even further and say that if the whole history of philosophy is nothing but the re-examination of arguments in which one and the same struggle is carried to its conclusion, then philosophy is nothing but a tendency struggle, the *Kampfplatz* that Kant discussed, which however, throws us back into the subjectivity pure and simple of ideological struggle. It is to say that *philosophy strictly speaking has no object*, in the sense that a science has an object. (Althusser, 2001: 34)

This well-placed emphasis on the discovery Althusser credits to Lenin is important for understanding the limitations of what animal-attentive philosophers are engaged in. For Althusser, philosophy intervenes scientifically into politics and politically into science, but it does so in its capacity as a mere representation of political struggle. Of course, throughout its history (which is no history, if we follow Althusser) philosophy has responded to the production of scientific knowledge and sought to solve problems that impede that production, but the problems philosophy solves for science and in the name of science are *ideological* problems. As such, the statements philosophy produces are not true or false with respect to some object, but are rather true or false according to tacit ideological assumptions or explicit political motivations. Althusser continues, "[Lenin] declares that it is impossible to prove the ultimate principles of materialism just as it is impossible to prove (or refute, to Diderot's annoyance) the principles of

idealism" (Althusser, 2001: 34). In other words, *philosophy is a form of rhetoric*; philosophical inquiry is an exercise in speaking to (but usually not articulating) political and ideological temperaments. The manner in which philosophy-as-sophistry progresses (but never develops, strictly speaking) is dialectically between two poles or tendencies in thinking, which for Althusser are materialism and idealism, but for our present interest can be taken as anthropocentrism and anti- or counter-anthropocentrism. (In actuality, the poles are probably innumerable, aligned in complex but not necessarily obscure ways, as I hope this paper has demonstrated in some small measure.)

It should be clear that while sciences continue to deepen and broaden our understanding of the lives of other animals (albeit often employing ethically dubious methods and methodologies), their results have had very limited material effects, by which I mean economic effects. And this should come as no surprise, because current philosophy can persuasively politicize the scientific results only for those who follow after the perspicuously deployed preliminaries[7] of anti-anthropocentric argumentation. In his excellent book-length analysis of humanism, anti-humanism, and anthropocentrism through the history of continental philosophy, Matthew Calarco writes that "[f]or Bentham, there can be no rigorous justification for ignoring the suffering of either human beings or animals, and his hope is that one day such injustices will be transformed" (Calarco, 2008: 116). We need to focus on the spaciousness of this conjunction. The first conjunct is that "there can be no rigorous justification for ignoring the suffering of either human beings or animals," which is true from a religious or ethical standpoint but is devoid of practical or political content. Calarco picks up on Bentham in Derrida in an attempt to make good on the claim's promise of rhetorical force:

> To my mind, the chief conclusion to be drawn from Derrida's analysis is that the human-animal distinction is, strictly speaking, *nonsensical*. How could a simple (or even highly refined) binary distinction approach doing justice to the complex ethical and ontological matters at stake here? […] The human-animal distinction is so clumsy and awkward, so lacking in rigor that one wonders what possible use it would have for *philosophers*, who so often pride themselves on the rigor of their concepts. (Calarco, 2008: 141)

Calarco's view of philosophical integrity has to be naïve. If it's as obvious as it seems that the human-animal distinction is nonsensical, either philosophers are idiots, or the pride they have for

their concepts has less to do with scientific rigor than ideology. Althusser was convinced that unless philosophers succeeded in working from a proletarian class position (through much hard work and with strong social discipline, we might add in paraphrase), their work would necessarily reflect and reproduce their petty bourgeois class conditions. In the same way, unless philosophers consciously work from a vegan political position (similarly through much hard work and with social discipline), their work will necessarily reflect and reproduce the conditions of their society, most significantly its exploitative drive.

One facet of the role of sacrifice at the heart of Western metaphysics is as an expression of the trauma of disavowed empathy for animals. As children, most of us had at least one experience that opened the possibility of caring for an animal and imagining ourselves *with* him or her, rather than merely alongside. And then, again for most of us, we learned to foreclose the possibility of that same imaginative capacity. Calarco writes that Derrida is deeply concerned to

> note that the force of the encounter with the "face" of other animals is *undeniable*. And this is the case, he insists, whether we affirm or deny the animal's face, whether we respond affirmatively to the encounter or disavow it. Both responses—negation and affirmation—testify to the encounter's force and to the fact that the vulnerability and expressivity of the face pierce and affect us. (Calarco, 2008: 119)

The undeniable force of the encounter is conjoined with and intended to make accessible the kind of hope Bentham held, "that one day such injustices will be transformed." Mystification of our encounter with the face of other animals under capitalism cannot be remediated through reason or appeals to the sensible thing, the consistent thing, or even the moral thing. All of these appeals miss their mark because they miss the point that our relationships to other animals are determined prior to our reasoning about other animals. If so many humans are so easily able to disavow the undeniable force of the animal encounter, *a fortiori* they will be able to disregard any argument about why they should avow the very same force.

And yet, some of us are doing all we can to struggle toward a full realization of an anti-anthropocentric theory and practice. What I want to suggest, then, finally, from the beginning, is that we grant importance not only to *truth* but to *effects*.

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Notes

[1] Jacques Derrida warns us, "Whenever 'one' says 'The Animal,' each time a philosopher, or anyone else, says 'The Animal' in the singular and without further ado, claiming thus to designate every living thing that is held not to be human […], well, each time the subject of that statement, this 'one,' this 'I,' does that he utters an *asinanity* [bêtise]" (Derrida, 2008: 31). Please consider this my "further ado," as well as an acknowledgement that more work needs to be done on the problem of the unavoidability of the *use* of "The Animal" even as we *mention* its asinanity.
[2] The original reads: "What could be expected, it emerged, was not only an increasingly harsh exploitation of the proletariat but, ultimately, the creation of conditions which would make it possible for capitalism to abolish itself."
[3] While there isn't enough space here to defend the following claim, I would assert that while capitalism is teleological, it lacks a distinct *telos*.
[4] For evidence supporting this claim, please refer to any history of maize-human symbiosis.
[5] On the near horizon is the reduction of the animal's formerly formulaic body to formulas, quite literally; *in vitro* meat is technologically feasible, just not yet cost-efficient. While the immediate ethical advantage of reducing the consumption of animals by promoting consumption of *in vitro* meat should, I think, be obvious, we will need to pay attention to the complexities generated by a practice that obscures the origins of killing even as it retains what one writer has called the "ineffable chew of real flesh" (Cloud, 2010). Contemporary industrial processes employed in the production of commercial imitation meats were developed early in the twentieth century to improve the productivity and profitability of livestock. We should consider how this industrial history is extended by the innovation of *in vitro* meat in terms of what I'm tempted to call its *seductive power*. We should consider as well its relationship to *disavowal*.
[6] In what I see as a cruel irony, it might be Grandin's professed inability to understand certain philosophical or otherwise language-based concepts that explains the concurrence of the fact that "[s]he came to see that she actually experiences the world much as an animal does" and the fact that "[t]oday, more than half of all cattle slaughtered in the US go to their deaths in equipment designed by Temple" (Harrison, 2006).
[7] "The crux of a philosophical argument often appears to be a Dedekind cut between a series of 'as I will show's and a series of 'as I have shown's. In a sense the preliminaries are the argument, and there is no crux apart from their perspicuous deployment" (Sellars, 1968: 73).

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The Contested Meaning and Place of Feral Cats in the Workplace

Carol Thompson

Abstract

This research is grounded in three years of fieldwork with Trap-Neuter-Return (TNR) groups on university campuses and participation in a consortium of feral cat managers located in a large metropolitan area in the United States. TNR groups provide care and humane management of feral cats with the goals of reducing the overall number of stray and unhealthy cats in the wild and allowing healthy and non-reproductive cats to resume their territorial colonization of campus spaces. The analysis communicates the experiences and perspectives of feral cat caretakers as they struggle to preserve and create space for cats on their university and college campuses. Narratives and communications from and between feral cat caretakers illuminate how they resist existing definitions and arrangements of power and endeavor individually and collectively to manage their identities and activities within the workplace. The analysis shows that by extending the locus of care of non-human animals into the workplace setting feral caretaker actions break with normal practice by bringing non-human animals into the moral landscape of the campus and treating campus workplaces as ecologically integrated urban environments where feral cats and other animals are legitimate and appropriate co-residents. Their actions are seen as transgressing the conventional uses of place and space and results in stigmatization from three sources: the perceived misuse of the physical space at work, being out of order in ideological or normative space, and guilt by association or what Goffman (1964) calls *tribal stigmatization*.

Keywords: feral, cats, TNR, stigma, reanimation, trans-species, work, Goffman, companion animals, identity, emotions

This research focuses on animals in the workplace and is grounded in the assertion that non-human animals are always, and always have been, present in the workplace. However, the reactions to and treatment of non-human animals in work spaces have, for the most part, been to view them as outsiders, or as "Other" (Ritvo, 2007). With the status

of Other comes accompanying reductionist assumptions that have ideologically positioned humans in a place of dominion over all animals (Arluke and Sanders, 1997; Derrida, 2008; Haraway, 2003; Ritvo, 2007). However, with the *animal turn* in the humanities and social sciences conventional Western understandings of animals are being re-examined, opening up the possibility of seeing and thus behaving toward non-human animal species in more inclusive ways. In urban geographer Jennifer Wolch's terms, we might "re-animate" (2002: 726) discussions and visions of life in cities. This article proceeds on the idea that reanimation and its goal of re-considering animals in the urban landscape is applicable to workplace domains. However, this is a challenging undertaking because *work* as a cultural "field" (Bourdieu, 1993) is not simply a physical and geographic place; it is a social organization with a set of orienting practices, customary relationships and embodied practices that are essentially at odds with conceptions of it as a place where humans and other animals co-exist. That is, the moral landscape of the workplace comes with a non-conscious ideological bias of seeing 'animals' there as not belonging.

The college campus is one of those places that operates under the unquestioned assumption that the workplace is exclusively a human domain. The bracketing and exclusion of non-human animal life is evident in the character and content of built environments on campuses. Aristotelian and Cartesian systems of classification that rank humans on the top of the chain of life (Calarco, 2008; Spiegel, 2008) and the resulting anthropocentric and exclusionary practices toward non-human animals abound in the social spaces of university life, as exemplified by the standard "No Pets" rule for offices, dormitories, athletic venues, administrative offices, etc., with service or therapy animals being the only exceptions to the rule. But, no matter how resistant some of its human inhabitants are to acknowledging and cohabiting with other species, college and university campuses are diverse ecosystems where an abundance of non-human animal life resides. Moreover, there is active resistance by individuals and groups on campuses who are working to expand the meaning and place of non-human actors in these spaces.

This research focuses specifically on the efforts of Trap-Neuter-Return (TNR) groups and individuals who seek to create campus environments where cats, humans and other species live and work side-by-side. My theoretical grounding is interdisciplinary,

drawing from sociology, critical and animal geography, philosophy and human/animal studies. I draw especially on a framework for understanding space and place that stems from the long-standing body of work that uses geography as metaphor to explicate difference in the social and cultural worlds (Bordieu, 1996; LeFabvre, 1974/1991; Philo and Wilbert, 2000; Wolch and Emel, 1998). Also, the work of sociologist Erving Goffman (1959, 1963, 1967, 1971) is used in the analysis to understand the conflicts surrounding and the stigmatization of cat caretaking. Finally, the social interactionist perspective on emotion management, primarily the work of Arlie Hochschild (1979, 1983), will be helpful for illuminating the emotional experiences of TNR workers whose behavior crosses cultural and behavioral boundaries.

Data and Methods of Inquiry

This study is based on four years of fieldwork with Trap-Neuter-Return (TNR) groups on university campuses, participation in a feral cat coalition group located in a large metropolitan area in the United States and participation in several online communities focused on TNR. The events, conversations and disclosures described are derived from hundreds of hours of participation in TNR work and interaction with TNR volunteers. The names used for both humans and non-human animals are pseudonyms. Other identifying information (e.g. street names, colony locations, office names, university names) is omitted to safeguard the identities and locations of TNR workers and ensure the safety of colony cats.

Methodologically, this work constitutes critical ethnography (Madison, 2012; Thomas, 1993). Critical ethnography is informed by critical theory, which acknowledges the inseparable relationship between researchers, subjects and the social and cultural context. Moreover, it "begins with an ethical responsibility to address processes of unfairness or injustice within a particular *lived* domain" (Madison, 2012: 5). Thus, this approach is also deconstructive (Clifford and James, 1986), and is intended to disrupt the status quo, identify social arrangements that produce inequalities, and move social relations from "what is, to what could be" (Madison, 2012: 3). To those who would say that critical ethnographic research is somehow less valid than other forms of scientific inquiry because it reveals its positionality and subjectivity, Donna Haraway (1988) and

Norm Denzin (2001) wisely inform us, through their critiques of the positivist paradigm, that all research is socially and politically situated, whether revealed to be so or not.

The analysis that follows relies on three major sources of data: 1) my experiences and observations derived from full participation in TNR, 2) interactions with cat caretakers recorded in daily field notes for the duration of the study and 3) the narratives of TNR workers as revealed in emails, group communications, and Internet discussions. This research illuminates (1) the goals and nature of TNR work; (2) the multiple sources of stigmatization for TNR workers; and (3) how TNR workers individually and collectively manage their identities and emotions as they struggle to establish cats as belonging in the spaces of work.

T**rap-Neuter-Return Groups and Their Goals**

TNR groups provide care and humane management of feral cats with the goals of humanely reducing their numbers, improving their quality of life and recognizing their right to live in the environments they colonize. Faculty, staff and students who care for feral cats through TNR programs view their work as conciliatory action that joins human and animal geography in humane ways. Through their actions, feral cat caretakers' define workplaces as ecologically integrated urban environments where feral cats and other animals are legitimate and appropriate co-residents. Their work fosters view of non-human animals in ways that emphasize their subjectivity and agency and recognizes animal life as valuable in itself. They possess complex and practical views of animals in the workplace taking into account kinships between species, and differences and interdependencies between humans and other animals. Their efforts expose many of the unexamined habits and *visual logics* (social order represented in the visual landscape) that shape life at work (Hinchcliffe, 2003; Wolch, 2002). Moreover, by acting on their views of cats as belonging in the spaces of work, they necessarily challenge the status quo and in doing so risk being labeled as deviant.

Trap Neuter Return (TNR) groups are comprised of volunteers and are increasingly common in urban areas and university campuses in urban and suburban areas across the United States and other countries. TNR volunteers use special humane traps and methods to catch adult cats and transport them to local veterinarians or clinics

where they are examined, spayed/neutered, vaccinated, micro-chipped and/or ear-tipped for future identification. Ear-tipping refers to the widely accepted practice among TNR groups and animal control organizations of removing the upper tip of the cat's left ear in order to visually identify feral cats who have been sterilized. Easy identification helps colony caretakers know which cats have been trapped and altered, and identify newcomers who have not, which prevents unnecessary disturbance of and surgeries for cats that have already been vaccinated and altered. Ear tipping (unlike ear cropping in dogs, which is painful and can lead to complications) is considered a safe procedure that is performed by a veterinarian while the cat is already under general anesthetic during spaying and neutering.

After the cats are spayed/neutered and deemed healthy they are released back into their home territory where they are fed and monitored by TNR volunteers. Any kittens born in that territory who are under 6 weeks of age are humanely trapped, socialized, neutered and adopted out as companion animals. Because cats as a species are territorial, TNR managed cats who are released back into their territory form stable colonies. Colony cats are periodically re-trapped for vaccinations and or medication, and sick or injured cats are removed from the colony for treatment or euthanasia to relieve suffering and prevent the spread of disease. The stated impact of TNR is that it *decreases* the overall number of free-roaming cats on campuses and assures that cats that are on campus grounds are healthy and non-reproductive. For the most part, TNR groups manage colonies effectively and have been successful at reducing the overall number of feral cats.[1] As these groups have multiplied in number and the method for managing stray cat populations has become more widely understood and accepted, some U.S. cities have come to their aid by drafting and adopting agreements and feral cat ordinances that protect the groups and the cats they must rescue.[2] Yet, TNR efforts continue to be contested by many citizens and members of campus communities who likely either do not understand the TNR philosophy or for a variety of reasons reject the re-animation goals implicit in that philosophy. While TNR programs on some campuses have made progress in educating citizens about the win-win consequences of humane colony management, there are powerful cultural forces and attitudes that promote a view of feral cats as a negative characteristic of urban environments. These forces cast reanimation

efforts as a transgression of the traditional human/animal divide.

The goals of TNR are consistent with the visions of critical geographers, like Wolch (1998 and 2002) and Philo (1998) who have forged a trans-species urban theory that challenges the socio-spatial practices of the Western nature/culture dualism that have shaped urbanization in ways that de-naturalize environments and marginalize non-human animals (Hovorka, 2008). While TNR group members do not express their actions and value commitments in the formal language of social theory or critical geography, they do embody what can be considered a trans-species urban approach to human-animal relations on their campuses in at least three ways. First, their work is grassroots practice that seeks to alter the "nature of interactions between people and animals in the city" (Wolch, 1998: 131). Second, their work is unapologetically aimed at defending the interests of urban non-human animal life. Third, they work against and call into question extermination-based animal control policies that operate on the ecologically destructive platform of excluding most non-humans from everyday life. Relying on critical animal geography (Wolch's work in particular) as a backdrop for viewing TNR, this analysis will show that the way TNR workers think, feel and talk about cats demonstrates their awareness of how *geographic Othering* places feral cats in "worldly places and spaces different from those that humans tend to occupy" (Hovorka, 2008: 97). Also, as the accounts of caretakers reveal, they are keenly aware that TNR work is stigmatizing and devalued by many because it transgresses an urban imaginary that normalizes the domination of cats and their habitats.

The Liminal Status of Cats

Historically, the socially constructed and imposed divide between nature and culture has made the species *Felis catus* (the domestic cat) categorically challenging for humans, which, to some extent, explains the incongruous definitions and qualities bestowed upon them. For example, cats are variously considered to be dependent and independent, wild and tame, lazy and vigilant, loving and aggressive etc. Correspondingly, they have appeared in the human imaginary as angels, demons, prophets, killers, protectors, companions, vermin and as surprisingly good meteorologists (McNeill, 2007). Noted zoologist Desmond Morris (1986: 10), appreciating the

inscrutable nature of the domestic cat, referred to its "double life" when observing that cats are both tame pets and wild animals. He and others have also noted that the so-called domesticated cat has changed very little from its predecessors, the European and African wild cats (McNeill, 2007; Morris, 1986). Unlike dogs, the domestication of cats can be seen as incomplete inasmuch as cats resist human attempts to dominate and control them (Bradshaw, 1992). Correspondingly, domestication as a conferred status for cats refers more to where they are located *vis-à-vis* humans than how they relate to humans (Kirk, 1977; McNeill, 2007).

The lack of categorical certainty becomes even more complicated, problematic and injurious when considering feral cats who are technically "domestic" cats that are considered to have "gone wild." The feral qualifier itself imposes an outlaw status upon cats because it dramatizes the fact that such cats are outside the control and domination of humans. Thus the feral domestic cat's status is liminal, in between domestic and wild, which is evidenced by the tensions that emerge when people talk about them (McNeill, 2007). For instance, their liminality is understood and demonstrated in the definitions produced and used by advocates on their campus related TNR websites. They state,

> Feral cats are domestic cats or the descendants of domestic cats that have reverted to a wild state (Aggie Cat Services, 2011).

> Feral cats are 'wild' offspring of domestic cats and result from pet owners abandoning and/or failing to sterilize their pets, allowing them to breed uncontrollably (Feral Cat Coalition, 2009).

> Feral cats are unsocialized, unowned free-roaming cats (Griffin, 2002).

The notion of being born into "the wild" in descriptions of feral cats disguises the fact that such "wild" areas are typically found in human built, planned, managed and tamed environments, and it stigmatizes any cats who are not themselves tamed and under the control of human masters. Thus, it appears that the problematic status of feral cats is rooted in their existence outside of their assumed proper place and apart from human control. That "problem," as such, frames the everyday discourse about such cats, even

among their protectors, and can have very real consequences for the cats. As Arluke and Sanders (1996: 169) have pointed out, a species or an individual animal's worth or moral status to humans is directly related to the willingness or ability of the animal to accept subordinate positions to humans and to conform to human expectations. Domestic cats are seen as wild, out of place, and out of control. They are outlaws commonly seen as needing to be displaced, managed or re-placed in very intentional ways by humans. Likewise, in caring for and resisting the dis-placement of cats, caretakers often find themselves at risk for stigmatization as they transgress the socio-spatial and behavioral limits of traditional human-animal borders.

Stigma: Outlaws at the Border

Erving Goffman's (1959; 1962; 1967; 1971) now classic and broadly applicable works have influenced scholarship across a multitude of fields and subfields, which are important foundations for this work. In Stigma (1963) and Relations in Public (1971), Goffman illuminates the social process of stigmatization and the negotiation of identity in public spaces. Stigma is seen as a matter of social definition and its application is relational and more or less salient across contexts (1963: 3). Stigmatization results in the social devaluation of individuals and groups. This analysis reveals three notable sources of stigmatization that stem from cat caretaking. Two of these involve notions of trespassing space and the third is a type of guilt by association, or as Goffman refers to it, tribal stigma (1963: 4).

To explicate the tensions of place and space for cat caretakers it is helpful to distinguish between social and physical space (Bourdieu, 1996). Social space refers to all of the patterns and relationships that constitute social life, whereas physical space is the ground, literal and metaphorical, upon which social life takes place (social location). For caregivers physical space in which they perform caregiving is laden with social and cultural meanings that translate into normative expectations about behavior and belonging. Because this work is rooted in critical ethnographic practice, Lefebvre's (1974/1991: 101) observation that space is socially produced and that the processes of its production are evident in social practices and relations is especially relevant. Space is an indicator of power and influence. Having physical space, and the nature of that space, is

socially derived and relationally maintained. For example, those who have no legitimate physical space which to call 'home' have no legitimate social existence (Wright, 1997). Moreover, contradictions within and conflicts over space reveal the political character of space and its social production. The normative boundaries of space are never more clearly visible than when they are breeched or transgressed and powerful normalizing forces push back in an attempt to re-situate and re-establish boundaries. As the narratives below reveal, the attitudes and actions of TNR caretakers push against the contours of social relations and its established hierarchies of power and belonging. Therefore, their activity can be seen as boundary work.

Trespassing the physical space of work

According to Goffman (1963), groups establish the means of categorizing persons as normal in keeping with attributes and actions that appear appropriate for the social setting and the routines of social intercourse established for those settings. Behavioral expectations also center on how props or objects in a social setting are to be used and this is especially important for those working with feral cats. The built environment is part of the stage for social interaction and there are physical and organizational aspects of sites that influence and constrain behavior in important ways (Milligan, 1998). A place or site for interaction is part and product of the "world" of interaction, according to Blumer (1969: 10), and corresponds to Goffman's (1959) notion that physical spaces and associated props position and contextualize social performances. One of the major norm violations committed by feral cat caretakers that leads to stigmatization is the re-appropriation or, according to some, mis-use of the physical areas of the workplace.

Only thirteen of the 50 states in the U.S. have laws that specifically pertain to feral cats and those that do generally do not address the complexity of the domain needs of the species. The vast majority of those with such views, as well as the remaining states that simply address cats as domestic pets, shift responsibility for defining law to local governments (Fry, 2010). Consequently, the legal terrain for managing feral cats is inconsistent across and within state jurisdictions.[2] The majority of laws that pertain to cats define them as domestic pets and classify them as property needing to be identified and under control of the owner at all times. Because of these standard conceptual and

legal definitions of domestic animals as property and standard notions of criminal trespass, feral cat colony volunteers and managers often find themselves standing with the cats on contested legal and geographic terrain. As TNR groups have multiplied in number and the method for managing stray cat populations has become more widely understood and accepted, some cities have come to the aid of those groups by drafting and adopting agreements and feral cat ordinances that protect the groups and the cats they rescue. Yet, TNR efforts continue to be contested by members of campus communities who either do not understand the TNR philosophy or reject the re-animation goals implicit in that philosophy. As the following email communication between caretakers regarding the lack of university support demonstrates, local and state laws can undermine the legitimacy and/or impede the work of feral caretakers,

> Yep... there is a city ordinance that says if you feed it you own it. [College name] doesn't want to claim ownership of the cats and they tell us not to feed. I've explained to [Paul] on more than one occasion that we HAVE to maintain them and feeding is how we see them, see new ones, see injuries, see kittens, see ANYTHING.

Another email communication, posted to a group of caretakers after a campus neighbor objected to feeding near her property, shows the collision between natural space and social space and the confusion and frustration over the legal definitions of land and cats as property. The email stated,

> [June] and I are going to walk and scout this afternoon. Are you around to walk and talk solutions? We need to see where she's talking about moving her feeding station. I can't believe this woman is so unreasonable and thinks she can tell us where to feed but I guess we are trapped, the cats are basically trespassing on her property. Guess we're lucky they don't call the cops…

Feral caretakers necessarily violate normative expectations for the appropriation and use of the physical workplace as a locus of non-work related activities. As a result, their behavior at work does not conform to the expected routines of occupational social intercourse. Because feral cats on campus are not in their "proper" place, as in a human household, and because in general feral cats have not given over completely to the domestication attempts of humans (Anderson, 1997; Digard, 1990; Russell. 2002), they

are a reminder of human failures in trying to appropriate, partition and control nature (Griffiths, Poulter and Sibley, 2000). Thus, those who care for, defend or attempt to work alongside feral cats are often called into question by others who view their actions as incomprehensible because they represent such a radical departure from the dominionist perspective that guides most plans for and use patterns of physical space on a campus. In fact, most TNR programs experience formidable opposition and vast amounts of red-tape when volunteers first propose a TNR program to campus administrators. Eventually, many are successful at gaining approval, but some groups are not as fortunate and must do their work "under the radar" without explicit permission from administration to operate. Whether sanctioned or not, campus TNR programs continue to experience resistance and in some cases open hostility from faculty, staff, students, administration, and/or campus neighbors. An example of this comes from a story told to me by a TNR volunteer at a campus coalition meeting. One afternoon she was calling cats to the feeding station after her official workday had ended. She was there for a while because she was counting them in response to a report from another feeder that one of the cats might be missing. As she was packing up to go, a person she assumed to be a university employee approached her and inquired about what she was doing. She said that "he seemed very irritated and bossy." She responded pleasantly that she was feeding and doing a census of the cats that belong to the feral colony she helps to manage on campus. He responded in an alarmed tone, "You feed them here? Do you have permission?" She responded, "Yes" to which he responded "Unbelievable" and walked on to his car.

The following excerpt from a story relayed through an email represents a less common but more positive example, which demonstrates that the questioner simultaneously understood that cat caretaking on campus violates the physical use of space, but also accepted the redefinition of that space. She wrote,

> Hey, we might have a new volunteer. Last night I fed late and I had a student come over very interested in knowing why I was feeding the cats.... She wanted to know if I needed her to watch out for me while I was feeding to make sure no one was coming. I assured her it was okay for me to be here…. She was thrilled to know it was okay and like she loves cats and wants to help us out. One more on the page—a good day.

This example shows that those who inhabit the borderlands of human/animal space are sometimes fortunate enough to find sympathetic others (Goffman, 1963: 30) who are willing to assist. In this illustration the student not only shares an understanding of the boundaries being crossed, but is also willing to protect those who dare to cross them.

Trespassing normative space

A second source of stigma, also a form of trespass, involves being out of bounds in ideological or normative space. As a work community, employees and students at colleges and universities share common spheres of normative experience. As Erikson (1966) and Lefebvre (1991) explain, humans create social and cultural spaces, which in turn influence spatial practices and perceptual fields. Groups share cultural space, on which they write and rewrite the boundaries of social existence. The mental and social activity of cultural space imposes itself upon physical space; or as Lefebvre observes, "practical activity writes upon nature" (Lefebvre, 1991: 117). Social space articulates social and spatial arrangements and vice versa. For example, social power is symbolically realized and consolidated in the appropriation and organization of space. Thus, the logics of social space reflect internal hierarchies of power. Social codes tell us who is in and who is out, and those who defy the logics of space are out of order, out of place, deviant.

However, there are always insurgent forces in everyday life that defy codification, resist domination and create conflict within the totalizing forces of hegemony (Lefebvre, 1991). The liminality of feral cats and the ambiguities and resistance that arise from their position in the moral landscape creates challenges and opportunities for the re-colonizing of space. In trespassing the spatial and social arrangements of work and its related hierarchies of power and meaning, cat caretakers open up spaces of consideration, not just for cats, but for all species. For example, feral caretaking is discredited because it challenges the modern definition of pet ownership and the traditional views of moral obligation regarding the care of undomesticated non-human animals. While it is true that in recent times cats, as pets, have come to hold special roles and relatively high status in the lives of some humans, millions of healthy cats are euthanized each year in the U.S alone simply because they are homeless. The TNR philosophy calls upon humans to treat cats as semi-autonomous beings, not wild and not pet, deserving of care. While the logic

of TNR seems to resonate with some, many more find it alien and are unable to broaden the horizon for cats. An email to a caretaker from a staff member who became aware of an attempt to establish a TNR group on a college campus reveals common assumptions about which animals deserve care, who should provide care and where that care should occur. Part of the email read,

> …I received the flyer [about campus feral cats] and don't get me wrong, I have a cat and like cats a lot. Unfortunately these are wild cats and I don't think they really belong on campus. I tend to think that cats belong in homes where they can be cared for properly and not cause problems for others…. I think it would be best for them to be moved to farms or homes…. I keep coming back to the question, why is this [university name's] problem to solve? This is[city name]'s or a wildlife department problem.

The following example is also a negative reaction to the expansion of the normative boundaries of caretaking into the workplace. Upon overhearing a portion of a conversation in the office between a TNR volunteer and a co-worker, her supervisor walked out of his office and said with all seriousness, "[Virginia] you do know you don't work for a zoo?" He laughed afterwards, but she said that, to be safe, she decided not to talk about TNR work in the office. His comment not only demonstrated the normative expectation of the physical divide of work and home, but also signaled that her care taking behavior was out of order in this work environment. Even though her job performance had never come into question, his comment served as a form of informal social control to displace cat talk and indirectly to signal the devaluation of cat care in the work environment.

The next example shows another way in which everyday spaces are powerfully charged with hegemonic conceptualizations of normative space. In this situation caretaking of cats at work is interpreted by a colleague as compensatory mothering—possibly suggesting a kind of psychological substitution on the part of the caretaker. An untenured faculty caretaker was in a minor conflict with a tenured faculty member over a feeding station that he felt was too near the front entrance of their office building. The resolution was that she agreed to move the feeding further away from any of the building's entry points. After their meeting she let the other caretakers know of the

agreement and said that afterwards he said, "I understand that you don't have kids and that these cats are your substitute children." She said she wanted to let him know that most of the TNR volunteers on campus do have children, but she was just happy to have the conflict with someone she likes and with whom she must work so closely resolved. In this example, her concern for the cats, coupled with the hierarchies of power at work, allow the tenured faculty member to have his say without objection. Also, his language reveals that he considered her cat caretaking as dis-placed care resulting from another socially stigmatizing status, that of childless woman. In this situation, gender stereotypes map onto the distribution of power in the workplace, thus reinforcing status hierarchies that view caretaking and motherhood as essential features of womanhood. In this situation the cat caretaker's attempt to redefine space was met with an attempt to place her in a devalued position within a powerfully charged normative framework that sees socially constructed aspects of gender identity as 'natural'.

Often, within the normative frame of work, caretakers who defend or attempt to work alongside feral cats are seen as violating the expectation that home, and not work, is the place for caretaking. This rigid separation of domestic and work spheres, a remnant of industrialization (Lefebrve, 1991), is gendered and problematic for those whose efforts represent a redefinition and re-appropriation of workspace as a safe place for both human and nonhuman animals. My own work as a TNR advocate and caretaker shows the confusion bystanders experience when encountering caretaking out-side of traditional spaces of care. My field notes read,

> I was feeding a lone feral cat on the edge of campus that is bordered by a very nice residential area. A young woman was walking down the sidewalk toward the library. Her face seemed familiar and I tried to remember if she had been in my class or if I knew her through my animal work on campus. Before I could place her, she called out in a friendly inquisitive tone "Dr. Thompson, is that your cat?" Assuming at that point that I did know her and that perhaps she knew something of my work with TNR, I said, "well, not exactly, but, he is one of the cats in the feral colony." She looked pleased and said, "after you tame it, are you going to take it home?"

The student's assumption that my actions regarding the cat naturally would be to move

him into a normative place of care, which would be an adoptive home or my own, illustrates how the extension of care can create confusion and tension with friends, colleagues and family members. One feral manager told me that after an unusually negative set of interactions with several people on campus her boyfriend said to her "I do see where they are coming from. You can't go around treating the campus like it is your home, people don't like it and what do you get? Just heartache." Another feral cat manager was approached by a friendly colleague who said that, unlike some, he didn't mind her caring for the cats. However, he wanted her to explain "after you trap them and fix them, why can't you just bring them home?" Each of these cases exemplifies the non-conscious acceptance of the work-home dichotomy and the breach of the normative expectations of care by feral cat caretakers.

Guilt By Association: Tribal Stigmatization

The third source of stigma experienced by feral caretakers is that their activities in the workplace indirectly connects them and their charges through *tribal stigmatization* (Goffman, 1963). In other words, the evaluations of an individual are based upon attitudes, stereotypes, myths, and impressions of a stigmatized group to which the individual belongs or sympathizes. One of the most important contributors to stigma attached to those who work with feral cats is deep seated prejudice against cats, which originates in myth, folklore and common misperception that cats are dirty, evil, diseased, mean, parasite carriers. Such erroneous assumptions result in the wholesale categorization of cats as 'dirty' or 'bad' animals by some (Arluke and Sanders, 1996; Smith, 1999). Cats are disparaged through negative stereotypes and those who care for them are demeaned by association. For instance, in the following email regarding a complaint made about cats on campus by a staff member, we see a clear example of how a strong dislike of cats can result in their negative images becoming attached to those who care for them,

> …We have had another complaint….the complaint made it sound like crazy cat ladies had taken over this side of campus.….and we [caretakers] are causing health problems near campus by feeding the cats.

And another example, from my field notes, concerns a confrontation that occurred on the

edge of campus, near an apartment complex,

> After my class, I went over to the north campus parking lot to check on [Plato] and [Erasmus]….[Plato] was out sunning on the apartment side. I called him over. A resident heard me … came out in a lather and told me to please stop feeding those stray cats….that the landlord is upset about all of those damn cat people feeding around here….

In yet another incident, as retold by a staff member, the anger and bad feelings that can occur when cat lovers and cat haters collide on campus reveals another form of tribal stigmatization at work. Faculty and staff members were gathered informally in the front region of their office space where some volunteers were having informal conversations about how and where to move the cats because there had been complaints about fleas and feeding. One of the faculty members overhearing the conversation said 'I wish I had a bb gun. I could get rid of them for you." Several people overheard him and the volunteer feeder in the room said, "You don't mean that do you? You wouldn't really hurt them?" He replied, "Of course not, but they are a definitely a problem." This case illustrates how cat caretakers are treated callously, faced with hostile views of their work and the cats through insensitive pseudo threats.

Another campus also had a problem with fleas at a temporary building near a TNR feeding spot. The flea outbreak was immediately blamed on the feral cats in the area and the caretakers for feeding near the building. Accusatory emails were sent to the TNR manager on campus. The faculty members housed in the building who were complaining had not stopped to consider that other animals lived in and around the temporary building and might be the source of the fleas. TNR caretakers initially felt this would be an easy situation to clarify since the feral cats in that area had been treated for fleas consistently for many months, making it likely that the flea infestation had come from raccoons, mice, rats or squirrels living in and around the building. Despite reasoned explanations as to the likely origins of the flea problem, the following email response was sent to the colony manager from a lower level administrator officed in the building: "Feral cats don't have fleas…..Riiiiight!"

Another increasingly common and powerful source of tribal stigmatization experienced by feral cat caretakers is being associated with political and ideological

groups aligned with the animal rights movement, and consequentially to a set of hotly politicized ideological tensions on university campuses. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) are two such groups that are sometimes unfairly vilified by some faculty, staff and students on university campuses, especially those whose political ideologies run counter to animal rights. For example, several TNR program managers reported being questioned at various times by professors from departments that used animals for research. One TNR manager said the following:

> A prof from the [X] department emailed to ask if I had time for coffee. He wanted to know more about the TNR group on campus. I naively thought he might actually be an advocate. It was a weird conversation. Turns out he was just interested in whether or not we were an animal rights group and I can understand that given his research. Of course I haven't heard from him since.

A graduate student from the sciences who advocated and volunteered with campus and city TNR groups on a regular basis recounted that his faculty advisor was disturbed when he became aware that he was participating in TNR. His advisor said, "being associated with an animal rights groups could hurt your job chances."

To complicate matters further, there is a great deal of public ignorance about animal interest groups because media accounts rarely distinguish whether a group's primary aim is welfare, protection, or rights. Debates over TNR often result in intense disagreements among, and sometimes within, groups because of divergent goals and ideological stances. For example, PETA does not support the TNR method for managing cat populations (PETA, 2010). As their website states,

> PETA's experiences with trap-alter-and-release (abandon) programs and "managed" feral cat colonies have led us to believe that these programs are not usually in cats' best interests… Having witnessed the painful deaths of countless feral cats instead of seeing them drift quietly "to sleep" in their old age, we cannot in good conscience advocate trapping, altering, and releasing as a humane way to deal with overpopulation and homelessness (PETA, 2010).

The National Audubon Society also has a general policy against TNR (Williams, 2009), with the exception of a few state and city chapters that have found it effective to work with TNR groups to reduce the overall threat to birds that stray cats pose in those areas

(Wilson, 2009). However, the Humane Society of the United States and many cat rescue groups wholeheartedly endorse TNR (Humane Society of the United States, 2009). It appears that most feral caretakers on college campuses do not belong to or affiliate with animal rights groups, rather they are typically active members of animal welfare organizations that pertain specifically to feral cat welfare and companion animal rescue. The most common affiliation among the volunteers is Alley Cat Allies, a national organization that works to protect and improve the lives of cats by providing support, information and funding for TNR groups (Alley Cat Allies, 2010).

Ironically, TNR work is also sometimes stigmatized by other animal protection groups. As a strategy for discrediting TNR, Internet blog posts and articles published by groups such as The Wildlife Society (TWS) and The Audubon Society present information laced with hyperbole that portrays TNR groups as irrational animal rights advocates who protect an 'invasive' species. One possible motivation for discrediting TNR is species competition and turf wars among advocates. For example, an Audubon related blog summarized the problem this way,

> The debate over TNR (Trap, Neuter, and Return) programs and how to deal with feral cats often pits animal-rights activists [meaning TNR advocates] against wildlife advocates [Birders]. Bird lovers contend that wild cats kill hundreds of millions of birds each year. Cat lovers say that the felines don't deserve to die (Berger, 2009).

The competing species claim also has the effect of deemphasizing the many human contributions to species loss. This is demonstrated in an *Audubon Magazine* article titled "Feline Fatales" (Williams, 2009). The article states,

> With something like 150 million free-ranging house cats wreaking havoc on our wildlife, the last thing we need is Americans sustaining them in the wild….TNR causes "hyperpredation," in which well-fed cats continue to prey on bird, mammal, reptile, and amphibian populations so depressed they can no longer sustain native predators."

In the campus workplace setting competing species rhetoric is a force with which TNR workers must contend and are susceptible. For example, on one large campus with a well-managed program a faculty member sent the following email to a feral colony

manager who in turn forwarded it to volunteers for feedback on how to proceed:

> I applaud [name of group] for its emphasis on spaying and neutering the feral cats on campus. But, why are you releasing the cats to kill what little wildlife we have left? Cats belong indoors. Your group needs to have greater respect for wildlife on campus and notably the ones that belong here [referring to birds, not cats]. Is there not another plan to pursue that would not imperil birds? I implore you to desist in releasing predators into the campus environment.

The colony volunteers emailed back and forth among themselves and with the faculty member debating on how to respectfully handle this complaint and plea by the 'birder'. The resolution was that the TNR manager agreed to keep better records to show reductions in numbers of cats on campus. The skeptical faculty member agreed to be open to future evidence that TNR, although not a perfect solution for birds, is better than the kill method for reducing cat populations. These examples show that even among animal advocacy and rights groups, TNR workers and groups sometimes find themselves marginalized for trying to shape social spaces where humans and cats can co-habit. Even though there are myriad reasons for bird loss, including urban sprawl, campus construction, pollution, etc., the message again echoed in these debates is that cats are out of place and TNR workers are called into question for aiding outlaw cats.

Managing Emotions

Those involved in TNR understand that they must contend with the emotional realities of working with, for, and against others on behalf of the cats. As one volunteer jokingly, but earnestly said, "working for cats is exhausting." Previous research on service sector work by Hochschild (1979; 1983) and Copp (1998) is helpful for illuminating the dynamics of emotion management when working on the edges of ideological landscapes, especially those that relate to hierarchies of occupations, professions or workplaces. For cat people, emotion management in the forms of suppressing, transforming, or expressing feelings when performing at work is complicated by the ideological and structural complexity of the college campus as a workplace. Nevertheless, emotion management is vital to the survival of the TNR group and colony. Because of the open nature of campuses, students, staff, faculty, and visitors

are constantly coming and going through physical space, which means that the foci of potential interactions and conflicts with others are numerous, variable and unpredictable. Cat caretakers often experience emotional dissonance derived from the disjuncture between their genuine emotions and those they are required to display as part of keeping their work life intact. Further complications arise due to the conflict between the roles they play at work as professionals, which are structured and formal, and the roles people play as part of TNR, which are unstructured and emergent. Moreover, colony time is 24 hours a day, whereas work time is temporally circumscribed for staff and administrators and, to a lesser extent, for faculty members. The colony is an ever present preoccupation with caretakers and what happens with the colony bleeds into work and non-work time for TNR feeders and managers. In such an environment, TNR managers and feeders must be constantly on guard and ready to lend a hand to co-caretakers, and/or do a bit of impression management to deal with others while also feeding and trapping. This can become difficult to navigate. A TNR feeder communicated that while she was setting a trap early one morning she encountered a faculty group coming back from a breakfast meeting. She was surprised because the group included one of the anti-cat "troublemakers" on campus and another faculty member who had helped raise money for the TNR program.

> I played it cool—just said hello to them and finished my work by covering the trap with a brown towel and hoped that one of them would say something to me so I could say something positive about our work…and I kicked myself all morning for not thinking of something to say that would have been good for him to hear while I had [Georgia] as backup. But knowing me, it is probably better I kept my big mouth shut.

In this example, the caretaker is painfully aware of the disjuncture between her genuine feelings and the need to project positive emotion in this situation. At the same time, she is also unsure she can pull off a good surface performance, by saying the right things, due to the intensity of her emotional dissonance. In this way the conversation is a world of its own with its own boundary maintaining tendencies and where landscapes of the self are negotiated (Goffman, 1967: 113). Her uncertainty reflects, to some extent, her degree of alienation at work. She is unable to conjure up a competent performance and she

understands that this has further alienated her by leaving her out of the conversation.

In another case, a feral manager who is normally calm and collected fails to suppress her emotions in an encounter when she was questioned at the end of a workday. She told me:

> I know better than to take the bait. But, you know it had been a long week. My husband was sick and the baby was coming down with it. I had to get the traps set and get to the drugstore before going home and wouldn't you know he caught me right as I was walking out of the door and said something like, 'I don't see why you spend all of your time on those cats when there are so many people starving in the world'… Without thinking I shot back telling him, 'well, I don't see you spending any time on either'…I know that was mean, but gracious what a mean thing to say to me."

As this response shows, interpersonal conflicts over cats can result from lapses in emotion management. Normally, she might have used humor in her inflection or chosen different words to uphold interactional deference, but her external preoccupation (Goffman, 1967: 118) alienated her from the conversation and she reacted defensively when her identity was called into question by someone who had a history of being critical of her cat caretaking. In this case, he devalued her work with cats in light of the needs of human beings, and she reacted in kind as she rushed out of the office to provide care for both humans and animals in need.

The area of greatest need for emotion management among caretakers comes when dealing with the potential or actual harm to cats. Very bad things can happen to cats when they are living in social and physical spaces hostile to their presence. As Arluke's (2010: 37) work documents, animals, often cats, are victims of extreme cruelty, sometimes for motives as unjustified as adolescent curiosity. Within the realm of an urban campus, cats live in dangerous places. Their territories map onto human geography and stretch across a conglomeration of dominated and cultivated 'natural' spaces. Human built environments pose many threats to cats as the following email communicates:

> I have sad news everybody. We found [Jonah] today, he crossed over the rainbow bridge. He was probably hit by a car. I found him up in the grass on his turf, and I am so hurt and sad, I can't express how sad. As many of you know, he had a bad

> habit of running across the street and parking lot to the feeding place. Many of you will be heartbroken too because we have all known him since he showed up 5 years ago. I know the point of the TNR is that the cats will eventually die off but personally it breaks my heart every time we lose one, especially from the original crew and in this way. Can I get some help this morning to deal with his remains? I don't think I can do it by myself—I need some support.

Unfortunately, on many of the campuses, cats take the leftovers and wastelands of campus space—parking lots, the areas behind food service areas, construction areas, the green spaces near roadways and the perimeters of campuses. Their caretakers, by virtue of standing with them in the areas where they live, experience a visual landscape of the campus that is quite different than the one the typical employee sees. Volunteers care for and understand cats *in situ*, a fact exemplified by a kitten rescue on my home campus. My field notes read:

> A student calls me alarmed. A kitten in front of the dorm construction site and it has been there all day and it is really sick. It is rainy/ icy and the temperature is dropping rapidly…. I question, how big, thin how is it acting, can you approach, fearful? [Student] says it gets close enough to take food, but runs if you try to reach for him. I tell him I will come with a trap and be there in less than a half-hour. When I arrived tabby kitten near death; wobbling, emaciated, diarrhea, wet, covered in thick fluid, smells rancid. We set the trap with turkey and rice baby food and wait in the sleet/rain for an hour. With the cranes, piles of rubble, machinery, and noise and now these temps and weather, how did he even survive this long? Finally he goes into the trap. Rushed to vet, named him Tom Brown after the dorm where he is found…. [Vet] says Tom is covered in thick grease. His guess is kitty had been living in a dumpster where grease traps are dumped. Tom may have a chance, has tested negative for all of the terrible things. [Vet] says we can try to save him…. [February 6, 2008]. Three days of hand feeding, watching him suffer, wasting away, cleaning diarrhea…rallied yesterday afternoon, but then worsened last night. Tom Brown died today. [February 10 2008].

This example shows that cats on university campuses are subject to the worst aspects of

constructing the built environment. And, in their attempts to render aid in these dominated spaces, cat caretakers find themselves in unusual and trying circumstances. Also illustrated here are the day-to-day emotional roller coaster and the intense stress of direct care for cats in hostile environments. Managing emotions related to death, uncertainty, conflict, interruption, anger, fear, finances, and work responsibilities make the life of cat workers difficult. As was said to me by a staff member who has worked in rescue for a decade and almost as long with TNR on her campus, "You have to be tough, tough like the cats." But, as becomes clear from working in TNR, even the toughest among us can experience fatigue and burnout (Figley and Roop, 2006).

One example of emotional meltdown and lingering resentment, relayed to me by a long-time caretaker, occurred when a she was confronted by a close colleague of many years. She said:

> He let me have it over the cats, right there in the parking lot…I was so shocked I can't even remember most of what he said. I was dumbstruck. He threatened the cats I sure remember that...and his words were so cruel. I am sure he was displacing some aggression and it found an outlet in his hatred for cats. But, I don't care. I hate him now, I really do. I can honestly say something changed in me permanently that day. I don't like it, but that is the way it is…I'm just not the same."

This caretaker suffered emotional trauma and lost a valuable friend as a result of the fallout from her caretaking. My own experiences merge with the sentiments of a caretaker of a failed TNR group on a college campus. The resistance and lack of support for their work finally got the best of their small group. She said, "Every once in a while you just have to take a break, or it will break you." Observing and listening to feral cat caretakers do the "emotion work" (Hochschild, 1979) necessary to survive in the moral landscape of the workplace reveals the situations and important others who make them feel out of place in their own work spaces. Like the feral cats they manage they are constantly positioned as outsiders and it wears on them.

In contrast to the negative emotions experienced when interacting with humans in these environments, cat caretakers have an overwhelming number of positive experiences when interacting with the cats. The result of this is that, in many cases, associating with

cats at work is more gratifying, predictable and relatively more positive than associating with people, especially disapproving others. One TNR caregiver said:

> I feed at 6:00 in the morning, just so I won't have to see anyone—that way it is just the cats and me, it is really peaceful in the mornings before the people get to campus.

Moreover, the clarity of the role of caretaker with its short and long term rewards is readily apparent. Unfortunately, the reinforcing nature of cat care in contrast to the hostility sometimes shown by co-workers results in a kind of species alienation for humans who save non-human animals. People in the workplace are often overworked, overcommitted and under-rewarded and seeing cat caretakers give their time, energy and resources to cats can produce inter-species jealousy. This was conveyed, indirectly, in an earlier example where a colleague accuses a caretaker of caring more about cats than people. Having colleagues be critical, accusatory, and intolerant of cat caretaking creates the interpersonal dynamics of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more critical and antagonistic humans are about cats, the more likely caretakers are to prefer cats to some of their human co-workers. Moreover, the implicit rewards of caretaking coupled with being defined as a deviant for caretaking, sometimes results in greater species alienation and stronger identification with cats.

Conclusion

Whether or not the proliferation of TNR programs on college campuses represents a fundamental change in how some people view and live among non-human animals, their work does provide a small and growing space for re-animation of the campus. However, although illuminated somewhat by a light at the end of the tunnel, TNR workers operate in the face of cultural, social and institutional resistance in the form of:

- Strong normative frameworks that see animals as property to be owned and controlled by individuals,
- Strong patterns of behavior rooted in tradition that fail to consider animal agency,
- Legal and moral frameworks that cannot reconcile the blurring of the binary categories such as wild and domestic, and
- A political economy that continues to approach nature and non-human animals as

part of it in anthropocentric and exploitative utilitarian modes.

Cats, while experts of their own space and time, lack the voice with which to resist the definitions placed on them and the spatial boundaries superimposed on their territories by humans. Their lives and ours intersect in consequential ways, although the weight of these intersections is disproportionately borne by the cats. The configuration of workspace in the context of the late industrial model of appropriation and ownership and the concomitant view of land and non-human animals as property, places cats and their caretakers in the role of trespasser. Consequentially, for the cats their homes are often designated as off-limits to them. They are not 'owned' so they make no sense in the logics of human habitat. They are infeasible, but they persist. They are at work before us, with us and after us. They greet, socialize, hunt, lurk, peer, sleep, sun themselves in places where they live, but don't belong. In *The Animal That Therefore I Am* (2008), Derrida's pronouncement that we are naked under the gaze of the cat (p. 10) reminds us that our actions toward other species reveals much about who we are and emphasizes that, like it or not, we are all "unimpeachably, near" (p. 11) the animal. If he was right that "the relationship of the living and of the living animal" (p. 402) is the most important question, then perhaps the everyday resistance of feral cat caretakers in the colonized spaces of the workplace represent a small contribution to the reanimation project and ultimately to the deconstruction of spaces in ways that allow for the *subjectivization* of animals. Thus, such work presses for the re-storying of 'animal' subjectivity, which has been denied by humans in their constructions of the social and natural worlds.

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Notes

1. TNR groups are typically self-funded through volunteer work, grants, and donations. Most TNR groups are registered non-profit groups. Conservatively, these groups save their cities and states thousands of dollars each year by taking care of cats that would normally be under the domain of tax-funded animal control agencies. On university and college campuses without official TNR programs the general practice is to trap and euthanize free roaming cats. This practice has had no impact long term on reducing or eliminating the presence of cats and has drawn fire from students and cat advocates who oppose cat extermination programs on moral grounds (Alley Cat Allies, 2010). A few forward thinking universities have taken the lead and through their Veterinary Schools run or assist official TNR programs as part of their overall mission. These schools have

been critical players in TNR research and program evaluation. Example of such programs are Texas A&M University School of Veterinary Science http://vetmed.tamu.edu/afcat/, Cornell University College of Veterinary Medicine, http://www.vet.cornell.edu/fhc/, and Purdue University School of Veterinary Medicine, http://www.vet.purdue.edu/cpb/faculty_profiles/beck_alan.html.

2. City ordinances that protect feral cats are reviewed and updated by www.animallaw.info. Only thirteen states and the District of Columbia have any laws that even mention feral cats (California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and Vermont). Generally, the state laws that do address these issues simply (1) define feral cats and (2) enable local governments to adopt their own solutions. The result of this approach, though, is that the law of feral cats can, and often does, vary drastically within the same state. An example of a feral cat protection ordinance can be found at: http://dallasanimalservices.org/trap_neuter_return.html

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Ecological Biopower, Environmental Violence Against Animals, and the "Greening" of the Factory Farm

Jonathan L. Clark

Abstract

The promulgation of pollution control regulations governing factory farms has led to a striking new way of representing and intervening in the bodies of farmed animals: the body is being represented as a source of pollution, and various technological interventions, from genetic engineering to dietary changes, are being deployed to reduce pollution at the source. In this article I analyze this new technoscientific project through the theoretical lens of ecological biopower. Focusing on the industrial pork sector's efforts to keep the cost of complying with nutrient management regulations in check, the article examines the case of "environmental nutrition," a dietary strategy that aims to reduce the excretion of nutrients from the bodies of swine. By highlighting whose diet is being changed in this approach and whose is not, I argue that environmental nutrition is as much about avoiding the exercise of ecological biopower over human beings as it is about exercising ecological biopower over farmed animals. I also argue that the pressing need to reduce the environmental impacts of factory farming is being used to justify new forms of violence against animals.

Keywords: ecological biopower, Foucault and animals, factory farming, environmental violence against animals

Since 1944, the National Research Council (NRC), one of the most influential non-governmental scientific advisory bodies in the United States, has been publishing Nutrient Requirements of Swine (NRC 2012). Given its title, one might expect that the main purpose of this handbook is to explain how best to meet the animals' nutrient needs. Yet as Richard Lewontin and Jean-Pierre Berlan (1986, p. 28) once wrote, we must be careful not to confuse "the 'needs' of animals" with "the needs of capital." A more accurate title would actually be Nutrient Requirements of the Pork Industry, for the main purpose of the handbook—and, indeed, of the field of swine nutrition as a

whole, at least as it has tended to be practiced in the United States to date—is to help the industry formulate diets that maximize profits, whether by trimming the feed bill or, as I explain in this article, by helping to keep the cost of complying with environmental regulations in check.

Published in 1998, the tenth edition of the handbook included a new chapter titled "Minimizing Nutrient Excretion" (NRC 1998, p. 103). According to leading swine nutritionist Gary Cromwell (2005), who chaired the subcommittee that wrote this edition, the industry had traditionally given little thought to this topic. By the early 1990s, however, a groundswell of public concern about the water pollution caused by factory farms had led to the promulgation of nutrient management regulations governing the disposal of excess manure, and the cost of complying with these regulations had created an economic incentive to reduce excretion of nitrogen and phosphorus, the two most commonly regulated nutrients.

Over the past two decades, animal scientists in the United States and elsewhere have developed numerous strategies for reducing nutrient excretion, including phase-feeding, split-sex feeding, selecting animals for increased productive efficiency, and using metabolic modifiers to increase efficiency (CAST 2002; 1996; Kornegay 1996; Kornegay and Harper 1997; NRC 2012, pp. 194-202; 1998, pp. 103-106). Scientists at the University of Guelph, in Ontario, Canada, even went so far as to create genetically engineered Enviropigs™ who are able to excrete low-phosphorus manure. Swine nutritionists have developed several dietary strategies, including an approach that E.T. Kornegay and A.F. Harper called "[e]nvironmental nutrition," or "the concept of formulating cost-effective diets and feeding animals to meet their minimum mineral needs for acceptable performance, reproduction, and carcass quality with minimal excretion of minerals" (Kornegay and Harper 1997, p. 100; cf. Longenecker and Spears 1995, p. ii). Taken together, these efforts are part of a larger development in animal technoscience, in which the bodies of farmed animals are being targeted for environmental improvement (Twine 2010, pp. 135-143), a development that is being driven partly by regulatory pressure.

In technoscience, Paul Rabinow (1999, p. 408) explained, "[r]epresenting and intervening" go hand-in-hand; the goal is not simply to know an object, but to know it "in such a way that it can be changed." In the field of swine nutrition, as in the other animal sciences, it is the bodies of farmed animals that are subjected to this technoscientific gaze (Derrida 2008, p. 25; Twine 2010, pp. 83-94). The point is not simply to know the body, but also to alter it, often in ways that are designed to maximize profits. The promulgation of pollution control regulations

governing factory farms has led to a striking new way of representing and intervening in the bodies of farmed animals: the body is being represented as a source of pollution, and various technological interventions, from genetic engineering to dietary changes, are being deployed to reduce pollution at the source.

I examine this new technoscientific project through the lens of Michel Foucault's (1990, pp. 135-159) concept of biopower. According to Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, biopower "entails one or more truth discourses about the 'vital' character of living human beings; an array of authorities considered competent to speak that truth; strategies for intervention upon collective existence in the name of life and health; and modes of subjectification, in which individuals work on themselves in the name of individual or collective life or health" (Rabinow and Rose 2006, p. 195, italics omitted; see also Lemke 2011, pp. 117-123). As this influential elucidation of the concept suggests, biopower has typically been used to analyze the exercise of power over human life. Over the past decade, however, scholars in the fields of environmental studies and animal studies have sought to expand Foucault's concept by suggesting that biopower is exercised over "all life," not just human life (Wadiwel 2002, para. 3, italics in original), and that it is often exercised in the name of the environment (P. Rutherford 1999). Combining these two insights, several scholars have argued that certain regimes of environmental governance—including, most notably, endangered species preservation and wildlife management—subject nonhuman animals to "ecological biopower" (Youatt 2008, p. 404; see also Bergman 2005; 1990, p. 82; Chrulew 2011; Dutkiewicz 2010; Luke 2000; Rinfret 2009; S. Rutherford 2011, pp. 84-86, 118, 132-133, 138, 193).

It is certainly true that environmental governance has led to new ways of representing and intervening in the lives of nonhuman animals, at both the individual and the population scales. And it is also true that this is being done in the name of discourses that seek to protect the ecological conditions of life for human beings and other species (Youatt 2008). This means that the first three prongs of Rabinow and Rose's framework are easily met. It is the fourth prong—modes of subjectification—that should give us pause. After all, there is no evidence to suggest that nonhuman animals work on themselves in the name of the environment (Bergman 2005; Youatt 2008). The case of environmental nutrition provides an interesting angle on this issue. By focusing on whose diet is being changed and whose is not, I argue that environmental nutrition is as much about avoiding the exercise of ecological biopower over human beings as it is about

subjecting farmed animals to ecological biopower. This does not, however, mean that we should eschew the concept when thinking about environmental interventions into the lives of nonhuman animals. To the contrary, as I demonstrate below, a great strength of biopower as a concept is that it helps broaden our understanding of violence against animals, including violence that is done in the name of the environment.

Before jumping into the argument, let me offer a few comments about the empirical focus of the article. Although my analysis focuses on the United States, efforts to reduce nutrient excretion are also underway in other countries where manure disposal is being regulated, including Canada and the Netherlands. And although I focus on swine production, other livestock and poultry sectors have also responded to regulatory pressure by seeking to reduce nutrient excretion. Finally, although I focus on nutrients, a similar story could be told about other potential pollutants that are either already being regulated or for which regulation is looming on the political horizon. A good example is the work that is currently being done to reduce methane emissions from cows and other ruminants.

Environmental nutrition

Manure is a valuable fertilizer because of the nutrients it contains, particularly nitrogen and phosphorus. As a result of the industrialization of swine production, however, many swine breeding and feeding operations in the United States have such high densities of animals to farmland that they generate excess manure (Key et al. 2011). Excess phosphorus is the biggest challenge facing the industry. The manure produced by many operations contains more phosphorus than is needed as fertilizer by all the farmland on the operation. Various efforts are underway to tap the value of excess manure, including the construction of methane digesters that promise to use it as a source of energy to power the facilities in which the animals are confined (Key and Sneeringer 2011). For many operations, however, the least costly way of dealing with excess manure, given existing technologies and markets, is to apply as much of it as possible to nearby farmland, whether on site or at another farm in the immediate area, even if this means applying it at a rate that supplies more nutrients than the land needs.

Though an expedient solution to the industry's manure management problem, using farmland as a low-cost sink for the disposal of excess manure has led to serious environmental

problems, including the contamination of groundwater and the pollution of lakes, estuaries, and other surface waters. Nutrient runoff is a major concern. Applying excess manure causes nutrients to accumulate in the soil. Storm-induced runoff can transport these nutrients into surface waters, accelerating the process of eutrophication and leading to fish kills and other problems. In the early 1990s, in response to concerns about nutrient runoff, Pennsylvania and other states in the U.S. began promulgating nutrient management regulations restricting (but not banning) the use of farmland as a waste sink, and the federal government has since followed suit. By setting a maximum legally acceptable nutrient application rate, nutrient management regulations limit the amount of excess manure that an operation may apply on site. Any that may not be must be managed in some other, typically more expensive way, such as hauling it to a farm that needs the nutrients. Lowering the nutrient content of a given volume of manure increases the amount of it that may be applied per acre before exceeding the maximum legally acceptable nutrient application rate. Nutrient management regulations thus create an economic incentive to reduce excretion of nitrogen and phosphorus. And because phosphorus presents the more formidable regulatory challenge (for reasons I cannot explore here), there is an added incentive to reduce excretion of it.

Phosphorus is not just a valuable fertilizer and a potential pollutant. It is also an essential nutrient that plays numerous anatomical and physiological roles in the bodies of swine. As in all vertebrates, it is a key component of the skeleton. If the diet contains too little, bones can weaken and begin to break. Young pigs can develop rickets, older pigs can develop osteomalacia, and sows producing large amounts of milk can develop paralysis of the hind legs (Cromwell 2005; NRC 2012, p. 78).

The NRC handbook defines not how much phosphorus the animals need (whatever that might mean), but the minimum amount needed to maximize growth rate and feed conversion efficiency, two important production traits (Cromwell 2005; NRC 2012, p. 74). This amount differs depending upon how an animal is used (NRC 2012, pp. 208-209). For example, young pigs who are kept as part of the breeding stock are said to require more phosphorus than do feeder pigs, who are slaughtered when they are approximately six months old (NRC 2012, pp. 208-209). Because the life of a feeder pig is so short, Penn State's Environmental Standards of Production for Larger Pork Producers in Pennsylvania explains, the industry need not concern itself with "long-term skeletal strength" (Mikesell and Kephart 1999, p. 9).

If, on the other hand, the diet contains more phosphorus than the animal can utilize, the excess is excreted into the urine and feces,[2] where it becomes a potential regulatory problem for the industry. One of the most straightforward ways of reducing phosphorus excretion is to feed the animals no more of this nutrient than is needed to achieve production goals. Traditionally, the industry added extra phosphorus as a safety factor. "Little attention was paid to 'over-supplementing' diets with nutrients," Cromwell (2005, p. 611) explained, "as long as it was not overly expensive." "The rationale was that the nutrients in excess of the animal's requirements were simply stored in the body tissues or excreted in the manure" (Cromwell 2005, p. 611). But this all changed with the promulgation of nutrient management regulations, which, as Cromwell (2005, p. 611) explained, created "a strong incentive in the swine industry to reduce [phosphorus] excretion."

The pork industry has long been aware that it is possible to maximize production without maximizing bone strength (Kornegay and Harper 1997). This is a clear example of why it is so important to distinguish the industry's needs from the needs of the animals. The industry's need to keep compliance costs in check has increased the economic incentive to skimp on skeletal strength, particularly in the case of feeder pigs. Yet as Kornegay and Harper (1997) suggested, this strategy has the potential to undermine animal welfare:

> It is well known that the amount of [phosphorus] required to maximize growth is less than the amount required to maximize bone integrity. Perhaps, from the perspective of animal well-being, attempts to maximize bone integrity are most important. But from an environmental perspective, attempts to maximize bone integrity results [sic] in excessive excretion of [phosphorus]. (Kornegay and Harper 1997, p. 104, citations omitted).

As regulatory pressure increased manure disposal costs, they predicted, the industry would eliminate the safety factor and begin feeding the animals no more phosphorus than needed to maximize production; in fact, the industry might ratchet down the phosphorus level even lower by feeding for optimum rather than maximum production. In either case, they explained, the animals would receive less phosphorus than needed to maximize bone strength (Kornegay and

[2] On a factory farm, swine manure is a liquid slurry that consists of feces, urine, water, and anything else that falls through the slatted floors of a confinement facility.

Harper 1997). The implications of this strategy are striking: to keep regulatory compliance costs in check, the industry would be growing animals with deliberately weakened skeletons, perhaps even so weak that animal welfare would be compromised.

The industry quickly realized that, even with feeder pigs, it is possible to skimp too much on skeletal strength, though the problem shows up only after the animals are killed. "Although maximizing bone development is not necessary for the production of a market pig," Kornegay and Harper (1997, p. 104) wrote, "a more difficult question is how much bone development is required to prevent damage to the carcass during mechanical processing that occurs during slaughter." Bones that are too fragile can break in the slaughterhouse, damaging the carcass and cutting into profits. One study of environmental nutrition found that reducing the safety factor had weakened vertebrae, which fractured when slaughterhouse workers stunned the animals just before killing them (Dritz et al. 2000). These fractures caused "blood spotting on the loin muscle," the authors wrote, "which had to be trimmed for cosmetic purposes," reducing the value of the carcass (Dritz et al. 2000, p. 121).[3] "When formulating dietary phosphorus concentrations," they advised the industry, "the balance between environmental concerns and improving product quality must be weighed" (Dritz et al. 2000, p. 124). In other words, the challenge is to pinpoint the profitable degree of skeletal strength, taking into consideration carcass quality, feed costs, regulatory compliance costs, and other relevant economic factors. It is difficult to imagine what any of this might have to do with the animals' needs.

It is important to acknowledge that skimping on skeletal strength is nothing new. It goes back at least as far as the New Leicester sheep. Created by famed nineteenth-century British breeder Robert Bakewell, these sheep were designed to be all meat and no bone. "By careful selective breeding," Karl Marx wrote, Bakewell had "reduced the bone structure of his sheep to the minimum necessary for their existence," which enabled them to reach slaughter weight faster than other breeds (Marx 1992, p. 315; see also Ritvo 1987, pp. 66-67, 77). Moreover, skimping on skeletal strength is but one example of the kind of ruthlessly efficient cost-cutting that characterizes the subsumption of farmed animals under capital (Benton 1993:152-161). But

[3] The pork sector is not the only one that has faced this problem. According to a 2003 article in the *Chesapeake Bay Journal*, efforts to reduce phosphorus excretion from broiler chickens can increase "the risk of broken bones in the birds, which could result in bone chips in the meat, a major concern of the poultry industry." http://www.bayjournal.com/article.cfm?article=1200 (accessed on July 25, 2012).

although cost-cutting is nothing new, the kinds of costs that must be kept in check are constantly changing. Only in the past several decades have the livestock and poultry sectors had to confront the cost of complying with environmental regulations. What is new, then, is that skimping on skeletal strength has become a strategy for keeping regulatory compliance costs in check. Insofar as the industry is actually implementing this strategy—and Cromwell (2005) implied that by 2005 the U.S. pork sector had already begun to do so—it is producing regulatory friendly skeletons, friendly precisely because they have been deliberately weakened.

Ecological Biopower

The emergence of the regulatory friendly skeleton demonstrates that the promulgation of pollution control regulations governing factory farms has led to new ways of representing and intervening in the bodies of farmed animals. Yet in Rabinow and Rose's (2006) view, biopower entails more than just biological technoscience; it also involves modes of subjectification. In the case of environmental governance, this means the making of "environmental subjects—people who have come to think and act in new ways in relation to the environmental domain being governed . . ." (Agrawal 2005, p. 7, italics omitted; see also Darier 1996). This presents a problem when applied to farmed animals. As far as we know, farmed animals whose diets have been altered, or whose bodies have been refashioned, to make them more "environmentally friendly" are not thereby made to work on themselves in the name of the environment. Instead of aiming to create "shifts in the subjectivities of those undergoing regulation" (Agrawal 2005, p. 17), the animal scientists whose work I describe in this article have sought to create shifts in the anatomy and physiology of farmed animals. They have sought to create environmental bodies, not environmental subjects. Of course, farmed animals become who they are partly as a result of the particular technological assemblages in which they find themselves entangled (Holloway 2007). As a consequence, targeting the bodies of farmed animals for environmental improvement may lead indirectly to changes in who—not just what—they are. Moreover, as in other areas of environmental management (Rinfret 2009), some strategies that aim to make farmed animals more environmentally friendly do involve deliberate efforts to change how they behave. Efforts to convince cows to keep out of streams come to mind. Even in such cases, however, it is by no

means clear that the animals become self-regulating environmental subjects. In any case, this does not appear to be what is happening in the case of environmental nutrition.

Lewis Holloway and Carol Morris (2007, p. 95) have acknowledged that the modes of subjectification prong of Rabinow and Rose's framework "is a stumbling block to the acceptance of biopower, as Rabinow and Rose define it, in relation to human interventions in the lives of livestock animals." In a creative effort to overcome this conceptual obstacle, they offer what they describe as "a more relational conception of biopower in which [humans] work on nonhuman others alongside their work on themselves . . ." (Holloway and Morris 2007, p. 96; see also Holloway et al. 2009; Morris and Holloway 2009; Srinivasan, in press; Twine 2010, pp. 86-87, 89). Building on Holloway and Morris's work, Krithika Srinivasan suggests that the ultimate targets of a technoscientific intervention—in my case, farmed animals—need not become self-regulating subjects in order for that intervention to be regarded as an exercise of biopower; it can be the agent who deploys the intervention, rather than the target, who becomes a new kind of subject (Srinivasan, in press). Morris and Holloway (2009) offer an example of what Srinivasan has in mind. They suggest that livestock breeders "might be understood as needing to be persuaded to work on themselves (and ultimately their animals' bodies) through their enrolment into the truth discourses about genetic approaches to livestock breeding" (Morris and Holloway 2009, p. 327). Applying this logic to the case of environmental nutrition, one might hypothesize that nutritionists and farmers have become environmental subjects who work on the diets and bodies of farmed animals in the name of the environment. Although this is a potentially fruitful avenue of research, I want to offer a different take on the modes of subjectification issue, one that focuses on whose diet is being managed and whose is not.

By 2050, global consumption of animal products is projected to explode, particularly in the so-called developing world (FAO 2011, p. 79). In light of these projections, the question of how best to mitigate the environmental impacts of the world's seemingly insatiable appetite for meat, milk, and eggs is being debated with a renewed sense of urgency (see, e.g., Pelletier and Tyedmers 2010; Steinfeld and Gerber 2010). Technological fixes such as environmental nutrition should be distinguished from what food historian Warren Belasco calls "anthropological fix[es]," in which "we redesign people's values, not their gizmos, to meet the challenges of feeding the future" (Belasco 2008, p. 118, footnote omitted). In today's debate, all sorts of anthropological fixes are being advocated, including veganism, vegetarianism, and a contraction and

convergence strategy that acknowledges the unequal "ecological hoofprint" that divides the rich from the poor (Weis 2010). In the latter strategy, the wealthy would reduce their consumption of animal products so that the poor could increase theirs, and the world would eventually converge on an ecologically sustainable per-capita level of consumption (McMichael et al. 2007).

Though acknowledging that technology alone cannot solve the problem, and that curbing consumption will be necessary, Henning Steinfeld and Pierre Gerber (2010), lead authors of Livestock's Long Shadow, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations' (FAO's) influential report on the environmental consequences of livestock production (Steinfeld et al. 2006), have stressed the difficulty of engaging in dietary biopolitics. One of the problems, they write, is that "[p]olicies directly targeting dietary patterns are often resented as interfering with very personal choices of how and what to eat . . ." (Steinfeld and Gerber 2010, p. 18238). Indeed, it is far easier to change the diets—or even the bodies—of farmed animals than it is to challenge the association of meat with modernity, or to convince the world's wealthiest consumers to give up their dietary privileges. After all, farmed animals who are asked to switch to a more environmentally friendly diet don't complain about affronts to their consumer sovereignty (cf. Emel and Hawkins 2010).

Diet is a biopolitical project. Whether by encouraging the consumption of animal products or by calling on consumers to go veg, various institutions and movements attempt to shape dietary choices (Twine 2010, p. 166). Vegetarianism and veganism can be understood as modes of subjectification; people become self-regulating subjects who work on their own diets and bodies, often in the name of animal rights, the environment, or both (Tanke 2007; Taylor 2010; Thiermann 2011). In my view, what is significant about technological fixes like environmental nutrition is that they lessen the need for policymakers to attempt to create these kinds of environmental subjects. These fixes work on the diets and bodies of farmed animals so that consumers need not work on themselves. Although it is important to be critical of green consumerism and the neoliberal subjectivity it tends to inculcate (Szasz 2007), we should be just as critical of technological fixes that promise to relieve consumers of the burden of changing who they are (cf. Warkentin 2006). These sorts of fixes are a good example of what Donna Haraway (2008, p. 268, footnote omitted), drawing on the work of Sarah Franklin (2003), has called "designer ethics, which aim to bypass cultural struggle with just-in-time, 'high technology' breakthroughs" (see also Twine 2010, p. 142). Examined from this perspective,

environmental nutrition is but the latest in a long line of "cornucopian technological fixes" that lessen the need for policymakers to exercise ecological biopower over human beings (Belasco 2004, p. 121).

Environmental violence against animals

Practices like skimping on skeletal strength should be understood as forms of violence against animals. They are clear examples of what Derrida (2004, p. 73) described as the "purely instrumental, industrial, chemico-genetic treatment of living beings." In light of Foucault's (2000, p. 340) distinction between power relations (which seek to control conduct) and relations of violence (which target the body), one might be tempted to wall off discussions of violence from discussions of biopower (for discussions of the violence/power distinction in the context of human-animal relations, see Palmer 2001; Thierman 2010). But as Foucault (2000, p. 341) himself explained, violence is often wielded as an "instrumen[t] of power."

The exercise of biopower over animals often entails violence, but this violence is inflicted in the name of life (Srinivasan, in press). In some cases (e.g., the neutering of stray dogs), the violence is said to benefit the animals on whom it is inflicted (Srinivasan, in press). In other cases (e.g., the killing of so-called invasive species), violence is inflicted on one group of animals to benefit another (van Dooren 2011). As Srinivasan explains, it is the justification for the violence—that it aims to foster life—that makes it part of the exercise of biopower (Srinivasan, in press).

In her call for greater dialogue between the fields of environmental sociology and animal studies, Amy Fitzgerald (2007) highlighted the need for more research on the various ways in which animals are harmed in the name of the environment. Scholars in the field of animal studies have analyzed violence against animals (Derrida 2008, p. 25; 2004), and political ecologists have taken up the topic of environmental violence (Peluso and Watts 2001), but to date there has been relatively little work on environmental violence against animals. Much of the existing work has focused on killing in the name of the environment, as in efforts to eradicate invasive species (van Dooren 2011). But what the concept of ecological biopower suggests is that, in addition to the power to kill, environmental violence against animals also involves the power to make live (Chrulew 2011). We see this in captive breeding programs, in which "forced reproduction" is

used to attempt to save endangered species (Haraway 2008:291; see also Bergman 1990, p. 82; Chrulew 2011; Freeman 2009; Stein 2004; Whatmore and Thorne 1998). And we also see it, I argue, in the targeting of animal bodies for environmental improvement.

By its very nature, factory farming is about making live. As Cary Wolfe (2010:22-23) puts it, "the practices of maximizing life, of 'making live,' in Foucault's words, through eugenics, artificial insemination and selective breeding, pharmaceutical enhancement, inoculation, and the like—all for the purposes of maximizing the efficient production of flesh—are on display in the modern factory farm as perhaps nowhere else in biopolitical history." Through a ruthless efficiency that seeks to reduce life to the biological bare minimum that is necessary to maximize profits, factory farming entails the production of animals whose bodies are "maintained in a bare, weak state" (Wadiwel 2002, para. 13). The deliberately weakened skeleton embodies this violent logic in a quite literal way.

If taken too far, skimping on skeletal strength clearly has the potential to undermine animal welfare. Unfortunately, however, I found no studies examining what effect, if any, environmental nutrition has had on the welfare of farmed animals. It would thus be premature to conclude that animal welfare is being sacrificed to keep compliance costs in check. But even if environmental nutrition were found to have no impact whatsoever on animal welfare, it would still constitute a troubling example of environmental violence against animals. This is because such practices only intensify what Dinesh Wadiwel has described as the "shrewd and calculating management of life" that has long been brought to bear on the bodies of factory farmed animals (Wadiwel 2002, para. 9). And what is perhaps most troubling of all about these practices is that an even shrewder, more calculating, and more ruthless efficiency is being celebrated as "eco-efficiency," greenwashing the underlying violence.

Conclusion

Since its inception, factory farming has been an industry in which environmental destruction and violence against animals have been closely intertwined (Boggs 2011). Now certain efforts to address the industry's environmental problems are intensifying violence against farmed animals (Noske 1994). And with influential organizations like the FAO accepting the spread of factory farming as inevitable, this troubling trend seems poised to continue. "As it

stands," the FAO (2011, pp. 94-95) recently wrote, "there are no technically or economically viable alternatives to intensive production for providing the bulk of the livestock food supply for growing cities." In light of this reality, they argued, the challenge is "to make intensive production more environmentally benign" (FAO 2011, p. 95). In other words, we need to green the factory farm. In pursuit of this goal, animal scientists are transforming the bodies of farmed animals into even more efficient biological machines for converting feedstuffs into flesh. Some call it "responsible intensification" (Steinfeld and Gerber 2010, p. 18238). Others see it as "a recipe for animal suffering, dressed up as a 'green' solution . . ." (Compassion in World Farming 2009, p. 31).

Despite the industry's green rhetoric, there are serious questions about whether strategies such as "environmental nutrition" will actually lessen the environmental impacts of factory farming. But although it is crucial to evaluate the alleged greening of the factory farm on its environmental merits, in this article I have sought to move beyond a purely environmental analysis. After all, these strategies are not simply technological fixes, to be evaluated solely on the basis of whether they are likely to solve the environmental problems they purport to solve. They are also technoscientific interventions into the bodies of farmed animals, and the violent nature of these interventions should be part of the public debate about how best to solve the environmental problems caused by the spread of factory farming.

"If what is at stake is the fate of the planet," Neil Evernden (1999, p. 149) once wrote, "then any intervention seems justified." There is a growing danger that the pressing need to address the mounting ecological crisis will be used to justify a tightening of the grip of ecological biopower on the bodies of vulnerable humans and nonhumans alike (cf. Smith 2011, p. 126). According to Matthew Chrulew's (2011) chilling account, this is exactly what we see happening already with the captive breeding of endangered species. As he writes, "[t]he closer a species to extinction—when a wild population is most endangered, or a captive one most fragmented, when the category of 'species' holds the most importance and thus the visibility of living organisms within the whole ensemble is most obscured—the stronger then is the grip in which the bodies of the last remaining individual animals are held" (Chrulew 2011, pp. 148-149, footnote omitted). A similar tightening of ecological biopower's grip is occurring down on the factory farm. In the face of the seemingly unstoppable expansion of factory farming, the need to

keep the environmental impacts in check is being used to justify ever more intensive interventions into the bodies of farmed animals.

We must remain perpetually "wary of environmental justifications" for these sorts of technoscientific interventions into vulnerable bodies (Stein 2004, p. 221). And the concept of ecological biopower can help us do just that. One of the great strengths of this concept is its ability to lift "the halo of the conservation imperative," revealing the violence that is often inflicted in the name of the environment (Chrulew 2011:147 n.3). Helping to lift this halo is a worthwhile project for scholars who are trying to build bridges between the fields of environmental studies and animal studies.

Bio

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Abnormal Appetites: Foucault, Atwood, and the Normalization of an Animal-Based Diet

Chloë Taylor

Abstract

In his lecture series *Abnormal*, Michel Foucault argues that the abnormal individual is the descendant of the monster, and that the monster came in two types: sexual and alimentary. While Foucault traces the genealogy of the sexual monster into the sexually abnormal individual, the alimentary monster is forgotten. This paper thus takes up Foucault's work on normalization in order to consider the genealogy of that other monstrous heir, the alimentarily abnormal individual, and pursues it into the twenty-first century. In particular, this paper examines the pathologization of vegetarianism and veganism in the writings of Margaret Atwood and in the invention of a new mental illness, orthorexia nervosa.

Keywords: Michel Foucault, Margaret Atwood, vegetarianism, veganism, sexual politics of meat, orthorexia nervosa

Introduction

In his lecture series, *Abnormal*, Michel Foucault argues that the monster is the genealogical predecessor of the abnormal individual targeted by modern psychiatry. According to Foucault, the paradigmatic monster during the Middle Ages was a fusion of man and beast. During the Renaissance it was the fusion of two humans in one body (the conjoined twin), followed by the fusion of man and woman (the hermaphrodite). By the time of the French Revolution, however, Foucault argues that monstrosity transitioned from being about hybrid morphologies to violations of laws of consumption. The monster became a creature of aberrant appetites. This appetitive monster took two major forms: the sexual monster and the alimentary monster. These two forms of monstrous appetite were sometimes separated by class, with sex being the privileged vehicle for affluent monstrosity, and food being the means of monstrosity for the starving classes. Thus the sexual monster was captured by the figure of the incestuous aristocrat while the alimentary monster was imagined as a cannibalistic peasant. Often, however, the two forms of monstrosity fused in the social imaginary, as in the propaganda about Marie-Antoinette, accused both of committing incest with her son and of having drunk blood from the skulls of

Frenchmen. (Avramescu, 203) "What created a problem," Foucault writes, "what constituted the point of formation of legal medicine, was precisely the existence of these monsters recognized as monsters precisely because they were both incestuous and cannibalistic, or because they transgressed the two great alimentary and sexual prohibitions." (101-102)

In his *Intellectual History of Cannibalism*, Cătălin Avramescu argues that the alimentary monster is one of the "great forgotten figures of philosophy" and that "this disappearance has a significance of a philosophical order, since it is within its space that we now think about good and evil." (3) For Foucault too, and although he does not express this explicitly, the alimentary monster seems to have vanished from history, for while the transgression of alimentary as well as sexual prohibitions is foregrounded in his discussion of monsters, when he traces his genealogy from monstrosity to the pathologization of abnormalcy, he considers only the sexually abnormal individual; the alimentarily abnormal individual remains unthematized. The questions with which I begin this paper are therefore: what became of the alimentary monster? Did the cannibal give birth to no "little abnormals," to use Foucault's phrase, in the way that the sexual monster did? Can we trace a history of pathologized alimentary consumption, the way that Foucault traces a history of pathologized sexualities?

In fact, reading Foucault's lectures, we come across at least one case of a nineteenth-century individual singled out for psychiatric treatment based on his rejection of alimentary norms: in *Psychiatric Power*, we read of a thirty-six year-old melancholic who spent his nights reading and refused to consume animal foods. Harangued by his housekeeper on the subject of his unwholesome lifestyle, he became paranoid that she would poison him. (34-35) Part of his psychiatric cure was the prescription of a regime that precluded further relapses into folly. Since his refusal of animal foods is singled out as one of the contributing factors in his madness, we can be sure that the psychiatrically prescribed diet included a return to consuming meat, eggs and dairy. What cases such as this suggest is that abnormal alimentary appetites were, like abnormal sexual appetites, pathologized by psychiatry from its birth. Indeed, Avramescu would have needed to look no further than the case of the child who breastfeeds "too long" to find a "little cannibal" whose alimentary desires are deemed abnormal today, and are widely supposed to give rise to abnormal sexualities, showing the fusion of alimentary and sexual abnormalcy in the modern imaginary, as in the eighteenth-century conception of monstrosity. Avramescu might also have considered the mother who eats her placenta after giving birth. While placenta-eating is completely normal mammalian behaviour, and seems uniquely ethical as far as human meat-eating goes, it is cannibalistic and deemed abnormal—indeed, abject—in the human species.

What I would like to do in what follows is to take up these suggestive ideas from Foucault's writings on nineteenth-century psychiatry and pursue them into the present. I will argue that alimentary appetites, like sexual appetites, continue to be sites of normalization, or that how we eat is a target of what Foucault calls disciplinary power. Moreover, as I have suggested elsewhere, just as the sexual and alimentary monsters were frequently fused in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century popular imaginary, so today the abnormalities of eating and sex are often conflated, with male vegetarians in particular suspected of being "queer." The normalization of sex and eating are thus not only analogous but inter-related and mutually reinforced. While we might discuss alimentary normalization and the disciplining of diet in various ways, such as the assimilation of immigrants into a North American diet and the deeply ambivalent biopolitical investment in women's breastfeeding practices, I will focus in this essay on vegetarianism and veganism.

I have chosen to focus on the regulation of the animal-food norm in contemporary Western societies, rather than other examples of the normalization of diet that I might have examined, for two reasons. First, it seems to me that in a discussion of alimentary normalization, vegetarianism is in many ways the equivalent of homosexuality in Foucault's discussion of sexual normalization. That is, vegetarians are the most prominent and the most politically visible group of alimentarily abnormal individuals, much as homosexuals are the most prominent and politically visible group of sexually abnormal individuals. Vegetarians and vegans have made the most headway as a political movement and community (e.g. restaurants are more likely to include vegetarian and vegan options today than to have options for raw foodists, locovores, freegans, or people who only eat seasonal foods, and there are more exclusively vegetarian and vegan restaurants today than raw, freegan, local or seasonal food restaurants); this is comparable to the way that the gay liberation movement has made the most political gains in the sexual liberation movement more broadly conceived. We can thus see mechanisms of alimentary normalization and resistance to that normalization most clearly by taking the example of vegetarianism and veganism, since this is where the stakes are arguably the highest.

Second, and more importantly, I focus on the normalization of an animal-based diet because of the overwhelming ethical stakes of this example. While I am troubled by the assimilation of immigrants into Western diets and dietary practices and I am also worried by the ways that mothers are biopolitically managed to breastfeed even while disciplined to not do so (in public, after the child is a certain age, etc.), the industrialized breeding and slaughter of billions of animals every year and the environmental devastation caused by this industry (with the additional consequences that this has on

wildlife) are, without a doubt, the issues that concern me the most within the realm of food politics. These concerns are what motivate this essay.

Expanding on Foucault's example of the psychiatric treatment of a nineteenth-century vegan melancholic, I will thus take two examples to explore the normalization of an animal-based diet, both of which take us into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. First, I will consider representations of vegetarianism (and of empathy for animals more generally) as symptom of mental illness in the writings of Margaret Atwood. Second, I will examine popular and medical discourses on "Orthorexia Nervosa" that pathologize the elimination of animal products from diets. I focus on the discovery, coining or invention of a new eating disorder that pathologizes vegetarianism because of the obvious parallels with Foucault's own discussion of the normalizing and normative role of nineteenth-century psychiatry. I also focus on this example because of the enormous prestige of medical knowledge, and thus the power that medical diagnoses can have in shaping society. I focus on Atwood's fictional writing, although these are on the surface very different from the kinds of texts that Foucault analyzes, because they seem to me symptomatic of wider cultural currents and because they are particularly illustrative of the ways that alimentary normalization intersects with gender and sexual normalization. Attending to Atwood's work thus helps to illustrate my argument that the disciplining of diet is not only analogous to the regulation of gender and sexuality that Foucault has described, but that all of these forms of regulation are interconnected and function to reinforce one another.

1. 2. Margaret Atwood's Edible Animals

A continuous theme in Margaret Atwood's fiction is that food reflects power relations. As Emma Parker writes,

> For [Atwood], eating is unequivocally political. Atwood defines 'politics' as 'who is entitled to do what to whom with impunity; who profits by it; and who therefore eats what.' Women are rarely depicted eating in literature because, as Atwood's comment implies, consumption embodies coded expressions of power. (1)

A male character in Atwood's 1981 novel *Bodily Harm* states, "I eat well, so I must have power." (241) Men decide what women will eat in Atwood's books: after her boyfriend leaves her, in *Bodily Harm*, Rennie realizes, "From now on she would have to decide what to eat. Jake decided before: even when it was her turn to cook he decided." (235) Deciding for themselves what to eat (and how much) is also a way that women assert power, for Atwood: in *Lady Oracle* (1976), Joan over-eats to resist her mother's

manipulation of her to lose weight. As Joan narrates, "I was eating steadily, doggedly, stubbornly, anything I could get. The war between myself and my mother was on in earnest; the disputed territory was my body." (69) Later, Atwood has Joan lose weight to get money to become independent of her mother. Gendered power relations are particularly marked by the eating of meat in Atwood's novels: men eat steaks while women eat egg salad sandwiches. Several of Atwood's fictional works describe women becoming vegetarians out of identification with nonhuman animal victims. From an ecofeminist or critical feminist vegetarian perspective, we might say that these female characters are insightful, recognizing the interconnections between the domination of women and the mastery of nature. Indeed, this is Carol Adams' interpretation of Atwood's *The Edible Woman*. (*The Sexual Politics of Meat*, 142-143) What Adams does not see, however, is that in Atwood's writing the female characters' identifications with nonhuman animals were only ever delusional fantasies of victimization and early signs of mental illness. While Atwood sympathetically describes women becoming vegetarian out of empathy for nonhuman animals, these women are ultimately not presented as ethical in any admirable sense, but as neurotic and self-deceived. They are not really concerned for other animals, moreover, but are projecting their own psychological needs onto the figures of their furry and feathered kin.

It is significant to note that Atwood has made a similar argument about Canadians—and this time in a nonfictional work—as she implicitly makes about women in her fictional writings. In *Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature*, Atwood observes that nonhuman animals are omnipresent in Canadian literature, but, unlike in British and American literature, they are consistently represented as victims with whom the reader is meant to identify. Atwood is adamant with respect to Canadian literature that this identification with nonhuman animal victims is neurotic and has more to do with Canada's sense of exploitation and endangerment (as a colony with a difficult climate and an aggressive neighbour to the south) than with a genuine concern for nonhuman animals. Identifying with dying animals is not really an expression of compassion for animals on the part of Canadians, Atwood argues; after all, Canada is a country "founded on the fur trade, and an animal cannot painlessly be separated from its skin. From the animal point of view, Canadians are as bad as the slave trade or the Inquisition." (95) She insists that Canadians must overcome their victim mentality and desist in their delusional and self-defeating identification with nonhuman animals. Women are represented in Atwood's novels much as Canadian writers are described in *Survival*, with femininity figuring like Canadianism in relation to a masculine Americanism. Atwood's work suggests that since nonhuman animals are paradigmatic victims, group of humans who feel victimized are likely to identify with them. While this is

understandable, Atwood also feels that such identifications are out of proportion with reality and are disempowering. As she bluntly describes her attitude in *Survival*, such people should "pull up [their] socks and quit whining." (9) Vegetarianism and compassion for nonhuman animals are thus consistently represented by Atwood in her fiction as a self-defeating persecution-paranoia and a loss of touch with reality. In the semi-happy endings of her novels and short stories, from *The Edible Woman* and *Surfacing* to "Moral Disorder" and *The Year of the Flood*, Atwood has her female vegetarian characters overcome their mental turmoil and return to eating meat. She describes this reintegration into omnivorism as empowering, pleasurable, and entailing a renewed grasp on reality.

In Atwood's first novel, *The Edible Woman* (1969), Marian McAlpin is a young woman working for a consumer survey company following the completion of her B.A. Early in the book, Marian's lover Peter describes killing a rabbit on a hunting trip to a male friend, Len:

> "So I whipped out my knife, good knife, German steel, and slit the belly and took her by the hind legs and gave her one hell of a crack, like a whip you see, and the next thing you know there was blood and guts all over the place. All over me, what a mess, rabbit guts dangling from the trees, god the trees were red for yards…"
>
> He paused to laugh. Len bared his teeth….
>
> "God it was funny. Lucky thing Trigger and me had the old cameras along, we got some good shots of the whole mess…" (81)

Marian realizes to her own surprise that she is crying, and leaves the table, afraid to make a scene. In the bathroom "The roll of toilet paper crouched in there with me, helpless and white and furry, waiting passively for the end." (83) When Peter, Marian, her roommate and Len leave the bar, Marian bolts like a hare, and is pursued by the two men who corner and catch her. The same night she hides under a bed, and needs to be extracted again by the men. Dropping her off at home that night, Peter, who had previously been hostile towards romantic commitment, proposes marriage to Marian—her rabbit-like flight, which had allowed him to hunt her down, has made him see her in a new light. Although she agrees to the engagement, from this point onwards Marian identifies with animal victims and cannot eat them. When Peter orders them each a steak in a restaurant:

> She looked down at her own half-eaten steak and suddenly saw it as a hunk of muscle. Blood red. Part of a real cow that once moved and ate and was killed, knocked on the head as it stood in a queue like someone waiting for a streetcar. Of course everyone knew that. But most of the time you never thought about it… She set down her knife and fork. (191)

Reading a breakfast menu with "'Bacon and Eggs, Any Style'… 'Our Plump Tender Sausages.' She thought of pigs and chickens. … She closed the menu." (333) While grocery shopping she is aware that the music in the store is meant to lower her sales resistance, and thinks of studies showing that cows produce more milk when played music. (219) Having her hair cut, she feels "like a slab of flesh, an object" (269). Having her hair dried, "She passed along the gently-frying line of those who were not yet done." (270) If she is an animal, Peter is a hunter, and she thinks of the "face of Peter with its hunting eyes." (331) Peter's cameras become conflated with his guns, and she is petrified of being "shot" by him when he wants to take her photograph. (299)

> As the days go by, Marian's aversion to animal foods extends beyond meat:
>
> The next morning… when she opened her soft-boiled egg and saw the yolk looking up at her with its one signficant and accusing yellow eye, she found her mouth closing together like a frightened sea-anemone. It's living; it's alive, the muscles in her throat said, and tightened. She pushed the dish away. (204)

Marian compares cooking turtles to the deaths of Christian martyrs—"What fiendishness went on in kitchens across the country, in the name of providing food!" (196) Although involuntary, she recognizes her vegetarianism as moral: "she… concluded that the stand [her body] had taken was an ethical one: it simply refused to eat anything that had once been, or (like oysters on the half-shell) might still be living. But she faced each day with the forlorn hope that her body might change its mind." (227) Marian's desire to eat meat and eggs again is motivated by a desire to be normal:

> What was essentially bothering her was the thought that she might not be normal. This was why she was afraid to tell Peter: he might think she was some kind of freak, or neurotic. Naturally he would have second thoughts about getting married; he might even say they should postpone the wedding until she got over it. She would say that, too, if it was him. (261)

Marian is thus unable to admit her vegetarianism to anyone except to an equally abnormal English student, Duncan. She goes to elaborate measures to conceal her vegetarianism from Peter, from her family at Christmas, and from her own dinner guests, rolling her meatballs under lettuce leaves, throwing pieces of meat across the table when her host is not looking. "'I'm turning into a vegetarian,' she was thinking sadly, 'one of those cranks; I'll have to eat at Health Bars.'" (193)

In a slippery slope argument, Atwood implies that once you stop eating meat, not only will eggs follow, but so will everything else. Peeling a carrot,

> [Marian] was watching her own hands and the peeler and the curl of crisp orange skin. She

> became aware of the carrot. It's a root, she thought, it grows in the ground and sends up leaves. Then they come along and dig it up, maybe it even makes a sound, a scream too low for us to hear, but it doesn't die right away, it keeps on living, right now it's still alive…
>
> She thought she felt it twist in her hands. She dropped it on the table. "Oh no," she said, almost crying, "Not this too!" (227)

Later "her body… put its foot down on canned rice pudding," previously acceptable because of its synthetic flavour. "But all at once… her eyes had seen it as a collection of small cocoons. Cocoons with miniature living creatures inside." (261) Soon after, she attempts eating cake, but "it felt spongy and cellular against her tongue, like the bursting of thousands of tiny lungs. She shuddered and spat the cake out into her napkin and scraped her plate into the garbage…" (267) A few days later we find that she cannot even wash her dishes or throw out mouldy items in her fridge: "Perhaps the mould had as much right to life as she had." (279)

Although feminist readers such as Sarah Skeats and Emma Parker have argued that Marian becomes anorexic and schizophrenic because she realizes that as a woman she is an object of consumption for men, Atwood in fact has no patience for such victim-identification. As in *Survival*, Atwood's attitude seems to be: "*pull up your socks and quit whining*." In *The Edible Woman,* she makes it clear that the women are consuming and hunting men as much as the men are hunting and consuming women, and thus if the women feel victimized they are deceiving themselves. Peter is described as "a nice package" and Marian reflects on the lifestyle that his future income will provide her. Marian's roommate Ainsley manipulatively pursues a man to impregnate her when she decides to have a child, and then aggressively pursues a husband once she decides that her child needs a father. Other single women pursue mates in the novel with equally military vigour. At a party, "Marian saw that Leonard had been spotted at once by the office virgins as single and available. They had him backed against the wall… two of them on the sides cutting off flank escape and the third, in front." (303) While one of the office virgins, Lucy, quickly "abandoned the seige of Leonard" (307), setting her sights on Peter instead, "Millie and Emmy were still tenaciously holding [Leonard] at bay. Millie had moved round to the front, blocking as much space with her wide skirt as possible and Emmy was side-stepping back and forth like a baseball guard; but one of the flanks was unprotected." (308)

Nevertheless feeling victimized by Peter, Marian eventually breaks off her engagement by telling him he was trying to "destroy" her, and offers him a female body made out of cake to consume instead of her. As soon as she refuses to be "food" for Peter, she is able to eat again. She starts by eating the

cake she had baked for Peter, but soon after she eats a steak. Duncan tells her that her explanation is "ridiculous." (362) "Peter wasn't trying to destroy you," he says, "That's just something you made up. What does it matter, you're back to so-called reality, you're a consumer." (362) Reality for Atwood is that we need to consume others to survive, so we might as well stop being squeamish about it. In this conclusion to the novel, we find that Marian was unable to eat meat and other foods because she identified herself as a victimized animal and as an object of consumption, however this identification was delusional. Once she rejected the role of the consumed animal, she is able to consume again, and is able to consume animals in particular. While Carol Adams reads this ending to *The Edible Woman* as a capitulation on Marian's part to patriarchy, Sarah Sceats writes that Marion learns that "sexual politics means eat or be eaten" (99). On this reading, eating meat is a way for the woman character to assert her equality with men and to refuse to be a victim. As Parker writes:

> As Atwood illustrates how consumption embodies coded expressions of power which have served to subordinate women, she subtly urges women to reclaim the right to eat and to proudly re-inhabit their own bodies. Women have been driven away from their bodies as violently as they have been driven away from food. Atwood shows them the path back to both. By demonstrating how consumption is related to power, Atwood subtly urges women to empower themselves by urging them to eat their way into the world. (367)

So long as this female empowerment through eating is indifferent to the suffering of those who are eaten, it is obviously a problematic, de Beauvoiresque kind of feminism—an uncritical assimilation of women into violent, masculine values. As Maria Comninou writes in "Speech, Pornography, and Hunting,"

> we see the phenomenon of successful women adopting the standards of men with a vengeance. Will women's march to power ascendancy, won against all odds, mean that they too will choose to flaunt their preferences for red meat, animal skin, sport hunting, and even bullfighting? […] Will animal exploitation become the ultimate symbol of equality with the white male? (142)

Indeed, this seems to be the form of feminism that Atwood envisions, and not just in *The Edible Woman*. Consistently in Atwood's works, the alternative to meat-eating for women is not just a self-imposed victim mentality, but madness.

In Atwood's next novel, *Surfacing* (1972), an unnamed woman returns to her childhood home in Québec along with her lover and another couple. Early in the novel she is described cooking meat, impaling worms and frogs on hooks, and hitting a fish in the head with a knife with no qualms. As the novel progresses, however, the character comes to identify with nonhuman animal victims. Initially,

much like a number of the Canadian authors whom Atwood discusses in *Survival*, she thinks of American bounty-hunters as the ones who harm animals, and her identity as Canadian, as one of the victimized rather than the victimizers, is entrenched. Later, however, she is forced to realize that Canadians harm animals too; Atwood repeats a point made in *Survival* when she has a character in *Surfacing* ask: "'Do you realize… that this country is founded on the bodies of dead animals? Dead fish, dead seals, and historically dead beavers, the beaver is to this country what the black man is to the United States.'" (39-40) Later, coming across a crucified heron, the nameless woman character of *Surfacing* assumes that the bird was murdered by American hunters. She is shocked when she discovers that culprits are from Ontario. Unhinged by this event, Americans and humans become conflated as hunters and Atwood's character casts her lot with the hunted to feel exculpated of the crime. She is no longer able to kill fish and sets frogs free rather than using them as bait. Another slippery slope ensues, and the woman flees her human companions to live outside, naked, believing that she will grow fur, captivated by magical forces and visions. Her insanity is explored through the growing number of foods that she cannot eat: at first artificial food is forbidden; then she won't kill animals and lives off vegetables in the garden; soon vegetables too are forbidden and she scavenges for roots and berries, starting to starve. As in *The Edible Woman*, the female character's hatred for hunters and her empathy for nonhuman animals mean insanity, a loss of touch with reality, and the threat of self-induced death. In her delirium, we realize that this character's refusal to see herself as a harmer of animals is related to her refusal to accept that she has aborted a fetus. She recalls that her lover had assured her that "it wasn't a person, only an animal," but she reflects, "I should have seen that was no different, it was hiding in me as if in a burrow and instead of granting it sanctuary I let them catch it." (144-145)

Realizing that she will end up in a "hospital or a zoo" if she continues in her madness, Atwood's character eventually gets her wits together, goes back to the house and returns to wearing clothes, eating canned meat, and to her relationship with a man in the city. The last chapter of *Surfacing* begins with the words, "Above all one must resist seeing oneself as a victim": the female character of this novel has to face reality, which means to realize that she isn't the one victimized, but is a harmer who eats meat, who impales worms and frogs, who is a citizen of a nation founded on cruelty to animals, and who consented to abort the mouse-fetus burrowed in her womb. As in *The Edible Woman*, we see an identification with nonhuman animal victims by a woman, but in the end it is necessary that she rejects this identification in order to return to reality and to survive.

The theme of lapsing omnivores who feel a temporary compassion for animals but eventually

face "reality," disidentify with their victims and return to eating meat, can be taken up in more recent works by Atwood. Most recently, in *The Year of the Flood* (2009), male and female members of the religious cult, God's Gardeners, start out as idealistic vegetarians, but by the end of the novel are killing and eating animals to survive, and are more joyful as hunters than in their pacifist cult days. In a short story, "Moral Disorder" (2006), Atwood describes a young woman who feels manipulated by men, boys and stronger women. She focuses her energy on growing vegetables and feels sympathetic to the farm animals whom her husband and other farmers kill. Her emotional response to the slaughter of an abandoned lamb whom she had nursed and who saw her as his mother is presented by Atwood as a displaced maternal desire: as it turns out, she is not upset about the lamb's death, but by her own childlessness; she is not sad that her husband takes the lamb-child to be slaughtered, but that he does not give her a human child. Once she tells her husband that she wants a child, she eats the dead lamb who had loved her and finds his flesh delicious.

What is the "moral disorder" in Atwood's work by this title? It seems that it is not the extensive and needlessly cruel acts done to nonhuman animals in the course of the narrative. It is not the chickens running around with their heads cut off, gushing blood. It is not the trusting lamb lured by his surrogate human-mother to be slaughtered by the men. And it is not the cows who are named and then eaten by the human family, to the delight of the man and boys, to the discomfort of the woman. The moral disorder is this story is this womanly discomfort itself, this human (female) identification with nonhuman animals, which violates accepted (masculine) moral norms and must eventually be resolved through maternity. As in *The Edible Woman*, the story concludes with a woman eating a slaughtered animal, and liking it, as the men have done all along. As in *Surfacing*, concern for a nonhuman animal and revulsion for butchery turns out to be longing for a future or lost child. As Atwood argues in *Survival*, interspecies affection is in fact displaced human love—love for nonhuman animals arises when love for a man or a human child is failing or absent: it fills a gap or a lack and remains anthropocentric. Various kinds of delusion that, for Atwood, seem to particularly afflict women—delusion that one is a victim, delusion that a fetus is an animal or that an animal is a child—result in vegetarianism, and vegetarianism is just a quick slide from insanity. Once the delusion of animal- and victim-identification is overcome and normalcy is regained, the women in Atwood's fiction enjoy eating lamb cutlets ("Moral Disorder"), steak (*The Edible Woman*), and SPAM (*Surfacing*). By eating meat again, these women not only avoid becoming "freaks" or "cranks" who eat in Health Bars, they also avoid death by starvation or institutionalization in "a hospital or a zoo." In more than one case, a female character's return to eating

meat also enables the reconciliation of a marriage or other heterosexual relationship.

As Foucault argues of modernity more generally, abnormalcy in Atwood's fiction is conflated with mental illness, and abnormal appetites are indicative of pathology, while the "norms" of normalcy are political and oppressive (in this case speciesist and masculinist) though passed off as natural and inevitable. What this consideration of Atwood's fiction suggests is that Foucault's arguments about normalization are as true of alimentary appetites as they are of sexual appetites.

3. 3. Righteous Appetites

While Atwood's two novel-length pathologizations of vegetarianism date from the late 1960s and early 1970s, we might think that by now vegetarianism has become relatively normal. However the 1997 coining of a new eating disorder, orthorexia nervosa, suggests that vegetarianism continues to be pathologized. The "orthorexia nervosa" diagnosis was proposed by medical doctor Steven Bratman and effectively suggests that most vegetarians and even more vegans are mentally ill. The term "orthorexia" derives from the Greek *orthos* for "right" and *orexis* for "appetite." It is used to describe persons who are unhealthily "fixated" on "righteous eating." Although "orthorexia nervosa" has not yet been taken up by the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* of the American Psychiatric Association, doctors are already diagnosing and treating the disorder in patients, and a number of articles accepting the diagnosis and studying its prevalence have appeared in scientific and medical publications (*Science Direct*, *Medical News Today*, *Palo Alto Medical Foundation*). Eating Disorder societies and journals have also accepted the diagnosis: an article on orthorexia has been published in the *Journal of Eating [and] Weight Disorders*, and a handout has been prepared by the National Eating Disorders Association for use by doctors treating orthorexia in their patients. The disorder has also received largely uncritical attention by prominent media organizations such as *The Guardian*, *The Observer*, and the BBC, to name only a few.

Symptoms of orthorexia nervosa include: eliminating entire food groups or categories of food from one's diet; spending more than three hours a day thinking about healthy food; planning tomorrow's menu today; feeling virtuous about what one eats; continually limiting the numbers of food one eats; experiencing a reduced quality of life or social isolation because one's diet makes it difficult to eat outside the home; feeling critical of others who do not eat as well as one does; skipping foods one once enjoyed in order to eat the "right" foods; feeling guilt or self-loathing when one strays from one's diet; feeling in "total" control when one eats the correct diet. An individual who suffers from three of these

symptoms has at least a mild case of orthorexia nervosa. According to the National Eating Disorders Association, one indicator that you are orthorexic is if it is "beyond your ability to eat a meal prepared with love by someone else—one single meal—and not try to control what is served." Once recovered, the same handout tells us that the former orthorexic will discover herself to be "a person who loves, who works, who is fun." Orthorexia is thus associated with a failure of love for other humans. While many of these symptoms could also describe weight-loss dieting and anorexia nervosa, the difference is that the anorexic and the dieter refrain from eating foods that are fattening, while the orthorexic is more concerned with the "rightness" or "virtue" of what she eats.

Of course, vegetarians and vegans are not always perceived as fun, particularly when they are criticizing the eating habits of meat-eaters. They are very likely to reject a meal prepared with love or otherwise by someone else, if that meal is, say, a turkey dinner. By definition vegetarians and vegans eliminate entire food groups from their diet, whether meat or eggs and dairy. Vegetarians and vegans who avoid animal products in a society whose main protein sources are derived from animals are obliged to spend considerable amounts of time thinking about getting food they can eat and must often plan their meals ahead of time; for instance, if one studies or works on a campus with no vegan food options, one needs to shop for and prepare a lunch before leaving for campus, which may mean thinking about tomorrow's lunch the day before. An ethical vegetarian or vegan who believes eating animals is wrong will necessarily be critical of others who eat animals and animal products, and will very likely feel good (or at least better) about herself for not doing so. Likewise, she will feel guilty if she lapses back into eating meat, eggs or dairy, or fails to live up to her ethical convictions. By definition a vegetarian or vegan who was raised eating animals and animal products will skip foods she once enjoyed. And of course, choosing not to eat what the majority of people in one's society eat will necessarily entail a certain amount of social isolation; a vegetarian or vegan may decline certain social invitations, or abstain from eating on those occasions, if only animal products are on the menu or are being served by one's hosts. An ethical vegetarian or vegan whose dietary choices are based on deeply held ethical beliefs will very likely not want to attend events where animals are being cooked and eaten, such as barbeques, much as a feminist will likely not want to attend an outing to the strip club. Vegetarianism and veganism as ethical and political positions are thus socially isolating, much like other ethical and political stances, and may result in a reduced quality of life for the human if the oppression she resists is widespread. An ethical vegetarian or vegan is willing to accept such a reduced quality in life in order to boycott the unacceptably poor quality of life of nonhuman animals in farms and

slaughterhouses, the diminution of her own quality of life paling in comparison. Any "modification of social and personal relationships" caused by self-imposed alimentary restrictions is a sign for worry, according to an Italian medical study of orthorexia, however, while an article on orthorexia nervosa in *Medical News Today* states that "eating more healthily should have a positive effect on health without reducing the enjoyment of life or affecting relationships with others." (1)

Also suggesting the link between orthorexia nervosa and vegetarianism or veganism, media stories on the diagnosis are frequently illustrated with images of people consuming vegetables: one article shows a man carrying carrots, for instance, while another shows a person eating a Spring mix salad. In other cases the connection between orthorexia and abstention from animal products is explicit: several articles on "orthorexia" have been published on the on-line site *Beyond Vegetarianism* (www.beyondveg.com), including an article by Steven Bratman, coiner of the "orthorexia" diagnosis. Bratman confesses in his *BeyondVeg* article that he is a former orthorexic himself. When he was orthorexic, he tells us that he was strictly vegetarian, whereas today he tells readers that he recommends no more than "semi-vegetarianism." An Italian study of orthorexia undertaken by researchers at two institutes of food science allow that ethical vegetarians may not be orthorexics if they are genuinely motivated by compassion towards other animals, however it also notes that an individual's proclaimed reasons for eliminating food groups may be "alibis" for the truth, and thus orthorexia may be masking itself under guises such as ethical vegetarianism in a phenomenon that might be compared to "passing." In contrast, the Italians are clear that vegans are "frequently" orthorexics, whatever their proclaimed motivations.

The modern conflation of mental "pathology" with abnormality that Foucault observes is very apparent in the writings on orthorexia. In the Italian study of orthorexia, "normal eating" is opposed to "fanatic" eating and orthorexia (155). There is nothing in between "normalcy," fanaticism and mental illness. In a Turkish study of orthorexia undertaken by a group of medical researchers, it is stated that the desire to consume healthy foods "is only defined as orthorexia nervosa when it causes a person to give up his or her normal lifestyle." (2) One indicator of orthorexia, in the Turkish study, is the habit of skipping a hot lunch or dinner in favour of a salad and/or piece of fruit, suggesting that one need only stray from the norm in trivial and perfectly healthy (albeit vegetarian) ways in order to be pathologized. The handout for doctors published by the National Eating Disorders Association states that "the orthorexic must admit there is a problem, then identify what caused the obsession. They must also become more flexible and less dogmatic with their eating. There will be deeper emotional issues, and

working through them will make the transition to normal eating easier." An article in *The Guardian* warns us that "orthorexics can be overweight or look normal" (1), and cites the founder of the National Centre for Eating Disorders who states, "It's everywhere, from the people who think it's normal if their friends stop eating entire food groups, to the trainers in the gym who promote certain foods to enhance performance, to the proliferation of nutritionists, dieticians and naturopaths." (2) The implication of these texts is to warn us that there may be orthorexics passing unnoticed in our midst who *appear* normal, but are not. We are called upon to be vigilant in our role as detectors and policers of abnormalcy.

According to a 1992 study commissioned by Vegetarian Times, 68 percent of vegetarians are female and only 32 percent are male. It is estimated that 75-80% of animal activists are women. Single women in particular are likely to be vegetarian, as many women lapse back into meat-eating when they enter a stable relationship with a man who eats meat; often this is because women are expected to prepare meals with meat for their male partners or there is marital and familial pressure to cook meat for their children. Because of the gendered nature of vegetarianism, pathologizing this diet (and pathologizing compassion for nonhuman animals more generally) has gendered implications. On the one hand, more women than men will be pathologized. On the other hand, it is likely that men who take on the identity of vegetarian or vegan, and who are compassionate towards nonhuman animals, will be more pathologized than women given that they are flouting gender norms as well as more general societal norms. If this is so, the pathologization of vegetarianism is comparable to masochism, which is more common in women but, and consequently, is more prone to be considered a serious pathology in men. Because anorexia nervosa is strongly associated with women, the choice of orthorexia nervosa as the name for a new eating disorder, which resonates with the better known eating disorder, also genders it feminine. This suggests once again that alimentary normalization will be caught up with sexual and gender normalization, as was also indicated in the analysis of Atwood's fiction.

3. 4. Conclusions

What I have tried to show in this paper is that much as Foucault genealogizes the normalization of sexuality under modern, psychiatric regimes of knowledge/power, so we can trace a history of the normalization of diet, the production of alimentary identities, and the pathologization of abnormal appetites such as (but not only) veganism. This essay offers only two fragments of such a genealogy, and yet this is perhaps enough to suggest that from the great incestuous and cannibalistic monsters of the early modern era, we can trace the birth of "little abnormals" of not only the sexual variety but of an

alimentary type as well; indeed, these two types are frequently conflated and the normalization of each is mutually reinforced.

I began thinking about this topic because I wonder why more people aren't vegetarian. A clue for me was that several people told me that they attempted to be vegetarians, but gave up because they were asked if they were "crazy." One man was asked this by a male friend and felt his masculinity was being challenged; another man was asked this by the woman he loved. The latter, like Marian McAlpin in *The Edible Woman*, feared that remaining vegetarian might cost him his relationship. Another man told me that he avoids eating meat but does not admit that he is vegetarian since this would make him an "odd duck" in the cattle-raising province where we live. Also like Marian, he goes to great lengths to hide his vegetarianism socially. Several meat-eating students have told me that their vegan cousins (or sisters, or friends) who claim to be avoiding animal products out of compassion for animals are *really* orthorexics, thus showing that ethical vegetarianism is coming to be seen as a kind of "passing" phenomenon masking underlying pathologies. A woman acquaintance told me that she had been vegetarian until she went through a period of depression and a doctor, upon hearing that she was vegetarian and without asking further questions about her life or inquiring into how she meets her nutritional needs, assured her that her *diet* was the cause of her mental health problems and that the only way for her to not be depressed was to eat meat. So she began to eat meat again. As Foucault has demonstrated with respect to the psychiatrization of sexuality, this story—like the case of the orthorexia nervosa diagnosis—suggests that with respect to alimentary norms as well, doctors may exploit medical diplomas to pass off their own mores for science, and this is facilitated by the way that pathology has been conflated with abnormality in psychiatric discourses and more generally in our culture, as seen in the writings of Margaret Atwood.

The hypothesis I have explored in this paper is that at least one reason why more people are not vegetarian—despite what we know and deplore about the living and dying conditions of animals in factory farms and factory slaughterhouses, and despite what we know and deplore about the impact of the animal agriculture industry on the environment—is that, like Marian McAlpin, they fear being abnormal. If this is so, I would conclude this paper on the normalization of speciesism through the disciplining of our alimentary appetites in the same way that Ladelle McWhorter concludes her book on racism and sexual oppression, which is to insist that we must reject "the very notion of normality as a coherent concept or a standard of human worth" (322). In a speciesist society, as in a sexist, racist and heterosexist society, we must strive to be "maladjusted."

Bio

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Book Reviews

Anat Pick (2011) *Creaturely Poetics: Animality and Vulnerability in Literature and Film*, Columbia UP: New York

Reviewed by Lindgren Johnson[4]

I can't say enough about Anat Pick's *Creaturely Poetics*. This is a beautiful, profound, and important book that works through and around long-held and cherished assumptions, both within and without animal studies. To say that this is a book that will change animal studies and the other fields with which it engages, such as film studies, philosophy, literary studies, and ethics, however, still misses the mark. What ultimately distinguishes *Creaturely Poetics* is not only the richness of its theoretical approaches, the diversity of its primary texts, or even the brilliant readings that weave together this textured material: it is the tenaciously ethical energy that propels and charges it. This is a book that matters.

As Pick explains in her very useful introduction, when Cary Wolfe published his groundbreaking *Animal Rites* (2003) he established much of the foundation for animal studies, arguing that a posthumanist tack should be taken in our consideration of animals as he moved away from the "extensionism" of traditional animal rights discourse. Rather than merely extending our reach outwards to encompass those most like us (and thus imposing a suffocating insistence on human exceptionalism in the midst of an apparent consideration of "the other"), Wolfe argued that we should work to alleviate the "'fundamental repression" (Wolfe 1) of nonhuman subjectivity through a sustained critique of the discourse of species and the institution of speciesism it supports.

Wolfe's attempt to address this fundamental repression of nonhuman subjectivity rests in a critique that "works its way *internally*" (Pick 2) through "the 'inside,' the site of what used to be called the 'self' and the 'subject'" (Wolfe 193). *Creaturely Poetics*, however, "proceeds in the opposite direction, *externally*" (Pick 3), by considering "the creature" as a being that "is first and foremost a living body—material, temporal, and vulnerable" (5). This consideration of "creatureliness" begins with and continues through a deep engagement with the work of philosopher Simone Weil and "the meanings of what Weil sees as the creaturely abandonment to

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'pitiless necessity'" (3). As Pick explains, "I am interested […] in the ramifications (for thought and also for action) of being oriented toward vulnerability as a universal mode of exposure" (5).

In considering these externalities Pick asks, then, not what it would mean to acknowledge the agency or subjectivity of the marginalized subjects that animals are, but what it would mean to pay attention to and actually embrace their--and our own—vulnerability and shared creatureliness. Moreover, she calls attention to the sacredness of this vulnerability. In doing so, she reorients us away from usual (though valid and important) moves aimed at directly empowering the marginalized to consider powerlessness as a part of the creaturely condition as it is also the seat of ethics and the sacred. Pick demonstrates how an embrace of creatureliness and its "inhumanity" can and should change the way we think and act in the world.

Creaturely Poetics calls attention to the ways literature and film--ranging from the desire for "a resuscitation of the human in the post-Holocaust task of remembrance" (18) to film theory's obsession with the return of the gaze as the mark of personhood--turn away from creatureliness. At the same time, it also examines the ways that literature and film often attest to creatureliness, arguing, for example, that "film's realism is its inhumanity" (115). Reading through a "creaturely prism" ultimately enables an understanding of human culture as much more than "the clichéd expression of the 'human condition' but an expression of something *in*human as well: the permutations of necessity and materiality that condition and shape human life" (5).

All that being said, a turn toward exposure is not entirely new in animal studies. As Pick herself points out, Wolfe's own contribution to *Philosophy and Animal Life* (2008), the beautiful collection of essays responding to J.M. Coetzee's *The Lives of Animals* (1999), is, after all, titled "Exposures," and the five essays that comprise the collection track the shift that animal studies has been taking toward a more creaturely approach (7). Much of Pick's argument expands on the work in this collection, especially that of Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond, who examines "the difficulty of philosophy" (Diamond 77) and its tendency to deflect from the exposure that Weil insistently and ecstatically embraces. Pick, following Diamond, argues that the philosophical register, though essential to thinking about animality and creatureliness, is deficient. A "new register […] which complements, but also keeps philosophy in check" is required (17). This new register is one that "attempts a rapprochement between the material and the sacred" (17), one in

which the source of the sacred is not the amorphous humanist soul, but the material vulnerability of the inhuman.

These various reorientations—a consideration of the outside instead of the inside, the move from the secular to the sacred, and the privileging of vulnerability over subjectivity--form the fabric of this book. Pick certainly anticipates objections to these reorientations ("To begin with, why treat embodiment solely in the locus of vulnerability? And why approach animals in this way, as radically vulnerable?") (14). Viewing animals from this creaturely perspective, she understands, might initially appear to reduce them to "the status of superlative victims," limiting our relations with them and foreclosing the very possibility of animal agency (14). Yet to place animals "in a context of such extraordinary powerlessness," she argues, is also to "draw attention to their outstanding position in the judicial, political, and moral orders" (15). Or, to put it another way, it is to resist a deflection from the animal reality humanism has created, as it is also to explore the "ethicoreligious" landscape and even potentiality of creaturely exposure (15).

Wolfe famously argues in *Animal Rites* that "we need to understand that the ethical and philosophical urgency of confronting the institution of speciesism […] *has nothing to do with whether you like animals*" (7). Many contemporary approaches, scholarly and non-scholarly alike, continue in a similar vein by dismissing the relevance of human affection to animal justice. Often these dismissals go even further, attesting to the impossibility and even danger of anything approaching human love for animals, as seen in the increasing number of smug arguments that proceed through a search-and-destroy-all-sentimental-anthropomorphisms methodology (Pick's nuanced reading of the reception of *Grizzly Man* has much to say about this phenomenon). *Creaturely Poetics* offers a radical corrective to this annihilation of love, expanding as much as reorienting the ethical imperative of animal studies. Pick asserts that our relations with animals, in fact, have *everything* to do with whether we like—whether we *love*—them, as she explores what this love—what such a creaturely poetics—would and can be.

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Pick asserts in her introduction that "animal studies at its most ambitious could be thought of as a way of reshaping (contracting) the humanities and social sciences under the sign of *dehumanization*" (6), and the subsequent six chapters, which are divided into two sections,

"The Inhumanity of Literature" and "The Inhumanity of Film," deliver on the ambitions of such a contraction.

The book is just as ambitious in its choice of textual material, and the first chapter jumps right into a discussion of "the unraveling of the human in the Holocaust" and unflinchingly argues that a "resuscitation of humanism in the post-Holocaust task of remembrance is neither possible nor desirable" (18). Such an opening argument is reminiscent of Elizabeth Costello's (failed) gambit in *The Lives of Animals*, and the stakes are high. But this first chapter sets the tone for the rest of the book in its ethical tenacity as Pick considers, among other things, why "comparing the fate of animals to that of Jews is considered ethically repugnant" (24). She exposes the great effort made to "to forget the Holocaust's systematic demystification of human identity" and how "the notion of 'crimes against humanity' in fact obscures the Holocaust's fundamental unraveling of the human" and is itself a form of mystification (51). She insists that we must "think though the insufficiencies of a humanist project of remembrance whose implications for the practical pursuit of justice for living beings are as far-reaching as they are debilitating" (51). Such trailblazing work in dehumanization is crucial not only for Holocaust studies, but for the study of genocide more broadly, slavery, the various animal deathways enabled by human exceptionalism, and the discourses of human and animal rights.

Continuing her examination of the "flight from interiority toward exteriority," Pick's next two chapters go on to consider questions of language, perception, and materiality in William Golding's *The Inheritors* (1955) and Marie Darrieussecq's *Pig Tales* (1996). Noting that "visuality has been especially pertinent in recent debates on nonhuman subjectivities," Pick discusses the "concrete and pictorial rather than abstract" perception of Golding's Neanderthal characters by way of Temple Grandin's "ocular logic," or what Grandin famously describes as her ability to "think in pictures" (54-55). The comparison and contrast of Golding's and Grandin's politics of alterity is particularly insightful and timely, and Pick cautions that "championing ulterior subjectivities does not in itself generate a new ethics if the question of power is left unaddressed" (65). Grandin's is an "avowedly Cartesian story, which quickly turns into a tale of betrayal," with her purported ability to see and think like cows enabling her to "enter into their midst like a spy" (66). Despite both texts' "emphasis on the picture as a gateway to nonhuman alterity," then, they have "starkly different versions of the idea of communion" (70). While Golding has pity for the vanquished, Grandin is in the business of vanquishing.

The third chapter considers embodied language in Darrieussecq's novel *Pig Tales*, which is narrated in the first person by a woman who has turned into a pig. Pick is interested in the novel's "écriture de cochon" and Darrieussecq's exposition of writing as a "corporeal rather than psychological event" (80). Drawing on Agamben's "account of the human as optical procedure" (87), Pick also focuses on the "visual ambivalence" of the novel regarding species identification and explores what she calls "primary anthropomorphism" (the creation of the human for the human) and the more familiar "secondary anthropomorphism"; as Pick argues regarding the relation between these stages of humanization, "to make other animals 'like us' [secondary anthropomorphism] entails forgetting that humans begin by making themselves 'like us' [primary anthropomorphism]" (83). For Pick, *Pig Tales* is "not merely a fictional narrative about species exchange but a metafiction on the forging of the human through language, through writing" (84-5). Ultimately, its "zoomorphic vision replaces presumptions not only about the supposed perfection of the female body but about the inherent dignity of the human form" (89).

"The Inhumanity of Film" begins with a brisk stroll through theorizations of the cinematic animal, including the work of John Berger, Steve Baker, Akira Mizuta Lippit, and Jonathan Burt, with Pick paying particular attention to the connections between the cinematic and the corporeal. She also brings André Bazin, among others, into play, considering his fascination with "cinematic death" and its affiliates, "temporality, contingency, and love" (112). For Pick, Bazin and Weil both insist on a "'taking hold' of necessity--by either capturing [this finitude or creatureliness] on film or by submitting to it via a process of attention" (116). Such a taking hold "is very nearly synonymous with love" (116). Bazin's work on cinema and realism allows for new theorizations of "the cinematic zoo (films that display animals)" as it, most importantly, gets us to a consideration of the "*cinema as a zoo*: cinema as a zoomorphic stage that transforms all living beings—including humans—into creatures" (106).

Chapter 5 takes up realism, aesthetics, and violence in its fascinating discussion of "scientific surrealism" in two documentary films: Georges Franju's *Le Sang des bêtes* (*Blood of the Beasts* 1949) and Frederick Wiseman's *Primate* (1974). Both films examine the killing and processing of animal bodies: Franju in the slaughterhouses of post-WWII Paris and Wiseman in Yerkes Primate Research Center at Emory University. Franju's and Wiseman's films expose "institutionalized violence" against animals, disclosing "the fusion of rationality and violence as paradigmatically modern" (131). But it is not just the modern fusion of rationality and violence

that interests Pick, but the fusion of violence and aesthetics. Beginning with *Le Sang des bêtes*, Pick demonstrates how the banality of violence coexists with the shock of killing, where violence and its recording on film is surreal, "simultaneously surprising and utterly mundane" (134); rather than "channeling an alternative to modern rationalism," surrealism instead "may be seen to merge with it" (resulting in scientific surrealism) (137).

Having asked us to consider surrealism's "affinity with violent imagery" (132), Pick's argument builds and really pays off in one of the most difficult reads of the book, the discussion of the animal experimentation that *Primate* records. Largely emptying the film of any verbal explanation of the experiments it documents, Wiseman allows actions to speak for themselves (to great criticism from the scientific community). Pick argues that *Primate* is "an extended exposition, not just of the banality (or rationality) of evil but of the *aesthetics of evil*" (147) in which two absolutely opposed aesthetics are revealed: that of "scientific beauty," which "revels in taking apart and looking in" (the film's climax is the researchers' exhilaration over the sectioned brain of a squirrel monkey whose killing, decapitation, and brain dissection we have witnessed) and Weil's "vulnerable beauty," which is a "pained response to the ease with which living bodies may be taken apart" (148).

The final chapter, which examines much of the oeuvre of Werner Herzog, argues that the human in Herzog is "not so much rejected as caught in mid-unraveling, a process simultaneously heroic and self-destructive" (153). One of the shining moments in this chapter is Pick's revision of film theory's politics of the gaze. While continuing to work with the thread of film theory surrounding animals that she discusses in Chapter 4, she questions the "so privileged as to seem intuitive" constitution of humanity and personhood "via the economy of returned looks between subject and object, self and other" (159). As Pick argues, "the demand […] 'to-be-looked-back-at' belongs to the network of visual commerce by which the self replenishes its powers through another's look" (159).

Such a "narcissistic economics of looking" has had ramifications well beyond film theory, impacting feminism, postcolonialism, work on human rights, and a range of ethical theories (159). In one of the many moves in which she turns theory on its head, Pick argues for a revaluation of the "fundamental conditions of vision": "In opposition to the humanist demand that the other look back at me as the condition for her claim to recognition and power, ethics perhaps begins with the blank gaze. For what is ethics if not my seeing without being seen—my

unrequited attention?" (159). As she continues, "it is precisely outside the leveling symmetries of visual exchange that it becomes possible to speak of ethics" (160). Drawing attention to the important difference between voyeurism and Weil's notion of attention in an "ethics [that] takes place in the absence of the mutuality of looking," Pick argues that perhaps "*Grizzly Man* practices the very sort of one-way looking that acknowledges the other in his absence," as she considers Herzog's acknowledgment of Timothy Treadwell (the controversial subject of *Grizzly Man*) and Treadwell's own acknowledgement of the bears with whom he lived (172).

Pick further argues that Herzog's films present dehumanization "not as a descent from humanity into otherness" but as a "creaturely ecstasy" (164). Such an ecstasy Herzog finds in Treadwell. Pick cuts to the quick with her critique of knee-jerk critical reactions to Treadwell, with their "self-congratulating sobriety" regarding his "misguided anthropomorphism," and she locates a fear of sentimentalism as the driving force behind the simplistic readings of *Grizzly Man* (168). In considering these critical anxieties surrounding Treadwell's anthropomorphisms, Pick asks how Herzog himself might be revising the wildlife documentary, as she argues that "a deep love of animals (dangerous, all-engrossing, and just a little mad) is indeed at the heart of Treadwell's footage," which Herzog, to his credit, does not obscure (174). Pick's analysis of the critical reception of *Grizzly Man* (which, in subtle ways, expands on the earlier discussion of primary anthropomorphism in *Pig Tales*) is the most interesting discussion of the mutabilities of anthropomorphism I have read since Erica Fudge's *Animal*.

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In *The Lives of Animals*, Elizabeth Costello, questioned about her vegetarianism, is told as much as asked, "Your own vegetarianism […] comes out of moral conviction, does it not?" Costello's response catches her audience off guard: "No, I don't think so [….] It comes out of a desire to save my soul" (43). When considered within a creaturely poetics, Costello's concern for her soul is not the deflection it might initially appear to be. Rather, it is a turn away from the unassailability of "moral conviction" toward vulnerability. Her response speaks to the intimate relations between creaturely materiality and human spirituality: paying attention to creatureliness is paying attention to the soul. But this is all lost on her audience, who can't seem to think outside the discourse of moral conviction and animal rights (or extensionism).

This is just one example among many of Costello's unsuccessful struggles to describe both the "wound" out of which she speaks (a creaturely description of the "self" if there ever was one) and the embeddedness of this self's soul in *in*humanity. And this, in so many ways, is where *Creaturely Poetics* picks up. Pick articulates, within the new register she elaborates, what Costello struggles to explain: the sacredness of creaturely inhumanity. This is a striking achievement and much of what makes *Creaturely Poetics* so luminescent.

Costello's soulful vegetarianism has everything and nothing to do with the increasingly popular belief in the spiritually restorative properties of intimate animal killings, where slaughter is experienced as spiritually productive (just think of Temple Grandin's ecstatic-because-sympathetic killing or the locavore movement's salvific-because-personalized killing). In both cases—vegetarianism and slaughter—there is, crucially, a shared recognition of the sacred profundity of animal exposure and a desire to be in intimate contact with it. Both, in other words, recognize the sacredness of exposure, but their response to it is radically different. Following Costello's inchoate lead, Pick interrogates the sacred as the rationalization for violence and animal sacrifice as she also goes beyond the facile security of moral codes and convictions, revealing the sacred as the reason for care and concern. The profundity of animal vulnerability, *Creaturely Poetics* argues, lies in the exposure that is our shared and always precarious *living*, the source of the sacred. Attention to this sacred creaturely vulnerability is where ethics and love begin.

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Inter-Species Relations: A Review of Clare Palmer's *Animal Ethics in Context* (2010) Colombia UP: New York.

Reviewed by Chlöe Taylor

"Tu deviens responsable pour toujours de ce que tu as apprivoisé."

—Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, *Le Petit Prince* (Chapitre XXI)

Clare Palmer opens *Animal Ethics in Context* by describing two dramatically different scenes of suffering. The first of these is the 2007 drowning by natural causes of over ten thousand wildebeest in Kenya's Mara River (pictured above), which took place as camera crews and safari tourists stood by and did nothing. The second scene is the 2008 discovery of over a hundred horses intended for slaughter who suffered from starvation, dehydration, and infections, some to the point of death, near Amersham, Buckinghamshire; for this neglect five members of a British family were convicted under animal welfare legislation. Although far more animals died in the first scenario than in the second (indeed, 1% of the total wildebeest population is estimated to

have died in the first incident), Palmer points out that almost no disapprobation was expressed for the many humans who watched the wildebeest die and failed to assist them, while considerable moral disgust was expressed for the British family who neglected their slaughterhouse-bound horses. The philosophical point of the contrast is about contexts: Palmer suggests that it was the different kinds of contexts in which the suffering occurred, and the different kinds of relationships that humans had to the nonhuman animals in question, that explains the different ethical intuitions that most people have about these two situations. What these intuitions suggest is that the kind of relationship that we have to particular animals changes the nature of our ethical duties towards them. This is an intuition that Palmer argues the dominant approaches to animal ethics cannot account for, as they focus exclusively on the capacities of animals (to feel pain, to be experiencing subjects of their own lives, to flourish) rather than on the relations between specific nonhuman animals and specific humans. Palmer's book argues that understanding the capacities of nonhuman animals is in fact insufficient for understanding our moral duties towards them: we need also to account for relations and contexts.

Chapter One of *Animal Ethics in Context* introduces the reader to arguments to the effect that nonhuman animals merit moral consideration at all because of their capacities to feel pain and to suffer from states such as fear and frustration. These are arguments that Palmer agrees with and that ground her position throughout the book that we have duties to not harm nonhuman animals whether they are domesticated, wild, or somewhere in between. What will be in question in the remainder of the book is what kinds of moral duties we have not merely to not harm nonhuman animals but to assist them, or when we should intervene as opposed to simply leaving them alone.

Chapter Two explores three major philosophical approaches to animal ethics that focus on capacities such as, but not only, the ability to feel pain. These approaches are utilitarianism, rights-based approaches, and the capablilities approach, as represented by Peter Singer, Tom Regan and Gary Francione, and Martha Nussbaum. Even while introducing these theories and their strengths, Palmer demonstrates their inadequacy. In particular, she shows that each of these theories runs into problems when it considers wildlife. While Singer, Regan, Francione, and Nussbaum each express at least ambivalence if not profound reservations about intervening in the wild—for instance by preventing predators from killing their prey, or sterilizing predator species and replacing them with herbivores—it is unclear how any of these theories can really

avoid such conclusions. Indeed, Nussbaum has infamously bitten the bullet and argued that humans should be benevolent dictators of the wild, and should replace nature with justice (Nussbaum 2006). While this conclusion seems deeply problematic to most readers, Palmer suggests that none of these ethical theories can consistently or entirely avoid it since they find their normative ground exclusively in the kind of beings that nonhuman animals are, regardless of their context and regardless of our relationships to those animals. In other words, when we focus only on capacities and not on contexts and relations, it does not matter whether the cat in question is of the domesticated variety and lives in our house or is a big cat and lives in a jungle—we have the same kinds of moral duties towards both cats and to their prey.

One reason that Palmer points out that we need to take relations and contexts into account is that even the capacities of nonhuman animals may depend on their relations to humans: humans may shape, create, stunt or prevent some of the capacities that other animals have, and thus capacities themselves are often relational. Palmer's demonstration of the inadequacy of the utilitarian, rights, and capabilities approaches to animal ethics to account for context and relations and thus for our different moral intuitions about different categories of animals sets up her argument for a relational and context-sensitive approach to animal ethics in the chapters that follow. Chapter Three turns to two sets of existing relational approaches to animal ethics from which Palmer wishes to distinguish her approach: 1) ethical theories that focus on affective relationships between humans and animals, such as care ethics and what Palmer calls affective communitarianism, and 2) contractual approaches to human/nonhuman animal relations.

Affective relationship approaches to animal ethics, such as the feminist care ethics of Josephine Donovan and Carol Adams and the affective communitarianism of Mary Midgley and J. Baird Callicott, are limited, on Palmer's view, because they restrict their account of relations to felt and emotional relations, specifically with beings whom we encounter. While she states that the moral emotions such as care and empathy are not irrelevant to her relational approach, Palmer does not want to *base* her approach on them since it is all too easy for us to distance ourselves from nonhuman animals in ways that ensure that such affective states do not arise. Palmer thus explores our relations to other animals not in terms of affective relations but, more fundamentally, in terms of causal relations; this means that we have an ethical relation with nonhuman animals when we have impacted or are impacted by their lives.

As noted, the second type of relational approach to animal ethics that Palmer distinguishes her theory from is the contractualist approach. We generally think about contractualist approaches to animal ethics as arguing that we have *no* direct ethical duties towards other species of animals since they are not the kinds of beings who could be signatories of a contract; we can, however, have indirect duties towards them if a human being who is a signatory of the social contract owns or cares about the animals. This is an approach that Tom Regan has said "takes one's moral breathe away" (Regan 1989), while Peter Singer notes that this moral theory fares so badly when applied to human beings that we can dismiss it without worrying about how it would be applied to other animals (Singer 1975). This is not the contractualist approach to animal ethics that Palmer explores in her book, however. Rather, she discusses a body of literature that argues that a large number of nonhuman animals—domesticated animals—*do*, in fact, have a *direct* (quasi-)contractual relationship with human beings, having at some point (tacitly) consented to domestication because it was in their best interest. Another version of this argument would have it that although nonhuman animals have not contracted themselves into domesticity in historical fact, they *would have* done so if they could since they are better off in their domesticated state than they would be in a state of nature. Although such arguments may be more palatable when considering some kinds of domesticated animals rather than others (such as well cared for pets rather than agricultural animals), Palmer refutes such arguments in general. For instance, she points out that a nonhuman animal who accepts to eat what is given to her, or to come inside for food, or to be petted, does not understand that she is 'consenting' to be sterilized or bred, to be experimented upon or slaughtered, or to have her nature changed through domestication. At the same time, Palmer suggests that the discussion of a domesticated animal contract is useful in that it makes us consider the under-examined question of how domestication impacts nonhuman animals, as well as the kinds of moral obligations that arise from being responsible for these impacts.

Chapter Four is a short chapter that defines a number of terms and makes a number of distinctions that will be used in the remainder of Palmer's book. It defines domestication and wildness, and discusses the many positions that nonhuman animals might occupy between these poles: feral animals, non-domesticated urban nonhuman animals, scavengers, displaced wild animals, nonhuman animals in zoos. It discusses the distinction between harm and failing to assist as well as the distinction between three kinds of *laissez faire* intuitions:

1) the strong *laissez faire* intuition: we are morally obliged to leave wild animals alone (it is always wrong to assist them);

2) the *weak laissez faire* intuition: we have no moral obligation to assist wild animals but it is permissible to assist them; and

3) the "No-contact" *laissez faire* intuition: we have no moral obligation to assist wild animals where we have had no contact with them, but it is permissible to do so; and in cases where we have had contact with wild animals and impacted their lives or benefited from this contact, we may be morally required to assist them.

Ultimately, Palmer will defend a version of the "No-contact" *laissez faire* intuition.

Chapter Five considers and rejects consequentialist and libertarian arguments for the strong and weak *laissez faire* intuitions respectively. Some consequentialist arguments suggest that even if assisting wild animals appears to have positive consequences in the short term, ultimately it harms them. This may simply be because any assistance interferes with a wild animal's wildness, and the benefits of wildness are thought to outweigh any suffering that is in question. Alternately, the consequentialist argument may be that any assistance almost invariable has (predictable or unpredictable) long term consequences that negatively impact the individual animal assisted, the species, other species or the ecosystem. Palmer raises examples that would support this view, such as feeding hungry bears in national parks, but also argues that not all cases of assisting wild animals are like this. There are cases where humans may assist wild animals without making the animals less wild and without causing long term harms to them, other species, or the ecosystem.

As is often noted about consequentialist arguments, it is difficult to predict these long term consequences. When I interfered with a cat killing a magpie in my yard, the magpie died on the way to the animal hospital and the cat ran away, perhaps suffering from hunger and needing to kill again. Perhaps I should have predicted that and not tried to assist the magpie, but in the split second when I made that decision I could not have known if the cat was feral or a neighborhood domestic cat (I still don't know), and that difference in context would have make a moral difference for Palmer. When I first fed and later adopted another feral cat who was in my yard and who would otherwise, with her then unborn kittens, have died or at least seriously suffered in the Northern Canadian winter, I arguably did not harm the ecosystem or other species or the cat or her kittens—though I certainly interfered with their wildness—but I almost certainly

benefited the cats; as Palmer notes, very few philosophers (herself included) are willing to make the hard argument that wildness is a "trumping value" (84) that outweighs any suffering. Although this feral cat wanted to come inside and to stay inside, it would be wrong for me to believe that she tacitly consented to domestication (although I tended to think of it that way) since she had no idea that this would entail not just food and shelter for herself and her kittens but sterilization, the adopting out of two of her offspring (which distressed all involved), and the changing of their natures: they were made tame. Her kittens certainly didn't consent. I feed what would have been feral cats (or dead cats) with cat food made out of the corpses of other domesticated animals, which complicates the ethical context further given that my responsibility towards domesticated animals is, for Palmer, stronger than my responsibilities towards feral animals. To complicate things even further, this particular cat had likely once been domesticated given the ease with which she (re)adjusted to indoor life and her quick trust for humans. This cat's history of relations with humans, and the history of the cat who killed a magpie in my yard, are not facts that I will ever know, and yet it seems that I would need to have known them in order to act according to Palmer's argument. This does not show that consequentialist arguments are wrong, only that it is often difficult to know how to act.

Palmer then considers libertarian arguments made in the human context, according to which we may help the poor if we choose, however we are morally entitled to allow the proximate and distant poor to suffer while we are affluent, so long as we have no special obligations towards those poor (e.g. they are not our children). A libertarian approach to nonhuman animal ethics would likely support the weak *laissez faire* intuition, arguing that we have a moral obligation to help our domesticated animals (we have taken on special obligations towards them), and it is morally permissible to help wild animals if we choose, however we have no moral obligation to do so. Just as critics of the libertarian position in the human context point out that the affluent are in fact thoroughly entangled with the proximate and distant poor, and it is thus a matter of justice that the affluent assist the poor where ever in the world they may be, something similar might be said of some (but not all) wild animals. The suffering of many fully wild animals—such as whales caught in fishing nets and polar bears suffering due to climate change—is causally entangled with human activity, and this gives rise to moral obligations to assist them. Since they are victims of injustice, it is not charity (or morally optional) to help the human poor or the polar bears. Palmer argues, however, that not all wild animals or all instances

of wild animal suffering are like this. There is suffering in the wild that has no causal relation to human activity, such as the mass drowning of wildebeest in 2007, or the death by tiger of an antelope. In these cases, there is no justice requirement that we should assist the suffering animal (and in the latter case there are likely good reasons why we should not).

By having raised problems with the consequentialist defense of a strong *laissez faire* intuition and with the libertarian defense of a weak *laissez faire* intuition, Palmer concludes that it is the "No contact" *laissez faire* intuition which is most defensible. That is: we have no moral obligation to assist fully wild animals, though in some cases (the drowning wildebeest) it is morally permissible to do so. For wild animals in the "contact zone" or whose suffering is causally related to human activities (such as whales entangled in fishing nets), special obligations to assist have been generated and are required by justice. Even the consequentialist who argues that we should not assist wild animals because this would interfere with their wildness might agree that we have special obligations towards those wild animals whose wildness we have *already* interfered with, such as the polar bear and the whale.

In the remainder of Chapter 5, Palmer argues that while she has defended the view that assistance is morally optional in the case of fully wild animals outside the "contact zone," whose suffering is unrelated to human activities, this is not so for domesticated animals whose vulnerability humans have cultivated voluntarily and in their own interests. Palmer notes that in the realm of human ethics we are commonly thought to have special obligations towards particularly vulnerable individuals even if we did not cause their particular vulnerability. The case of domesticated nonhuman animals is different in that in this case the particular vulnerability of these animals has been cultivated and in some cases even bred for (such as laboratory animals created to be prone to cancers and hairless cats). The closest parallel in the human realm, Palmer argues, is the choice to bring a child into the world. More specifically, Palmer notes cases of deaf parents who deliberately create a deaf child. While deafness arguably increases that child's vulnerability in the world, it makes the child fit more easily into the deaf parents' home, just as some modifications of domesticated animals (sterilization, declawing) make them into better pets. In such cases it is generally accepted that those who made that choice to bring a child, and especially a particularly vulnerable child, into the world would have a special obligation towards that child. The irony is that those who breed nonhuman animals in captivity, and who breed and raise them for traits that make them particularly vulnerable, do not

often feel special obligations to protect those animals from harm as a result. On the contrary, such people breed and raise nonhuman animals in vulnerability-increasing ways precisely to make those animals easier and more profitable to harm (to experiment on, to slaughter). Often the argument is made that farmers and animal breeders can do what they want with their nonhuman animals because those animals would not even exist without them. This is like saying that it is permissible to experiment upon, kill and eat one's children since they would not exist without their parents. Our causal entanglement with the very existence of human children and domesticated nonhuman animals does not make those beings our property; it gives us a special responsibility for their welfare.

Having established her argument by the end of Chapter Five, in Chapters Six and Eight Palmer works through a series of cases in order to illustrate its applicability and to explore some potential problems. The examples in Chapter Six concern coyotes displaced by a new housing residence and "dumpster kittens." The examples examined in Chapter Eight concern polar bears and global warming, wild elk suffering from disease, injured squirrels, and encounters between wild birds and domesticated cats. The problems worked out through these examples include claims about reparation for past harms and whether we can be responsible for harms of which we are not the direct agents or the beneficiaries. Some of these examples were already mentioned above or will be drawn on below in my discussion of Chapter Seven.

Chapter Seven, situated between the two example chapters, responds to a number of anticipated objections to Palmer's position. Without entering into each of these debates in detail, the potential problems that Palmer discusses in this chapter include: whether she relies on a problematic human/nature dichotomy; whether her theory allows us to fail to assist suffering "strange" human beings with whom we have had no causal contact; whether domestication is always a harm; whether painless killing is a harm; and, finally, whether her view of animal ethics is excessive in the amount of information that it requires us to have before we can act.

This last problem, already discussed above with respect to my encounters with feral cats, is a persistent one in Palmer's book. In an example pursued in Chapter Six, for instance, a man who comes across a litter of 1-week old kittens and has doubts about whether to help them would have to undertake a complicated analysis of his own implication in the domesticated animal system before knowing whether he is ethically obliged to help these kittens. He would have to consider: does he or has he ever had pets? Does he benefit in even tenuous ways from other

people having pets? For instance, do his social relationships or his finances benefit from the fact that pets are good for the health and stress levels of their human companions and thus beneficial to human society? Is he complicit in negative societal attitudes towards nonhuman animals that have resulted in the domesticated animal system? It turns out that it would be extremely difficult for this man to extricate himself entirely from the fate of the kittens, however Palmer writes that if he had come across a nest of 1-week old baby wild rats, he could simply have reflected on the quite different relationships that humans have with rats than cats and walk on by. Of course, what Palmer doesn't note is that he would have to first verify that these 1-week old creatures are indeed wild urban brown rats and not, say, fancy rats dumped by a pet store or a pet owner, or lab rats dumped by a nearby laboratory, and it is not clear that your average passerby could make such a distinction. One worries that this is a bit too calculating, and that our hypothetical passerby might do better to be a bit more Levinasian than Palmerian on this day, or simply respond to the face-to-face encounter with suffering beings that he is having.

There are two inter-related concerns here: one is that too much—and sometimes impossible kinds—of information are required in order to act, and the other is that sifting through this information makes ethics too calculating, not allowing for a truly ethical encounter. Palmer's quite fair response to the first concern is that we should not always expect ethics to be simple when life is complicated, and in many cases we do have and should take the time to reflect carefully before we act. While it is quite obvious that factory farming and laboratory experiments on nonhuman animals are immoral, knowing what we should do to even begin to address the harm we have done to polar bears requires a considerable amount of scientific knowledge and reflection; moreover these are not animals whom we regularly encounter. This response is less relevant in the case of the "dumpster kittens," however, whom the passerby encounters and could easily help. Unfortunately, Palmer refuses to give any significant ethical weight to the phenomenon of encounter.

Palmer's worry is that if she concedes that one has an ethical responsibility to help the kittens simply because one has encountered them, then there is no good reason for why one doesn't also have to help all the kittens and other needy animals whom one doesn't encounter. This response seems to beg the question as it explains why encounters don't matter by assuming that encounters don't matter. Accordingly, when Palmer discusses two scenarios involving injured squirrels, one who was injured by another wild animal and the other who was injured by

a car, she argues that the passerby has no moral obligation to help the first squirrel but has a moral obligation to help the second. The fact that the passerby is in the presence of a suffering creature whom she can help, and in so doing would do no harm, is irrelevant; all that matters is how the suffering in question was caused, and if there was no causal link to human activity, then the passerby has no moral responsibility to assist. Palmer then moderates this response: as noted above, although Palmer wants to distinguish her relational approach from affective relational approaches such as care ethics, she states that affective relations may still have some role to play in moral decisions. The extent of the role that Palmer is willing to grant to affective relations becomes clear in her discussion of the first squirrel, as she adds that given the kinds of virtue ethics arguments that care ethicists have made, we might say that it reflects *well* on the moral character of the passerby if she assists even the squirrel who was injured by a wild animal, and reflects *badly* on her character if she doesn't do so. This is as much as Palmer will concede, however, and she maintains that there is no moral obligation to assist the first squirrel.

That a passerby should encounter two similarly dazed and bleeding squirrels and is required to aid one but not the other because of this kind of analysis of the provenance of the harm may be counter-intuitive to some readers and is a strange conclusion for a book that began by wanting to make sense of our moral intuitions. When I have encountered injured wild animals—such as a bird on a city sidewalk, or a cockroach flailing on his back—I did not stop to wonder how the animal had been harmed. I simply rushed the bird to an animal hospital and flipped the cockroach onto his feet. Even when I knew that a wild animal whom I encountered had been harmed by other wild animals—such as a bat whose wings had been pecked by birds—it did not cross through my mind that I should not assist any more than I would do if the punctured wings had been caused by humans. The bird, cockroach and the bat were suffering and their suffering was useless and an evil and I wanted to stop it. Palmer can say that I showed a good character by acting as I did, but she retains a hierarchy between causal relations (matters of justice) and affective relations (matters or character): while it is required to be just, showing a good character is just a nice extra. This is the same kind of hierarchy of justice over care that has been proposed by Rawls, with justice being required and care being optional. Care ethicists have demonstrated the problems with such a hierarchy: in fact, justice and care, or attention to causal and affective relations, are equally important. While Palmer is persuasive about the limitations of focusing on capacities and about the limitations of focusing on affective relations, she herself

seems to err by focusing (all but) exclusively on causal relations or on justice rather than care. What we need is not just an ethics that accounts for both capacities *and* relations, as Palmer argues, but one that also accounts equally for both affective *and* causal relations.

Palmer's book is carefully argued and structured and is persuasive on many levels. It makes an original and important contribution to the philosophical literature on animal ethics and would make an excellent textbook for an introductory philosophy course in animal ethics, as it introduces readers to a range of theories, problems, and arguments as well as developing the author's own thought-provoking position. I want to conclude, however, with one concern. Throughout her book Palmer refers to nonhuman animals as "animals," "it"s and "that"s rather than "nonhuman animals," "he"s, "she"s, and "who"s. While she never mentions why she chooses to perpetuate the language of "it" and "that" when referring to nonhuman animals, in her notes on terminology in the Introduction to the volume, Palmer, as many other authors writing in the area of critical animal theory have done, notes that she will use the word "animal" to refer to nonhuman animals because of the limitations of the language, or because no other term in English exists that isn't cumbersome. As she acknowledges, however, this choice reinscribes a problematic human/animal dichotomy that she explicitly rejects and that her work seeks to undermine. The use of "it" and "that" also perpetuates the view that nonhuman animals are things, closer to hammers and rocks than to human animals. "Cumbersomeness" is a poor excuse for using speciesist language that we know perpetuates oppression. If a language convention is sexist, racist, speciesist or otherwise reifies systems of oppression, it is better to use a cumbersome phrase. New language uses come to sound less cumbersome over time or with familiarity, and their initial cumbersome is useful as it draws attention to an ethical and political point. Another option, however, is to invent new words that one finds less cumbersome. Instead of repeating the excuse about cumbersomeness or an absence of words in the language, critical animal theorists would do better to invent new words or to use some of the words that have already been invented to refer to nonhuman animals, like anymal (Kemmerer, 2006) or animot (Derrida, 2006). Inserting "nonhuman" before "animal" in cases when nonhuman animals are whom one is referring to (as I have done in this review essay, except, on occasion, where adjectives like 'wild' and 'domesticated' are doing the same work) is simply accurate and is not so awkward that it is worth reinforcing speciesist assumptions to avoid it. Using "he," "she," and "who" instead of "it" and "that" is simple and not cumbersome at all, even if it requires ignoring

one's Spelling and Grammar check. While this may seem like a trivial point, as others have argued it is in fact important that our language embody rather than undermine the philosophical, ethical and political points that we are laboring to make.

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Tom Tyler (2012) *CIFERAE: A Bestiary in Five Fingers*, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis and London.

Reviewed by Rodolfo Piskorski[5]

The *Posthumanities* series, published by the University of Minnesota Press, once more outdoes itself by releasing another remarkable book. If Cary Wolfe, the editor, has managed to churn out one exciting and incisive new book after another, this time comes one that is unique in many ways: Tom Tyler's *CIFERAE: A Bestiary in Five Fingers*. It starts on the right foot for being visually striking: it is square (and not rectangular) and full of pages adorned with illustrations of animals (from medieval bestiaries to Garfield). It offers a veritable update of the bestiary genre, while still providing the contemporary philosophical *Zeitgeist* that a cross-section of animal species such as the bestiary seems prone to evoke.

Tyler's project is sizable but thoroughly convincing. He begins by the assumption that philosophical discourse about animals is first and foremost an *epistemological* question, both because of a supposed human inability of going beyond our (human) minds, but also due to the promise of a true alternative worldview in the shape of animal subjectivity. He puts forth early in the book the famous quote by Protagoras according to which man is the measure of all things, leaving an exploration of its varied, conflicting readings intentionally for the very end of the book. Protagoras's claim may determine that one can only engage in epistemological philosophy in an anthropocentric fashion. Tyler's stance, however, is that epistemology and anthropocentrism are two separate questions that have been entangled. Therefore, he proposes to explore the major epistemological footings (realism, relativism, and pragmatism) in order to test

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whether their core arguments are inherently and structurally anthropocentric or not – if they ascribe to Protagoras's claim.

The book is structured in five chapters – each named after one of the five fingers from the title. Chapter 1 attempts to map the interface between anthropocentrism and animals in philosophy, via Bataille and Heidegger. Chapters 2 through 4 analyze the different epistemological paradigms – realism, relativism, and pragmatism respectively. Finally, chapter 5 tries to address the problems of attempting to define the human and the anthropocentrism that may arise from that. Tyler is clear from the onset, though, that he believes epistemology doesn't necessarily have to be anthropocentric, and he diagnoses epistemological philosophy as one of the main culprits of "theoretical" animal abuse: "Like language, these philosophical animals often find themselves subject to casual or unwitting abuse" (3), and Tyler urges us to "attend, where possible, to the unsubstitutable singularity […] of disruptive individuals like Jacques Derrida's indecisive but determined cat" (4).

In this quest, Tyler will find two common elements in the texts he reads, placed diametrically in their structure: hands and animals. Hands, Tyler shows, are foregrounded in philosophical texts with an obsessional regularity that is telling. Philosophers are prone, he suggests, to point at the human hand (and for most of them, all hands are human) as the mark of superiority that warrants human exceptionalism and epistemological anthropocentrism. And, on the other hand, Tyler demonstrates how a broad range of thinkers – when they're thinking about animals or not – seem to be virtually unable to write philosophy without recourse to animals. Therefore, Tyler presents a careful exploration of epistemological philosophies by the means of a bestiary of the animals that have been put to work by the writers and philosophers he quotes, all the while keeping the engaging "question of the hand" on equal footing with his discussion of animality. Perhaps even more interesting than that, there is an underlying discussion throughout the whole book as to the possibility of actually freeing animals from discursive abuse: he includes 101 animal images in his bestiary-like treatise in order to foreground silenced animal presences, but he does not shy away from the implication that animal images are still a form of enslaving representation.

In this discussion, Tyler coins the term "cipher" in order to tackle the myriad of animals who people philosophical texts. These *ciferae* (to use the Latin term he often employs) are animal examples used by authors that are empty of signification of their own – they are stand-ins

for something greater than themselves (the point), and are interchangeable with many other animals or even things. Quoting the *Oxford English Dictionary*, Tyler tells us that the word cipher means "a person or thing 'who fills a place, but is of no importance or worth' in its own right. The real power residing elsewhere, the cipher remains 'a nonentity, a mere nothing'" (23). As for the animal *ciferae* of philosophy, they are "symbolic characters in animal form, hieroglyphs utilized by philosophy that a meaning might be conveyed" (28). Tyler is clearly timorous of the fact that the philosophical tradition that is said to represent the human's characteristically superior rationality is in fact using and abusing animals in order to make the very point that humans are, indeed, superior to other living beings.

But not all ciphers do their work as they're told, and Tyler coins a second term for the refusal of mere emptiness and place-holding: when an animal resists its interchangeability and calls attention to its specificity, it becomes an *index.* An index, as opposed to a cipher,

> *points out* what is of interest, using a quality or behavior peculiar to the animal, and is therefore intrinsic to the philosophical argument. […] The cipherous use, in which the choice of creature is entirely arbitrary, stands in direct contrast to the indexical use, in which specific traits are especially selected. (32-3)

But even an animal which is intended a cipher can display a disobedience that frees its specificity from the laws of philosophical projects by putting its foot down and snatching the *ferae* from inside the *ciferae.* Ciphers, then, can turn into indexes when we least expect and their passivity and meaningfulness become a rather rebellious opacity of meaning which disrupts the philosophical argument to which they had been enslaved: "Whenever we meet a cipher, there is every chance that all the careful work undertaken for their master has already begun to come undone. These animals are not content to remain mere ciphers and demand to be treated otherwise" (29).

Tyler points out Freud as one thinker who systematically engaged in the practice of turning ciphers into indexes, quoting his famous analyses of animal presences in his patients' unconscious, especially the case of the Wolf-Man. But Tyler's wording when exploring the index resembles more closely Deleuze and Guattari, who were openly anti-Freudian and who had a different reading of the Wolf-Man's dreams. In *A Thousand Plateaus,* when discussing the concept of becoming-animals, they write: "[Becoming-animal] disrupts signifying projects. […]

[Psychoanalysts] see the animal as a representative of drives, or a representation of the parents. They do not see the reality of a becoming-animal, that it is affect in itself, the drive in person, and represents nothing." (2004: 257) While Freud, according to Tyler, turned ciphers into indexes by foregrounding the specificity each animal brought to the meaning-making machine of the unconscious, Deleuze and Guattari point out that animals (or becomings-animal), in fact, cannot be *adequately* put to mean anything, and therefore always resists symbolization and metaphoricity in some level. Although such argument can be read all over Tyler's wording, he comes particularly near when he concedes that "both [ciphers and indexes] retain the services of animals," (33) or when he proposes that "we must cease to understand [the animals of philosophy] as arbitrarily chosen placeholders, unwittingly serving some higher pedagogic purpose. We must *de*-cipher the ciphers, that is, stop treating them as ciphers altogether" (29).[1]

It's not exactly clear how animals can be actually made present by the means of the specificity of the index – one must remember that the index still conflates each animal with its own species. I sense that Tyler suspects so, and his attempt of turning his book into a bestiary is an attempt of signaling just that. After all, by writing a book about epistemological anthropocentrism and hands by the means of a discussion of animality, he runs the risk of coming up precisely with another philosophy book which exploits animals' symbolic capital. By inserting 101 images of animals interspersed in his text, Tyler weaves an interesting philosophical text that tries to account for its nature as bestiary, and for its uses of animals as symbolic matrixes. These images function as an attempt to fight the erasure, silence, and exploitation such animals (necessarily?) suffer within the fabric of philosophical discourse, and their visibility attests to Tyler's wish of uncovering them and revealing their legacy. In his "philosophical investigation," Tyler wishes to "gain no small benefit from the assistance of animals, […] who nudge their way back into view, all insisting in their own distinctive, individual contributions to the task at hand" (8). Whether animal images – *as* mimetic representation – can count as visibility or freedom from symbolic entrapment is, in my account, perhaps the most interesting issue the book raises, even if silently.

Tyler seems to indeed consider that there is no possibility of complete freedom from symbolization for animals, for the concept of "the Animal" is first and foremost a product of symbolicity. He appraisingly explores a certain "death of the Animal"[2] as of way of freeing non-human individuals from the symbolic discourse of species, and arrives at a different elaboration

of his own term *ciferae*: "With the introduction of a heterogeneous array of different animals [rather than only either ciphers or indexes], we are better placed to achieve the death of the Animal, but in its place we are left instead with an *animal function*" (50). The "death" of the Animal (i.e. the end of the discourse that conflates all non-human animal life) seems to be his goal, but getting rid of ciphers and indexes, while getting us closer, still leaves us with such (symbolic) animal function. In a way, all animal presences in discursive practices are not readily cipherous or indexical, but enigmatic and require deciphering. As such, although no animal has a *determined* function within representational practices, it seems impossible for us to keep from providing them with one.

Such discursive function of the animal, Tyler suggests, is perhaps unavoidable and this book comes across as a remarkable attempt to struggle with this realization, all the while trying to achieve a more just relationship to non-human life. His insistence that the working of a cipher consists of a place-holding mechanism resonates considerably with Derrida's openly linguistic and discursive thinking surrounding writing and the supplement. Animal ciphers stand in place for the real power of meaning which "resid[es] elsewhere", in human concerns and signification, just as writing merely stands in for the truth of speech. Similarly, when Tyler concedes that even the species-specific meaning of the index cannot be freed from such discursive reduction of animality, he comes interestingly close to John Berger's account of the symbolic potential in an animal's relationship to its species:

> What distinguished men from animals was the human capacity for symbolic thought, […] yet the first symbols were animals. […] Animals interceded between man and their origin because they were both like and unlike man. […] They were mortal and immortal. An animal's blood flowed like a human blood, but its species was undying and each lion was Lion, each ox was Ox. This was maybe the first existential dualism. (1991: 9)

Berger tries to unpack the radically metaphorical relationship an individual animal has to its species in human imagination and language, to the point that it might not be possible to refer to any individual animal without recourse to the totalizing name of its species. And Tyler's animal index, as he himself hints, is not able of escaping the symbolizing power of animality even when resisting animal interchangeability.

The harsh fact is that interchangeability, the principle of all linguistic articulation, is at the root of "the Animal" as metaphor, or of the animal function. That is why it sounds awkward

when Tyler quotes Carol J. Adams's concept of the "absent referent" appraisingly, since it seems to conflict with his own arguments. Although he quotes many of her other admirable insights, Tyler defines the absent referent as that structure of referencing in which, "although the animals are there, they are not there *as animals*, that is, as particular pigs or asses in their own rights" (28). According to Tyler's own argument, though, it's not really clear how an animal can be made to be present. If animals work as ciphers or indexes – if they are "the Animal" or are subsumed under an animal function – they cannot present themselves. There can be no such thing as the sign *as such*; ciphers, like signs, are always something other than themselves. And if animals (like the sign or the trace) are "structures of non-presence" (Derrida, 1976: 84), all their (self-) presentation will always be *re*-presentation. Thus Tyler's idea of writing philosophy as a bestiary (i.e. by the means of visuality and representation) is a noble and inventive strategy to bring animality in philosophy to the foreground.

Other than animals, Tyler's other interest in the book is the issue of hands, of which he does an incredibly detailed study. From Heidegger's *Handlung* to the narcissistic accounts of the opposable thumb in evolution theory, Tyler carefully unpacks the strategic ways philosophical texts employ hands – similarly, if opposite, to animals – as markers of human identity and exceptionalism. Tyler is at his finest when he is able of weaving together the many strands of interest which (I suppose) triggered the writing of the book: slowly exploring philosophical anecdotes, narratives and memes in order to show the epistemological concern that turns thinkers to hands (as apparatuses for "grasping" or "shaping" reality) and animals (as receptacles of an unknowable perspective, or of the unseeing lack of connection to the real). His philological work on the topic of hands is astounding, and the several ancient philosophical and cultural references about each finger in the beginning of each chapter are very fun to read.

A more rigorous discussion of the hand is left to the very end, side by side with a problematization of the human, which Heidegger posited had to come first of all (and which is taken up in detail). Whether true hands are in fact an exclusive province of the human is fittingly explored alongside the imposing figure of the thumb as that tool-making tool which has enabled the human to have evolved to its present state. Particularly engaging are Tyler's discussion of less recent texts, such as Kant and 19th century authors such as Charles Bell, as he lays out how the hand is naturalized as always already part of the proper human, but always in a way outside of nature as that which enables human dominion over the technical, the technological, and the

cultural (218-9). The treatment of the hand itself as an almost techno-machinic graft into the animalistic human body mirrors the age old human self-image as a cross between a lowly ape and a godly angel, which might in fact explain the reason why the hand has gripped the imagination of so many thinkers as that which best represents what humanity "properly" is (227). If Tyler's project with his book is convincing readers that hands are a systematic obsession among writers who have tried to establish human essence, he has succeeded admirably. The ubiquitousness of hands is indeed startling and telling.

In this last section he comes closest to glimpsing a structural reason why animals are seemingly necessary in philosophical exploration. Tyler seems to suggest that our culture finds it impossible to discuss what the human is and how it is possible to know at all without recourse to a (usually parenthetical or preambulary) comparison to the animal kingdom. Sometimes, as is the case of Bataille discussed early in the book, such foreword statements about humans' differences compared to animals are actually acknowledged *as* shallow ranting – Bataille does after all admits that he treats animality from a "narrow viewpoint" (9). More often than not, the structural pillar of philosophical human essence that is animal disavowal is quickly brushed aside as a footnote and left for more serious problems, such as the nature of knowing and of human technical prowess.

Tyler shines especially when he plays with the literary overtones of his discussion, such as when he reads, after Adorno and Horkheimer, the riddle of the Sphinx as an (animal) question which demands a (human) answer – an answer (i.e. "man") which is itself the human. According to the authors of *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Oedipus's answer to the riddle is the knee-jerk response that the Enlightenment offers to any question – man is the measure of all things, therefore he must be the answer to all questions. (I wonder if that means that all questions are, then, animals.) The irony is that Oedipus, the symbol of the man who knows, the truth seeker, is actually blinded by his not knowing his true identity, and not realizing that the foot-themed riddle applies to him more than any man.[3] Extrapolating from such limb-related questions about human essence, Tyler goes on to discuss 19th century discourses surrounding the human hand, the opposable thumb, and humans' kinship with the apes. The answer concerning the human's natural disposition of limbs, hand and feet as elicited by the Sphinx might as well be, for Tyler, that humans are those who only have *two* hands: "In challenging Oedipus to know himself, the Sphinx was probably closer to the mark when she focused on feet rather than on hands" (255).

By conflating human hands and human feet, and by stressing that so-called paws and feet can function as well as hands, the Sphinx argues that the human hand is not so exceptional after all.

I have intentionally left Tyler's argumentation related to the possible anthropocentrism of epistemological paradigms for last – his writing is always very lucid and clear, and one should follow his arguments him- or herself to ascertain their validity. Suffice to say that he elegantly concludes that all strands of epistemological thought he analyzes are in no way inevitably anthropocentric, and that if they have ever come across as such was probably due to a certain philosophical lack of rigor or blatant speciesism. This conclusion seems particularly urgent if one considers that philosophical work on the knowledge and essence of humans apparently assume it's impossible *not* to be anthropocentric. Tyler puts forth the lucid argument that it is perfectly possible to philosophically discuss a place for the human in the planet while still respecting animal life and acknowledging our debts to animals.

In general, I had the feeling Tyler is mostly a Continental thinker. He certainly seems to espouse Continental modes of thought – he quotes Derrida appraisingly, explicates Nietzsche with interest and detail, and defends Foucault from Richard Rorty's criticism. However, he does seem to frame such Continental ideas in an analytical form, similar to what Matthew Calarco did in his incredible *Zoographies*. And he does not shy away from calling out Continental thinkers' anthropocentrism, such as in Bataille's usually revered work. His analytical perspective, on one hand, does help to shake the notion that Continental philosophy is immune to argumentation and is averse to logic, but it also restrains their impact. In a way, Tyler's topic here is so absurdly important, overarching and ambitious that, by carefully arguing each point, his book could only make it justice if it were perhaps over 600 pages long. On the other hand, however, Tyler is able of producing beautiful and powerful arguments by means of his apt philosophical imagery and his ability of weaving together different strands of thought quickly and playfully. As it is, the book is a thoroughly enjoyable experiment in literary analysis and creation, a very original attempt at weaving very different themes – epistemology, animals, and hands – into a broad discussion that constantly plays with its own elements. Not only that, but his project comes across as particular relevant to those who are trying to find different ways of making philosophy while embracing animals.

Notes

1. Tyler tells us that ciphers are "philosophical beasts of burden" (28) that suffer "textual abuse" at the hands of philosophers. They are ciphered when treated like place-holding zeroes which could be replaced by any other animal or thing, in the name of the philosophical point at hand. They can "prove to be the downfall of their incautious employers", though, for they can easily become an index, that is, "one who informs or betrays, [who] rats on his or her employer" (30). For Tyler, "indices are like finger-posts, helpfully indicating avenues of thoughts that might prove productive" (30). Thus, the cipher's rebellious meaning should be read more structurally than as a matter of instance: any cipherous use chooses to overlook that the animal in question actually points towards other readings than just the one intended, like the animals in dreams analyzed by Freud, whose specificities and symbolic connections help reveal hidden meanings. Or, as Deleuze and Guattari point out and Tyler implies, animal symbols resist even that level of careful reading and threaten to break free of any predictable symbolicity.

2. His phrase "death of the Animal" also reminds of the book of the same name edited by Paola Cavalieri, where she gets awkwardly wrong-footed by discussions with her Continental interlocutors such as Cary Wolfe.

3. Tyler tells us that the Sphinx killed all who couldn't solve her riddle: "There is on earth a being two-footed, four-footed, and three-footed that has one name; and, of all creatures that move upon earth and in the heavens and in the sea, it alone changes its form. But when it goes propped on most feet, then is the swiftness in its limbs the weakest" (163). Oedipus is the first and only to manage to solve the riddle, whose answer is simply "man" – humans crawl on all-fours as babies, walk upright when adults, and make use of a walking stick when in old age. In the story, however, Oedipus fits the description more than any other man, for his own name refers to his swollen feet as a baby and, after blinding himself and growing old, he uses a stick in order to walk. For Tyler, Oedipus is the prototype of the human, the one who knows, the truth-seeker, who is able to crack the riddle that cipherous animality presents (164). But paradoxically, Oedipus is ignorant of his own identity, being unaware at this point that he is actually an adopted child.

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***Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011)* Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights, Oxford University Press: Oxford**

Reviewed by Kurtis Boyer[6]

In Zoopolis (Donaldson, & Kymlicka 2011), Donaldson and Kymlicka provide a thought provoking, and sometimes surprising use of Liberal theory of justice to argue for extending inviolable right to animals. The book breaks new ground in its political treatment of the subject of animal rights. The primary focus is not just on how animals are worthy of such rights, but instead, extends into political theory in terms of how the extension of rights can, and should be, framed in a coherency to the moral theory of justice to which moderates human-human relations today.

Zoopolis addresses two fundamental issues. Most fundamentally perhaps, is the desire to improve the state of the animal in human society. Towards this end, Zoopolis represents a sincere attempt. The second issue, that of a political impasse, that animal advocacy has remained constrained by, is where the authors seek to make the majority of their contribution. Their discussion of human-animal relations is couched in a political disposition regarding communal relations - and in particular, to how they relate to ideas of citizenship, justice, and human rights.

The problem *for* the animal is one *of* advocacy. The authors see this impasse as being a major factor in contributing to the movement's lack of success in its attempt to "dismantle the system of animal exploitation"(3). The problem of the impasse is almost one of pragmatics - or the way they see animal rights as being conventionally defined. They see the presentation animal rights as being done in a way that makes it theoretically unsustainable, and a political non-starter (10). By framing the problem in this way, Zoopolis makes the failure of animal advocacy a political problem. There may be a degree of implied causality between the problem of animal exploitation

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and the problem of the impasse. However, almost as a natural outgrowth to this analytical frame, is the way that it lends itself to an equally pragmatic presentation of argumentation, to which the authors so eloquently build, in an incremental fashion, their call for extending rights to animals. This call is based on the sentience argument, with a focus on shared relational ethic. This inclusion of sentience doesn't entirely detract from the pragmatic nature of the book. This is because the problem of animal exploitation is not framed in a critique of how we define "being human" or "being animal". Instead, a focus on the "impasse" allows the authors to create a very easily digestible premise, to which we can all agree – that we are opposed to animal "cruelty". From here, the authors move to justify a re-imagining of human-animal relations in political terms. The authors point out that disenfranchised portions of human society, such as infants, or the mentally disabled, are provided for via rights packages that while securing their place in society, are given without the requirement that they advocate on their behalf or participate fully in society - and as such, extending these rights to animals are already warranted within liberal rights theory. A focus on coherency, is the manner in which this is presented. In other words, the arguments are presented in a way that relates to the legal and ethical guidelines that we already have in place that we use to define ourselves, and our relations towards those we care for. For the animals that are deemed to be part of this broader community of sentient beings, the use of coherency as a means to advocate for animal rights is surprising and convincing. The authors present the idea of animal rights by way of replacing an aversion to them, with a sense of striving to retain them. Framed by the subtle suggestion that we all already believe in this sense of sentient community, it becomes a matter of putting them into practice in a way that we are comfortable with. In a sense, it almost becomes a pursuit to retain the thing "that makes us who we are", that authors use to eventually advocate for veganism, while at the same time are able to scurry past the toes of many, who bypass the political issue of animal exploitation by mashing together the current state of moral acceptability with political possibility.

The authors present their remedy for the political problem of the impasse, by couching it in what's missing from the three main ways animal advocacy is conventionally defined. The authors distance themselves from the welfarist and the 'ecological' approach to animal advocacy, which by design subjugates the interests of animals to that of humans. Instead, the authors position themselves within a third approach – described as an animal rights framework. This last

framework treats animals as both individuals, and as being holders of inviolable rights. However, the authors see this approach as failing to progress from its state of political marginalization into mainstream acceptance. In particular, the authors see a problem in the manner in which advocacy has been framed by a predominantly "narrow" way - in that rights are usually confined to a "limited" list of negative rights (6). The "negative" being that the focus is on *stopping* the killing, the confinement, the torture, the separation from one's family etc. The "narrow" for the authors is that these rights are usually seen as being applied generically to all animals. The marginalization of the movement has been in part, consequential to the failure to account for the 'positive obligations' and 'relational duties" which humans have towards animals.

The authors raise an important call for the need of animal advocacy to rethink the static position to which the "human" sits among a world full on non-humans. It is however from this carved out lack acknowledgment regarding the "realities of human-animal co-coexistence", to which the authors present a more "realistic" human – animal positioning. Herein lies the attempt to replace a sense of aversion to, with a sense of striving for, a new relations with animals. Relational "realities", are the point of departure to which a liberal democratic theory of justice is forwarded as being the most appropriate way to guide the formal inclusion of animals into our broader community.

Zoopolis suggests three main groups of rights holders - ordered by their relationship to human society (13). The first category being made up of animals which are "fully domesticated". These animals have a very close relationship with humans, which the authors assert, should be seen not as property but as full rights holding members of the broader communities they share with humans. It is these sets of relations from which the majority of discussion around positive or dutiful relations is inspired. The second sub-set of animals envisioned by Donaldson and Kymlicka are those that inhabit areas often used or inhabited by humans, but continue to exist undomesticated to humans. These are the rats, raccoons, pigeons, crows, coyotes etc. Unlike the first sub-set, these animals should not be considered full members of human society, but as the authors term, as 'denizens', should be seen as deserving of a respect, and a freedom from intent to harm. Lastly, are those animals, which create and maintain living spaces outside of the spatial domain of humans. These wild autonomous animals are members of their own sovereign

communities and should be left free from external restrictions to their individual or collective pursuit of self-determination.

It is easy to appreciate the attempt made in this work. Donaldson and Kymlicka make a clear and well articulate use of Liberalism to advocate for animals. Further, there is good reason to believe that this approach will be much more palatable for the general public. However, I found myself still wondering whether a successful application of liberal democratic theory would also address the fundamental problem of animal exploitation, or the human self-interest and speciesist inheritances that serve as the authors themselves say, as a "backlash" against the animal rights movement.

The manner in which the extension of rights is normally defined within this broader Liberal frame of inclusion, has not been without critics. For some in the fields of Indigenous and critical disability studies for example, the means to which inclusion is often framed, is done so without accounting for the functionality that these differences represent in maintaining a culturally, linguistically, cognitively etc. way of being in the world that is vital for their own model of self-determination. Often the results of these processes of inclusion, is a further entrenchment of a system of subjugation, with the determinants of wellbeing being increasingly defined by universalities that inherently reflect a foreign way of being. For example, Indigenous scholars such as Taiaiake Alfred have often stated that the extension of citizenship rights towards Indigenous peoples remains unreflective of the traditional way that Indigenous peoples relate to governance. This has led Alfred and others to claim that "inclusion" often results in a continued colonial relationship, guised as emancipation (Alfred, & Corntassel 2005). Critical disability scholars share a similar sense of apprehension regarding processes of "inclusion", and the ability to adequately address the various ways of being that make up the broad term "disabled". Through policy and the use of technology, "inclusion" has often come to substantiate an identity of inadequacy among individuals which do not match up to the norm of "full ability" implied in the universal condition of "being human". Via its conceptualisation of "duty", Zoopolis could face similar junctions of critique from critical animal studies. To that end, I was left without clarity to whether the new orientation towards positive relations described in Zoopolis, need result in anything new at all. I wasn't sure to whether Zoopolis challenged or actually

empowered my existing anthropomorphic delusions towards those individual animals I am already attached to.

The animal's difference of being, that which is vital to its wellbeing, as well as the functioning of its future rights, may already be compromised by the flattening of difference which underpins the preferential information which not only informs our current relations, but also that which creates, but more importantly (for the animal), breaks the bonds of duty. The authors acknowledge preferential information and its mobilization through human self-interest to be a major deterrent in improving the condition of the animal. They note (37) that this condition is represented through both our over-representation of similarity as well as difference between humans and animals. However, it would have been interesting to hear a more in-depth discussion on how ideas on difference and similarity sustain each other. After all, is there not a relationship between the emotive response, articulated through our aversions to witnessing our negative relations, and those articulated though the striving to retain and further extend what people often consider to be "positive relations"?

We humans have long been digesting the moral tenants related to the liberal sense of inclusion. So in that sense, Zoopolis provides a more than convincing attempt to succeed in addressing the problem of the impasse. However, Zoopolis gives less insight in providing a clear way to engage with the problems that arise from *wanting* to relate to animals. Ultimately our current state of human-animal relations remains defined by either a state pre-determined violent passivity, or the unintended consequences from attempting to exert control over determinants of wellbeing that exist outside our world. So in a sense, the fact that Zoopolis does such a convincing job in providing a means past the impasse, may represent its biggest problem in addressing what underlies both our negative and positive relations with animals.

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Sarat Colling and Anthony Nocella II (2012) *Love and Liberation: An Animal Liberation Front Story,* Piraeus Books LLC.

Reviewed by Nicholas Silcox[7]

There have been few creative works that bring together the complexities of romantic love, compassion for nonhuman animals and the ideology of animal liberation. *Love and Liberation: An Animal Liberation Front Story*, by Sarat Colling and Anthony Nocella II, attempts to show that within these two concepts, love and liberation, there is immense overlap. *Love and Liberation* is a story of compassion, empathy, and understanding between two young people in love who are brought even closer because of their shared quest for animal liberation. The black and white illustrations by Lara Drew help to make the reader's journey to an understanding of animal liberation come to life. A story of evolution, the characters go through an inspiring transformation that encourages the reader to think about why it is necessary to engage in direct action in the name of human and nonhuman animals, thereby showing that such actions spring from love and compassion even though they are illegal. Although *Love and Liberation* does offer readers an exciting story of human transformation while showing the mutuality of the concepts of love and liberation, at times, the short novel rushes too quickly through the transformative process, and in doing so, some of the nuances of how one becomes an animal liberator are lost.

The story begins in the midst of an Animal Liberation Front (ALF) action. The main character, Gabby, is walking her companion animal, Liberty, when she notices something strange going on at a new fast food restaurant that is being constructed near her house. She witnesses two people dressed in black who were spray painting and breaking windows, and throwing a Molotov cocktail into the restaurant. Gabby is astonished by what she sees and begins walking back to her house when a man behind her asks if she had seen the people. Gabby asks "What people?" and the man replies, "Damn ilf." She is curious about who the "ilf" are and calls her boyfriend Andre's brother, whom she knows to be vegan. He tells her about veganism and says that the "ilf" is actually the ALF, the Animal Liberation Front. The next day, at a lunch date with Andre, Gabby notices some graffiti in the bathroom with obvious anti-meat and pro-animal rights

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messages. This series of events causes Gabby and Andre to confront their own complicity in animal exploitation, and they decide that they must act by directly contributing to the liberatory objectives of the ALF.

She starts to ask questions of local activists and friends about what it means to be vegan, and what the ALF is. After Gabby and Andre collect literature and movies on the ALF, suddenly seeing that they are everywhere surrounded by the oppression and exploitation of other animals, they convert to veganism. They both begin to doubt their previous paths, feeling a growing disinterest in their jobs and schooling. All the while, the collective growth of Gabby and Andre brings them closer together. As they learn more about the need for human, animal, and earth liberation, they are able to learn more about their relationship and their love for each other.

The story culminates as Andre and Gabby, after weeks of research and planning, engage in direct action and property destruction to liberate animals living in a research facility where Andre is going to school. While the end of the story shall remain un-detailed to foster reader interest, both Gabby and Andre are faced with difficult decisions made more complex by their being labeled as terrorists due to the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA). At the end of the novel, one of the pair is forced into confinement while the other continues a journey that will lead to the liberation of more exploited nonhuman animals. Along with the animal liberations that populate this story, the couple is also liberated from their inability to see the truth, and they developed a love stronger than most people ever experience.

In creating this animal liberation coming of age narrative, *Love and Liberation* captures that moment all animal liberationists, and social justice advocates in general, have when they realize that personal and social change is their life calling. In doing so, the narrative shows the importance of developing strong, loving relationships as animal liberationists and social justice activists. The narrative in *Love and Liberation* provides a guide for activists who are considering the issue of other animals in a hegemonic capitalist society. Gabby's coming of age account follows her transformation from an average accountant to a vegan animal activist, thereby allowing the reader to see that change is possible. Gabby and Andre's metamorphoses allows the reader to see that the process of becoming vegan, an animal activist, and even a member of the ALF is not only an easy one, but one that is necessary once animal exploitation has become apparent, or so the story seems to suggest. This story gives insight into the interdependency of love and liberation.

To achieve liberation for humans and animals, love must be present and embraced. Love for other humans, for other animals, and for the earth lights the path toward justice. In order to love, Gabby and Andre, like all social justice activists, have to liberate their minds to see the oppression that was once invisible. The book also sheds light on the AETA, by which one of the characters is convicted of terrorism at the story's end. However, after reading a narrative grounded in the love that leads to liberation and seeing character transformations from average citizens to animal and social justice activists, ALF actors are humanized in such a way that leads the reader to sympathize with them and understand the trouble with labeling such activists as terrorists. In establishing a narrative that encourages the reader to humanize and sympathize with the characters, it helps to encourage thought and discourse on the issue of the AETA and so-called animal rights or eco-terrorism. The illustrations by Lara Drew throughout the book put the reader into the story's action. Every illustration adequately projects Gabby and Andre's experiences and gives the reader a lasting visual understanding of what the road toward animal and human liberation looks like.

Although the story does offer a great deal of insight for aspiring animal activists, the story progresses at a pace that overlooks some of the subtleties of the journey to becoming an animal liberationist and social justice advocate. For example, Gabby's comfort with property destruction as a form of direct action develops a bit too quickly to be believable. Accepting property destruction as a legitimate tactic would naturally seem to take a longer amount of time and consideration than what is present in the text. Similarly, Gabby and Andre's quick transformation from apolitical ignorance to engaging in a research facility liberation occurs too abruptly to be fully convincing, as the ALF's website itself cautions prospective activists from jumping too quickly into animal rescues. Finally, Gabby's arrest and branding as a terrorist at the novel's end also occurs too quickly. This may be too controversial and difficult an ending for some readers, especially those unfamiliar with the animal liberation struggle. The arrest allows the reader to sympathize with those who are unjustly branded as terrorists as well as demonstrating the strength of Andre and Gabby's love and desire for human and animal liberation. Neither character gives up on the promise of freedom after the arrest. However, the final part of the narrative is perplexing and rushed, because up to that point the story offers details of a couple's conversion from everyday members of society to animal liberationists. Seemingly, the authors are attempting to sway the reader into Gabby and Andre's line of

thinking (and, consequently, the ALF's) concerning the issues of human and animal oppression. Depicting an arrest after one action—an action to which neither character has built up to with smaller acts of sabotage—could stop potential activists from engaging in direct action. The authors understandably used a lab raid and subsequent arrest to show the depths of the characters' commitment and the injustice of the AETA. Following anarchist principles, the ALF believes that moral obligation supersedes the law. However, this does not make getting arrested and jailed a natural progression for animal activists, or even a necessary part of participating in animal liberation efforts, particularly for people who are only beginning to open their minds to the oppression of humans and other animals. Therefore, what is meant to be a story of transformation in defense of the ALF and direct action could wind up being viewed as a cautionary tale against such actions.

Overall, however, *Love and Liberation* adequately narrates a coming of age story for many advocates and animal liberationists while presenting a compelling story of love between aspiring activists. Further, the novel fills a glaring gap in animal rights and liberation media by presenting a fictional tale, as opposed to academic scholarship, on the plight of animals and the importance of the ALF as a social justice network. As such, a work of fiction may be more palatable to a wider audience than an academic essay or research project. This story would be a good read for people who are looking to become activists for human and animal liberation. That said, the story progresses too rapidly in parts because of the brevity of the book and misses some of the nuances of becoming an activist and a vegan. Despite this shortcoming, *Love and Liberation* is an intriguing work that documents the journey toward justice for all species as one full of empathy, companionship, love and liberation.

Ron Broglio (2011) *Surface Encounters: Thinking with Animals and Art*. University of Minnesota Press.

Reviewed by Alysse Stepanian[8]

In *Surface Encounters* (2011), Ron Broglio broadens the phenomenological ground of his first book, *Technologies of the Picturesque* (2008), in which he discusses representations of nature by art and technology. Broglio asks the seemingly impossible question of what is an animal phenomenology, or what is it like to be an animal from the animal's perspective. To explore this question, he combines concepts found in contemporary animal art with philosophy as a way of breaking away from conventional approaches to thinking about the worlds of non-human animals.

Broglio argues that traditionally animals are judged against human standards and are believed to lack critical reflection and the depth of human interiority and self-reflexive thought. Human belief that animals live on the surface, lacking depth, has justified animal cruelty and the flattening of the worlds of all non-human animals under the concept *animal* (xvi-xvii). On this same subject, Jacques Derrida has written: "The confusion of all nonhuman living creatures within the general and common category of the animal is not simply a sin against rigorous thinking, vigilance, lucidity, or empirical authority; it is also a crime" (Derrida, 2002: 416).

The question of animal phenomenology is raised by Broglio as a "lure" to take the reader to the outer edge of the human world (xxiii). Since animals are believed to live on the surface, and artists have mastery in working with surfaces, contemporary art can help us move beyond conventional representations and anthropocentric hierarchical ways of thinking. Bridging the abyss that separates humans from animals, surface encounters can provide contact zones with the worlds of animals. Artists can investigate what it is like to be an animal by engaging with their unfamiliar worlds, and reveal human fragility and the gap in human knowledge regarding our ability to understand them. Broglio maintains that it is at this very site of surface encounter that

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philosophy will be able to think differently and begin productive inquiry into the worlds of animals.

Each chapter of this small but dense book ties philosophical ideas to the works of an artist. Six artists are chosen based on the way their works relate to specific philosophical issues and the unique ways in which they are engaged with animals (xxvi). Conceptually, the book flows in three movements. The first two chapters explore "artist approaches to animality" (xxv): Damien Hirst objectifies animals as something to be cut open and examined from a safe distance by human subjects, deepening the rift that separates humans from other animals, and Carolee Schneemann's performances engage the human body with animal flesh. Here the distance may seem closed, but the animal remains objectified. The gap between humans and animals is narrowed in each of the following chapters, with works that challenge traditional human-animal hierarchical relationships. The second movement "[takes] up the immanence of animal worldings" (xxv). Snæbjörnsdóttir & Wilson allow indirect views into the heterogeneity of the animal worlds, followed by Olly and Suzi who make surface encounters with animals in their natural environments without co-opting them into the human world. In the final movement the human-animal divide is crossed, as Marcus Coates becomes the animal through his shamanistic performances. Matthew Barney's video encapsulates these concepts into a short coda that ends with Barney himself becoming the animal.

Attention is brought to the limitations of the artists in articulating their contact with other animals and the contradictory ways in which their works may be interpreted. Broglio states that his interest does not lie in critiquing the artists, with the exception of Damien Hirst. Instead, he tactfully employs them as "allies" (xxvi); without co-opting their work, he intends to build on their labor and ideas by translating and extending them into other disciplines and ways of thinking. Broglio observes that these artists are not philosophers, yet he thinks that contemporary artists are less limited than philosophers in terms of engaging with the worlds of animals, as their non-linguistic and asignifying works can go beyond the limitations of language and reason. Rather than trivialize the worlds of animals, artists can provide wonder from surface encounters. By revealing our inability to understand the world of the animal, artists can move philosophical concepts in new directions. Broglio is intrigued by questions of ethics, as well as ontology:

> How can we meet the other on terms other than our own without co-opting this other for our own ends? [...] engagement with animals is not only a question of

> ethics but also of ontology. Primarily, I am interested in questions of ontology-our being and comportment in our world and on this earth. Realizing and taking seriously that there are other beings with other worlds and ways of being on this earth means reassessing humanism and what it means to be human. (xviii)

Broglio references Heraclitus' aphorism "nature loves to hide" as a means of emphasizing the violence in cutting open and exposing the flesh of the animal, which impinges upon nature's desire. In the opening chapter, "Meat Matters," comparisons are drawn between some of Damien Hirst's works of dissected, sliced, and preserved animals, and the philosophical ideas of Francis Bacon who esteemed the empirical value of science and its ability to control nature. Hirst's *Mother and Child, Divided* (1993), which won the 1995 Turner Prize, is comprised of a cow and a calf vertically cut in half and preserved in formaldehyde solution in four glass-walled tanks. The calf is placed in front of the mother, with the two halves of each animal separated by just enough room for the viewers to walk between them. Broglio asserts that both Hirst and Bacon use animal flesh for human spiritual ends. He writes:

> […] Bacon, who sees in science the possibility of restoring humanity to a prelapsarian state of knowing, equates dissection with just such a look below the skin. Nature is tortured into truth. […] Nature is turned inside out. The animal interiors become exteriors to be named and known. […] surfaces become pliable objects under human dominion. (7-8)

Bacon's empiricism is contrasted to Hegel's idealism. In Hegel's dialectical thinking, a synthesis or wholeness is achieved, as contradictions are resolved. Through this sublation, the lesser wholes are elevated to a higher level of meaning. Broglio compares this to the dynamics in Hirst's work, in which "matter is divided or opened up to create contradictions in need of resolution" (12). In both, a "metaphysical violence" occurs as the mystery of nature is overcome through reflection and transmutation:

> Transmutation changes the object of knowledge from something external to the thinking subject to that which is present to the subject and then to that which is internalized. In short, we eat the other. (13)

Hirst's interest lies in the abstraction of animal flesh as the animal becomes knowable when it is violently cut open and exposed, in order to incorporate it within cultural intelligibility. The ultimate meaning of his work lies in our reflection on human interiority.

While Hirst's work sacrifices the animal in exchange for knowing and artistic consumption from a safe distance, Chapter 2 discusses Schneemann's performance of human animality that flattens humanness, making it "another surface working alongside meat as flesh cut open" (26). In the climactic ending of her performance, *Meat Joy* (1964), the bodies of men and women in frayed scant clothing are intertwined with spasms and groans and laughter, as animal flesh is dropped upon them, and "humanness is leveled [*sic*] onto a plane of immanence alongside that of the animal" (26). *Meat Joy* reveals the fragmented human-animal of Nietzsche's satyr in a Dionysian feast of destruction:

> One of the distinct turns in modern philosophy is reading the human as not apart from but immersed in a world of surfaces, a shift most notably developed by Nietzsche. Where *Meat Joy* develops liberation through contact with surfaces, in his early work *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche uses Dionysus to much the same ends. Schneemann's flesh as material for art and Nietzsche's reading of Dionysus myth both trouble a sense of humans as unique and apart from the world of things. (31)

In Chapter 3, the discussion moves toward exploring the worlds of animals from less traditional perspectives. Bryndís Snæbjörnsdóttir & Mark Wilson bring our attention to the way other animals are enframed and represented in moments of encounter with humans. One of their projects discussed, *(a)fly* (2006), is a group of photographs depicting the spaces that domesticated animals occupy within human dwellings. Images of these "seemingly inconsequential corners," such as washrooms or stairs, encourage the examination of the "narcissistic appropriation" of the worlds of these "pets" by humans (67-69). These works invite us to wonder about the heterogeneity of the lives and worlds of animals, and give them "a face and a dignity of being" (69). As our "bubble" or domestic environment "or what Uexküll calls [*Umwelt*]" (86) overlaps with that of the Other, our familiar human perspectives are displaced, and we are reminded of our own animality within culturally refined habitats.

Traditionally, animal portraits have subsumed and enframed animals within human culture, or reduced them to identifiable parts of interest to natural history, agriculture and breeders. Chapter 4 takes us from these distanced images to the art of Olly and Suzi, who use surfaces as points of encounter with the animal Other. The physicality and performative aspects of their works are compared to the physicality and performative aspects of the life of Diogenes, the cynic philosopher and "dog" of Athens, who was tired of words and lived on the streets, behaving in socially unacceptable ways. Armed with knowledge about the animal they are about to encounter, yet feeling the physicality of fear, Olly and Suzi come into contact with the animal Other in extreme environments and collapsed distances, such as in a shark cage. In some of these projects they make surface encounters with animals by offering the jaws of a shark or paws of another animal a large sheet of paper to make their marks and "to write and think with and to think on" (98). The two species meet within these contact zones, each encounter with a different set of circumstances and actions and reactions. Temporary pidgin languages with individuality and tentative meanings open up possibilities for new awareness and knowledge that "counters human interiority as the space for thinking" and does not subsume the animal in our world of culture (xxx).

In Chapter 5, the art of Marcus Coates brings the discussion back to Diogenes, who preferred "thinking with the living flesh" (101). The "knowing idiocy" of Diogenes went against the civility of Plato's Academy, and opened the way to possibilities in thought beyond common sense (101). The concept of becoming-animal juxtaposed with human civility is expressed in the art of Marcus Coates. In his shamanistic performances, Coates risks being construed as an idiot when he makes contact with the animal world with absurd, unintelligible pidgin language of guttural sounds and words. He seeks out problems within communities as vehicles for revealing the possibilities for the future. By becoming-animal he connects with animal spirits, and finds answers to these problems, which open a flow of powers that call for adjusting the common sense of social values. In a shamanistic performance, *Journey to the Lower World* (2004), Coates held the attention of his audience long enough to convince them to set aside doubts and open themselves to alternative modes of thinking in a state of unknowing. *Journey to the Lower World* was created to seek out cohesion for residents of a housing complex in Liverpool who faced the demolition of their building. Crowned with an antlered deer head and draped with his skin, and jingling car keys tied to his shoes, Coates stumbled around the complex in a trance state. The

residents watched with alternating laughter and awe as Coates communicated with the animals of the lower world with absurd sounds and gestures. At the end they earnestly listened as the artist reported his vision. While in a trance, he saw a bird that couldn't fly because its [*sic*] feathers moved independently. Coates explained that this vision pointed to the protective power of the group, and the value of the residents of the housing community looking out for one another.

Broglio compares the work of Marcus Coates to Kafka's "minor literature," as discussed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (105). As a Jewish writer in Prague, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Kafka forged a "minor literature" that went against the "civil sensibility" and "sensible writing" of the Austrian, German speaking majority (105). In this revolutionary and political act, Kafka moved away from the socially agreed upon "good metaphor and obedient literary image" that was upheld as social truth, into a "metamorphosis," which put an end to signification and symbolism (106). Broglio believes that similarly, by "becoming the idiot and animal" and going against civil sensibilities, the art of Marcus Coates moves against "established major art, its metaphors, its hierarchies of signification, and its privileging of the singular artist and his expression of the interior humanist subject" (108).

In a brief coda that encapsulates and extends the ideas presented in the five chapters, Broglio discusses Mathew Barney's video *Drawing Restraint 9* (2005), shot on the Japanese whaling ship, the *Nisshin Maru*. The preference of the Japanese crew for the symbolic violent consumption of a giant sculpted whale on the deck is juxtaposed with the eventual metamorphosis and becoming-whale of the Occidental guests. After a ritualized tea ceremony that defines the rules of engagement with the Japanese hosts, the male and female visitors are left alone in a cabin under the deck. Freed from the external constraints, in a passionate and erotic scene they unveil layers of human flesh from one another, "similar to that of flensing whales," until they become whales themselves (130).

The Introduction of *Surface Encounters* opens with a dramatic paragraph stressing that the focus of the book is the problem of animal phenomenology and understanding the experiences of other animals from their perspectives. Broglio then warns the reader about the difficulties of moving beyond our human biases, when "what we know best" is the world of humans (xv). At the end, even with the variety of works presented within the limited scope of the book and despite the becoming-animal of Coates and Barney in the final chapters, the reader is left to wonder whether the works cited have brought us any closer to understanding the worlds of

animals from their points of view. Since we can only comprehend the viewpoints of other species in relation to our own, Broglio points out the challenges to our knowing what it is to be an animal "from the fur of the beasts themselves" (xv). He explains:

> Animal phenomenology is an impossible horizon because humans fundamentally return to a human phenomenology, or at least its limits and what can happen to human phenomenology as it bears witness to that which remains closed to us. In this book I do not examine specifics of how animals think and feel. […] Rather, I am using the limit of knowing as a site of productive inquiry. […] Without transparency of knowing the Other, I've found recourse in discussing the frictions and follies of animal encounters. (xxiii)

Early on in the Introduction Broglio indicates that the first two chapters bring attention to "violence and consumption of another and its world" (xviii). His arguments remain consistent with regards to Hirst's conceptual enframing of animals that elevates humans into a world of "self-reflexive consciousness" and "leaves the animals (or their carcasses) behind" (xxv). One gets the idea that no amount of abstraction and conceptual theorization hides Hirst's indifference to the suffering of other animals. In Chapter 2 Broglio writes that in *Meat Joy* Schneemann celebrates surfaces and sexual freedom, and explores desire in part by using animal flesh. She subverts the male gaze that objectifies women by creating tactile work that, unlike Hirst's distanced cut open flesh, calls forth "the infection of touching, over and against the safe distance of looking" (27). Broglio briefly mentions Schneemann's use of animals as "props for human discourse" (xxvii), and later talks about "violence […] in the knowing and making of her art" (39). Yet within the context of critical animal studies, Broglio leaves the reader dissatisfied by failing to adequately address Schneemann's exploitation of animals. With *Meat Joy* it does not take much of a leap of imagination to be reminded of animal crush videos that use live animals for the gratification of sexual desires. About *Meat Joy* Broglio notes, "[s]enses are opened, and bodies are opened also as hierarchical valuation collapses" (28). While it would be unthinkable for Schneemann to use female human flesh to bring attention to their objectification, her use of the flesh of other animals points to what Peter Singer describes as a religious notion still alive among humanists "that humans are at the center of the moral universe" and in control of other animals (Singer, 2004: 19-21). As one who feels a victim of patriarchal society's oppression, Schneemann's exploitation of animals is even more violent than the male gaze that she is set out

to subvert. All social oppressions are interconnected; by objectifying animals, Schneemann indirectly condones the mindset behind hierarchical injustices, thus doubling the objectification of women. The pattern of these repressions is always the same: those above exploit the ones below, and most times they're not even aware of doing it.

For artists that investigate the worlds of animals, the only way to genuinely part with hierarchical thinking is to refrain from being exploiters themselves. The image of Marcus Coates crowned and draped in deer head and skin is evocative of violence against the animal Other. In this sense, his "minor art" does not depart from traditional, acculturated habits that condone co-opting the lives of other species for human ends. To quote Ralph Waldo Emerson, "You have just dined, and, however scrupulously the slaughter-house is concealed in the graceful distance of miles, there is complicity" (Emerson, 1914: 4).

In *Surface Encounters* much has been discussed about finding meaning in objects by making them present to the "knowing subject" via consumption or "eat[ing] the other" (13). To borrow from Deleuze and Guattari's idea of "minor literature" (105), perhaps it is time for artists to think about practicing "minor consumerism." This means thinking from fresh perspectives and questioning the established norms rather than swallowing and regurgitating them mindlessly. Ultimately this could lead to reconsidering the choice of material, whether it is animal flesh, skin, or hair on a paintbrush. Parting with the majority's myopic civil sensibilities can put one in the vulnerable position of being taken for the "village idiot." But as an obedient consumer undergoes "metamorphosis" and social restraints are removed, new possibilities for the future could present themselves. Eventually it might become evident that what needs to be discussed is not the question of becoming-animal, or becoming aware of human animality, but rather acknowledging that we are all animals, and we are all sentient beings. This ability to feel is a site of encounter, where all animals' bubbles or *Umwelt*s overlap.

It may be that Broglio "enlists the artists as allies" (xxvi) as a way of assuaging their qualms and feelings of vulnerability with regards to opening themselves to criticism within the unfamiliar context of critical animal studies. It is very likely that by putting the artists on the defensive, Broglio would have been unable to secure their cooperation that he found essential in his process of writing. Artists have traditionally used animal flesh and blood in their works and continue to do so. Most of them have never met criticism unless blatantly exploiting live animals. Many artists whose focus is the environment do not seem interested in exploring the remarkable

damaging effects of factory farming, and many others interested in social justice dismiss the possibility of a bond between animal abuse and crimes against humanity. In his book "Eating Animals" Jonathan Safran Foer writes, "[w]e also have a strong impulse to do what others around us are doing, especially when it comes to food. Food ethics are so complex because food is bound to both taste buds and taste, to individual biographies and social histories" (Foer, 2009: 31-32). Fear of separation from the herd is deep-rooted in social beings. It is also possible that the author fears the dismissal of his book by traditional academia if he risks being labelled an extremist. Broglio's non-confrontational writing is analytic, scholarly, and intelligent. Yet his overlooking of some of the exploitation of animals by artists cited gets in the way of moving beyond biased anthropocentric ways of thinking and the ultimate goal of "reassessing humanism" and taking the worlds of other animals seriously (xviii).

Surface Encounters may be challenging and difficult to comprehend, but for this reader having a background in visual arts, it has been an impetus for seeking out further readings in related subjects. By bringing together different academic fields of study, *Surface Encounters* expands the audiences for critical animal studies, brings attention to animal oppression and marginalization, and opens up possibilities for art, philosophy and higher education, that does not preclude other species. *Surface Encounters* points to one of the greatest impediments to human knowledge, the misconception that humans know and are in control of other animals. It is at this very limit of our knowing that Broglio hopes to find a new beginning.

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Film Reviews

Rise of the Planet of the Apes? More like A Few Apes Escape from Three Businesses in One Part of One City 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, 105min

Reviewed by K. Vivian Taylor[9]

Don't let the snarky title of this review fool you; parts of *Rise of the Planet of the Apes* (2011) are actually quite entertaining. The entire first half is an empathy-building exercise. A powerful opening scene conveys the terror of primates in their natural habitats being hunted by intrusive humans. Although the innocence of nature effect is somewhat dampened by music, the scene is capable of evoking empathy in viewers of all ages, who will feel the suffering of Number 9, as she is carted away on the bed of a truck in a tiny, dark box with a small hole for air and light. This suffering is enhanced by the stark contrast between the wild, expansive jungle of the opening scene and small rooms and fluorescent lights of the sterile laboratory of the next setting.

By the time Bright Eyes (formerly known as No. 9) attempts to escape the confines of her laboratory cell, the audience completely sympathizes with her, cheering for her successful escape. Of course, she is brutally shot and killed in an act of violent human overreaction to manmade problems. This reactionary, unthinking human violence is amplified when the boss, a heartless capitalist, orders Franklin, the chimp handler, to euthanize 12 more chimpanzees.

However, the legacy of Bright Eyes lives on in her unborn child, Caesar, whom Franklin harvests and James Franco's character, Dr. Will Rodman, takes home to raise as part son, part pet. Dr. Rodman and his senile father, played by John Lithgow, take Caesar to the Redwoods, a place that symbolizes the majesty of animals in their natural habitats. However, this narrative device disappoints at the end of the film when Caesar and the rest of the escaped apes return there because the Redwoods are nothing like the jungles of Africa. "Caesar is home," he says. Well, not really.

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After Caesar attacks the next-door neighbor for becoming aggressive with Dr. Rodman's father, the court orders Caesar to relocate to a primate sanctuary. The happy facade of the primate sanctuary, as viewed by Dr. Rodman, conceals the torturous reality of cramped cages, brutal mistreatment and neglect, and lab testing. This concealment is symbolic of the "happy cow" myth of the meat and dairy industry, which conceals the shocking realities of life for billions of animals per year, allowing Americans to believe that cows happily graze pastures and are doted on by small family farmers prior to being milked or butchered. Vegans know the truth about these comforting lies. The primate sanctuary in *Rise of the Planet of the Apes* is actually a supply source of laboratory testing subjects, and cows actually live brutal, short lives.

The sanctuary worker taunts and abuses the chimpanzees with the typical mindless cruelty and speciesist hatred found in so many slaughterhouse workers, as documented by hours of hidden camera footage. His co-worker and the two women he tries to impress by bringing to the sanctuary question his cruelty, but they do not actively attempt to protect the animals, much like people who claim to "love animals" in one breath then eat them in the next.

The original *Planet of the Apes* franchise utilizes blatant anthropomorphization of the apes, as displayed in their clothing and English-language skills. Apes are anthropomorphized substantially less in this film than in the original series, but this film slips back into the lazy habit when Caesar says "no" during the attack on the sanctuary workers. This cheapens the triumph of the apes and insinuates that increased intelligence due to exposure to the anti-Alzheimer's drug, AZ113, equals more humanlike (i.e. verbalized) behavior. Instead of allowing the chimps to display increased ability to problem-solve and other, more realistic indications of heightened intelligence, the film resorts to the cheap trick of allowing Caesar to speak.

After Caesar's verbalization, the film begins to lose its appeal. The chase scene is predictable: it features a San Francisco trolley, an ineffectual government employee (in this case an animal control worker), innocent bystanders stuck in traffic, and a failed police blockade. Relying on these stock characters and situations further cheapens the film's attempt to distinguish itself from the original *Planet of the Apes* franchise.

One rhetorically interesting scene in the chase is the by police officers' use of horses, which the apes then commandeer. This is an unexpected twist on speciesism, which typically features humans exploiting all non-human animals for profit or gain. This ape-down (instead of human-down) speciesism makes the apes no better than the humans, insinuating that no matter which species is in control, the "weaker" animals will always be exploited. The film missed a real opportunity to comment on speciesism in this scene.

At the end of the film, after the credits begin to roll, the plot point of Franklin's mysterious death from a virus caused by AZ 112-113 is reintroduced in the form of the pilot neighbor carrying the virus to various countries. However, this narrative thread remains unresolved. This is an obvious and tiresome way to imply that sequels could likely follow. Since most folks would have stopped watching the film by the time the credits were partially over, to them, Franklin's death would have been in vain. This matters little, since sequels are rarely born of narrative necessity anyway.

Overall, the film is a decent way to pass a couple of hours for viewers who are not interested in critically engaging with a film. I, for one, need that level of engagement to thoroughly enjoy a filmic production.

***We Bought A Zoo (2011)* 20th Century Fox, 124 minutes**

Reviewed By Delphine Leardini[10]

Zoos have become a popular subject in children films such as *Mr. Popper's Penguins*, *Madagascar*, *The Zookeeper*, and *We Bought a Zoo*. *Mr. Popper's Penguins* characterizes a zookeeper as evil in the custody fight for a man's penguins, which results in the birds being released into their natural habitat— a cheerful end for both the movie and the penguins. In contrast, *Madagascar* and its sequels send mixed messages that, on the one hand, animals are happiest in zoos, and on the other, are happiest in the wild. This mixed message suggests that animals may prefer the wild, but that zoos can also provide a habitat in which animals may flourish. *Zookeeper*, theatrically released in 2011, is the most disappointing. In the film, a zookeeper is put on a pedestal by the animals who want him to stay because he's such a great caretaker.

The latest family film on zoological parks, *We Bought a Zoo*, is based on the real life story of Benjamin Mee, a middle-aged English journalist who bought a zoo a few years back on an impulse. His wife died three months after they moved into the zoo. (In the movie, his wife was already dead before he bought the zoo). The animals of the zoo helped him cope with the pain. It is known that animals have this amazing effect to make people feel better, and even help them in the recovery of depression or other diseases (Thomson, 2011). In memory of his wife, Mee opened the Dartmoor Zoological Park in 2007. Mee reports that the animals were going to be put down if he or someone else hadn't bought the zoo. By purchasing the zoo, he saved the animals from death. Mee looks like a hero, providing life to the inhabitants of the zoo, and honor to his wife. While all this looks fine on the surface, it is crucial to take a critical perspective and to put the acquisition of the zoo in context. It is great to rescue an injured bird, but it is even greater to release him afterwards, and not keep him as a pet. When it comes to human and animal rights, we can't just do what is good. We have to do what is right, and what is best. Mee should have tried to find a "reserve" in Africa or Asia to release the animals in their natural habitat.

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It has only been a matter of time before the cinema industry took Mee's book to make a movie out of it. Such an amazing and touching story would seduce young and old, reaching a broad audience and generating big money. A true story about animals for kids. What could be more profitable? Two international superstars were cast: Matt Damon and Scarlett Johansson. The director, Cameron Crowe, likes life-driven characters that are trying to find their place in the world. His movies—*Say Anything*, *Almost Famous,* and *Jerry Maguire*—are simultaneously heart-warming and deep. Damon, Johansson, and Crowe are regularly associated with dramas, not the shallowness of "family-blockbusters." Together, the cast raises our confidence in the truth and legitimacy of the film, facilitating our acceptance of it as a romantic fiction.

The family of *We Bought a Zoo* is composed of the father, Benjamin Mee, his teenage boy and his cute little daughter. The family looks somehow dysfunctional: the boy is reprimanded because he makes dark art, whereas the girl is very lively. Buying a zoo seems to be an easy thing, so they do it. Taking care of wild animals is portrayed not only as being easy but also as benign. The team of the zoo asks him why he bought a zoo in the first place. His answer? "Why not!" There are a lot of other disturbing things. When Benjamin first visits the zoo, he comes close to a lion, and reads "Buy me" in his eyes. The zoo caretakers are represented as neither socialized nor smart, close to nature and far from civilization. They offer comfort in Benjamin's adventure, because they are experienced in the matter. Benjamin is not left alone with all the animals.

Cages are called "enclosures" because it's fancier and makes the zoo sound less like a prison. Everyone in the zoo hates the inspector of the USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture), who is the only one who can control the respect of the rules – size of the enclosures, etc. – they hate him because they know they don't fully respect the norms, and they must make some changes so they get the final approval before opening the zoo. And surprise, that costs money! As the USDA inspector said, "Welcome in the business." Because it is a business. But when you love animals, magic things happen: Benjamin miraculously finds some cash his wife left him. How convenient!

In another scene, a bear is too thin and sad; the crew gives him drugs, and they don't seem to realize that he might miserable because he does not live in his natural habitat. The same thing happens with a tiger who is also given drugs. When he growls in pain in his cage, the crew has a simple explanation: "See, she's likes us!" After having opened a big box full of snakes by

mistake, Benjamin's son shoots them as if they were objects, and then the crew picks them up carelessly. The family's dog is free and goes wherever he wants, as if pets deserve more freedom than wildlife. Nothing is debated. They don't question themselves about the status of the animals.

In the end, they finally realize the tiger whom they have a special relation with is suffering, so they decide for an "end of life plan." The parallel with the cancer of Benjamin's wife seems obvious: he has to let them go. If spectators are able to see the metaphor, this is a possibility to think about animal and human rights. You can cogitate about human euthanasia, and about animal freedom. There's a risk of anthropomorphism, but the reflection is worth a shot.

There's another scene that made me think that there's a little gray area. With a humoristic music as background, we see a bear on the loose. He escapes in the woods, and breaks Benjamin's gun. The bear in the hills amazes Benjamin; he looks so powerful and beautiful. He belongs there. This scene is brilliantly filmed. The light emphasizes the strength of the bear, king of the woods. But the crew has to catch him, because otherwise he would cause bad press before the opening of the zoo. So they put the bear back in his cage where he looks - again - unhappy. There's no lesson learned, no real connection with the animals. The characters are the same through the adventure; they don't evolve or mature.

In conclusion, I would say that the movie is great on form but rather questionable on substance. Nevertheless, there are a few moments for reflection, but you have to be skilled at critical thinking. The problem is that children usually aren't. Movies based on a true story may inspire people to replicate in real life the characters they have seen in films. Movie studios have a responsibility towards children, whom are easily fooled by the sparkles and the magic of what they see. Education begins at birth, and the earlier they learn something, the more embedded it will be in their brains. Animal rights is a notion that needs to be taught to young kids, so they can become responsible and sensitive to the cause. Once you are an adult, it is very difficult to change one's opinion. Talking about this movie creates an opportunity to explore the subject of zoos.

People ought to know the real purpose of zoological parks. The oldest scientific zoo in the world, The London Zoo, was founded in 1828, but only opened to the public later. Before the London Zoo, zoological parks were originally menageries where animals were shown for entertainment. Collections of animals have been around since Antiquity, as symbols of a nation's power, religion, and entertainment such as the public games in Antic Rome. Nowadays, zoo

advocates don't defend zoos by saying they show wild exotic animals to impress people. Traveling has become more common and affordable, people can seek information on the Internet, and keeping animals captive for one's own amusement isn't a good enough reason. Animals are living creatures with emotions, not objects for fun.

One argument for zoos is conserving endangered species. In zoos, they aren't threatened by natural predators and humans, and thus can reproduce more easily. More care is also provided to the animal offspring. But that is in theory. In practice, mating is very difficult because of the stress and boredom in captivity. Scientists argue that they can learn a lot about animal behavior in captivity. But the said-behavior often varies due to stress, and can't be compared to a natural comportment, even if some zoos try to recreate the best environment possible. For instance, lions need to hunt, and depriving the animals of fulfilling their instincts isn't good for them.

Others say zoos are a great place to educate the public. Kids go on trips with their schools to learn more about ecology and to become aware of endangered species. But people mostly go there for amusement, to see animals they don't usually see, and don't question themselves much. They only spend little time with each species. This is more voyeurism than respect of living creatures. Moreover, if they get used to the idea that animals are pleased to be in zoos, the idea can root in their mind. Therefore, animal welfare in zoos will not be something they'll tend to question.

Finally, if zoological parks were only meant to care about threatened species, what would be the point of exhibiting them to the population? Helping animals requires a lot of money, but there are other ways to raise the necessary amount, without including the animals in their own so-called salvation. A four-decade Oxford study found that some species show great evidence of stress in captivity. PETA, although being itself sometimes subject to controversy, had conducted studies in zoo too, and found that some animals really suffer (PETA).

Laws prohibiting the private ownership of wild animals have to be strengthened, and more education is needed for the public, so people can learn to respect animals. In 2011, a tragedy occurred in Ohio: nearly fifty wild animals that were part of the "collection" of Terry Thompson—including tigers, lions, baboons and bears—were set free and later killed by the police (Muskal, 2012). Thompson had little to no experience with wildlife, but nevertheless owned a private zoo. The media tend to glamorize wild animals, as we can see in *We Bought A*

Zoo, in which anything can be accomplished without previous experience as long as people have the spirit to do it.

Inoffensive in appearance, the message is actually very dangerous. Movies like *We Bought A Zoo* may encourage some people to buy exotic animals because it seems so fun and easy. It looks like buying a tiger is the same that buying a cat. The fact that purchases of Dalmatians after *101 Dalmatians* and clownfish after *Finding Nemo* rose was a sign that movies have an impact on the public's desire. This kind of underlying message is not safe: after the *101 Dalmatians*, the breed knew a big success, but not for the best. Cute as a button as puppies, they quickly grow up, becoming big energetic dogs that can't be handled anymore, sadly ending in shelters or abandoned. Either film makers should try to send the right message to educate children and adults, or they should stop making propaganda-like movies for zoos.

The media have a responsibility to the public. They can aim for profit, but should be more careful when using the power to influence society. This might be idealistic, though. Regrettably, in today's world profit comes before ethics, and it is our responsibility to spread the message about animal welfare. The ethics of the entertainment business need to be pushed to a higher level. Hollywood may be a jungle – where the richest is the king - but the living creatures far away from their own real jungle are the ones suffering.

In the 19th and 20th century, there were public exhibits of humans, called ethnological expositions. Indigenous members of tribes or disabled people were placed in cages, just like animals today. This was awful and racist, but we realize today how degrading it was. Maybe there's hope that opinion about animals will change too, and that animals will soon be recognized as having rights just as humans do.

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Vegucated (2010) Filmbuff, 77 min.

Reviewed by Corey Waters[11]

When Marisa Miller Wolfson initially considered practicing veganism, she wondered if her diet would be restricted to "dry, chalky bran muffins" and if she would be prompted to "grow out [her] armpit hair." As she embraced veganism, these concerns faded. She discovered ample desirable vegan food options and learned that practicing veganism does not require a physical appearance perceived as radical. For Miller Wolfson, veganism was accessible to the extent that she considered it "easy." She recognized, however, that such accessibility varies according to, among other factors, "economic and geographic circumstances." Thus, while embracing veganism was easy for her, she recognized that it is not easy for all. A full-time food activist, Miller Wolfson sought to assess how "people who came from different backgrounds and faced different challenges" would react to veganism. This curiosity spawned *Vegucated* (2010)[12], a Kind Green Planet-produced film that, written, directed, and narrated by Miller Wolfson, documents the experiences of three diverse New Yorkers who pledge to practice veganism for six weeks. Selected from a pool of 25 interviewed candidates, Tesla, Brian, and Ellen are aided in the six-week "challenge" by a thoroughly resourceful and carefully crafted "vegucation" network that, coordinated by Miller Wolfson, presents veganism as ethical, healthy, environmentally sensitive, and accessible. The result is a well-polished, 77-minute documentary

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that informs vegan advocacy and that, for a broader audience, exposes the consequences of animal-based food production and consumption.

Regardless of her intent, Miller Wolfson informs vegan advocacy by revealing the significance of establishing and maintaining a social network replete with resources and support for advocacy targets. Elizabeth Cherry (2006, p. 156) argues that "maintaining a vegan lifestyle is [less] dependent [...] on individual willpower, epiphanies, or simple norm following" than "on having social networks that are supportive of veganism." Utilizing 24 "in-depth interviews with self-defined punks [...] in the southeastern" United States, Cherry (pp. 158, 164) compares a sample of punks with a sample of non-punks and concludes that the former are more likely to maintain strict vegan standards because, unlike the latter, they belong to a subculture that is supportive of veganism; that shares vegan resources; that combats "backsliding" from strict standards of veganism; and that even espouses veganism as a social norm. As Doug McAdam (1986) would assert, these punks embrace veganism not via "'push' variables such as individual motivation," but via "'pull' factors found in social network embeddedness" (Cherry 2006, p. 165).

Tesla, Brian, and Ellen are not passive subjects. They act with agency as they apply to participate in the six-week challenge and as they express their particular desires, which the *Vegucated* network must accommodate. However, they are also acting in response to vegan advocacy discourses that have interpellated them. They have been "pulled" into a social network through which veganism is accessible and discursively portrayed as ethical, healthy, and environmentally sensitive. Through the *Vegucated* network, Tesla, Brian, and Ellen gain nutritional advice and undergo medical tests from physician and vegan advocate Joel Fuhrman; interact with a professional chef; learn to identify vegan food items and cosmetics on tours of multiple grocery stores; learn to find vegan clothing and shoes; dine at vegan restaurants; exercise with vegan bodybuilder and trainer Kenneth Williams; watch a film documenting how animal-based food is produced; interact with a representative of a dairy and egg producer; visit multiple farms that exploit and kill other animals; tour OohMahNee Farm Animal Sanctuary; attend the Vegetarian Summerfest conference, at which they interact with biochemist and nutrition expert T. Colin Campbell and cattle rancher-turned-vegan environmentalist Howard Lyman, among others; and tour an abandoned slaughterhouse. Crucially, the *Vegucated* network is also a venue in which Tesla, Brian, and Ellen share their particular experiences and concerns and receive advice and emotional support from Miller Wolfson, from other vegan advocates, and

from each other. Without this network, vegan discourse and practice would be less accessible to Tesla, Brian, and Ellen.

Vegucated highlights the significance of a social network more by complicating than confirming Cherry's study. As with Cherry's punk vegans, Tesla, Brian, and Ellen are pulled into a network that discursively advocates and resourcefully supports veganism. However, they are also embedded in other networks, some of which demand non-vegan behaviors. The *Vegucated* network, as with the punk subculture documented by Cherry, must contend with these competing networks. Such contention is evident in the experience of Tesla, whose family network does not accommodate her veganism. A college student who lives in Queens with her Honduran mother and Peruvian father, Tesla experiences a "crisis" during week five of the six-week challenge. At a meeting with Miller Wolfson and fellow vegan advocates Moni Woweries and Jasmin Singer, she reveals that she is "scared."

> "I don't know if I want to stay a vegan. I'm tired of having my dad cook food, and it's like, 'Okay, are you done?' 'Cause then I gotta go in and make my own food. And I can't eat with my family. I'm tired of like—, I've gone out so many times where, it's like, I have to sit there, and he's like, 'Are you gonna eat?' And I'm like, 'No.' 'Cause I can't eat anything (*starts crying*). I'm sorry. I'm such a punk. [...] And it's, like, hard. 'Cause then it's like, I was like, 'Why are you doing it then? Why are you doing it?' And I was like, 'Because I feel like a hypocrite if I don't keep doing it.' And, like, I don't want to not be vegan, and they're like, 'Well then, just don't.' I just—, it's so confusing."

Tesla's narrative reveals that she values dining with her family, and that her veganism interferes with this valued ritual. Her narrative also reveals specific pressure from her father, who asks, "Are you gonna eat?" Her veganism interferes with his preference and his expectation that she eat with the family. The significance of her family and friendship networks in her life is further underscored later in the meeting when, in response to Woweries' prompt to identify her "wish" and the "thing" she is "lacking the most" while practicing veganism, she declares, "I wish everybody I knew was vegan." Tesla's narrative also reveals the inconveniences of constantly preparing her own meals, of waiting for her father to finish preparing the family meal, and of dining with family at restaurants that do not adequately accommodate veganism.

Tesla's veganism-rooted alienation from her family is evident on the "Tesla Cam," her personal *Vegucated* camera. While dining with her cousin from New Orleans during week two of the challenge, Tesla is asked, "Do you think you'll be staying vegetable or veggies or whatever they're called?" Then, while visiting family in Honduras during week four, she is asked, "What do you eat? How do you live?" Her cousin's refusal or inability to identify the term, vegan, and her Honduras-based family's concern for how she survives, construct a discourse of veganism as foreign, extreme, and potentially dangerous. The act of dining together is significant in her family's culture, and so is the food that is consumed during these dining occasions. Brief film segments documenting Tesla's outing with her cousin and her vacation in Honduras reveal that the consumption of other animals is embedded in her family's narrative identity; that is, the consumption of other animals, according to how Tesla's family members narrate the act, is a part of who they are. As her cousin from New Orleans acknowledges, "It's just our way of living." Within such narratives, Tesla's veganism is othered and even rendered unintelligible.

By merely existing, the *Vegucated* network contends with the discourses and the narratives embedded in Tesla's family network. When Tesla reveals that she is scared and needs guidance, Miller Wolfson, Woweries, and Singer are there to meet with her. Beyond merely existing, the network provides emotional support. When Tesla confesses that she is uncertain about continuing to practice veganism, Miller Wolfson, Woweries, and Singer are sensitive and understanding of her circumstances and struggles. They also present practical advice. Singer encourages Tesla "to just try a little bit at a time" and to consider vegetarianism "for now." When Tesla exclaims, "I wish everybody I knew was vegan," Singer suggests that she "join a vegan meetup" group in New York. In doing so, Singer engages in "brokerage," defined by McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2001, p. 26) as "the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites"; that is, she creates a potentially fruitful connection between the *Vegucated* network and a vegan meetup group. If a vegan meetup group can provide to Tesla at least part of her stated wish, perhaps in the form of a dining experience and a community in which all participants practice veganism, then linking the *Vegucated* network with a vegan meetup group would expand the *Vegucated* network and its capacity to pull targets such as Tesla into veganism.

The *Vegucated* network also contends with competing discourses and networks by engaging in "certification," a process that, according to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (p. 121),

"entails the validation of actors, their performances, and their claims by external authorities." During week two, for example, Miller Wolfson taps Williams, the "prize-winning bodybuilder and passionate vegan," to work out with Brian. An authority in the context of bodybuilding, Williams certifies veganism by both stating and proving that the practice does not harm, but rather enhances, athletic performance. He validates veganism simply by embodying it. In the middle of a weightlifting set, Williams explains to Brian, "Every athlete needs protein, but it's not the quantity, it's the quality of the protein. [...] [M]ost athletes now today do animal-based protein. I do soy. I do spirulina. It just works everything." He adds that he regularly consumes tofu, tempeh, and seitan. While Brian is a 27-year-old aspiring actor and seemingly uninterested in competing as an athlete, Williams' certification of veganism as conducive to enhanced strength, conditioning, and overall health captures Brian's attention and emerges as a viable force capable of contending with discourses and networks that link veganism with physical weakness and poor health. Miller Wolfson employs additional certifying agents, including Julia Spagnoli, a Fuhrman patient who, having survived three heart attacks, transitioned to veganism at her physician's advice, lost 80 pounds, and gained "another life"; Lyman, the former factory farmer who admits that factory farming "destroyed his land" and who now advocates veganism on account that by consuming other animals "we're digging more graves with our fork than anything else"; and Cayce Mell, a cofounder of OohMahNee Farm Animal Sanctuary and a mother of a lifelong vegan child who, in contrast to the predictions of his pediatrician and of other skeptics, has been healthy since birth.

Vegucated is more than just an attempt to "vegucate" Tesla, Brian, and Ellen. It is also an attempt to "vegucate" a broader audience. Thus, while documenting the six-week challenge, Miller Wolfson explains how animal-based food is produced and how animal-based food affects human health and the environment. Her explanations are well researched, intricately detailed, and complemented by charts, graphs, video evidence, and expert testimonies.

The segment, "Factory Farming 101," opens with the finding that "world meat production increased fivefold" from 1950 to 2000. Since 1950, Miller Wolfson explains, "large, industrial-sized [farming] operations" have replaced many small family farms and "streamlined every part of the [production] process to be able to compete in the marketplace." Such streamlining has involved treating animals "like machines." Utilizing disturbing factory farm video footage with its accompanying audio of screaming animals, Miller Wolfson narrates the plight of particular

animals, including "beef" cattle, "dairy" cows, pigs, turkeys, "broiler" chickens, and "egg" chickens. She documents how steers "undergo routine procedures," including branding and castration, "without anesthesia"; how "dairy" cows are artificially inseminated in order to produce milk; how their babies are separated from them within about 48 hours of birth so that their milk "can go to humans"; how their male babies tend to be sold for veal or raised for beef; how the cycle of artificial insemination of "dairy" cows continues until they are "killed for hamburger meat"; how a "typical mother pig spends most of her adult life in confinement"; how her babies are separated from her "within about 10 days" of birth; how babies are deprived of anesthesia "for routine procedures"; how – accompanied by an especially powerful clip of a dying pig shaking and struggling for air while lying on its back – many pigs die from "infection, injuries, faulty construction, or neglect"; how many birds do not survive the "sorting process"; how their snoods and parts of their toes are "cut off" and how parts of their beaks are "seared off," all "without painkillers"; how their legs fail to "support" them or how they die from heart failure because their breasts "grow so large so quickly" as a result of genetic modification; how "useless" male egg-type chickens who cannot lay eggs and produce enough meat are "thrown away" alive or "ground up alive to be used for animal food or fertilizer"; how egg-laying hens are "crammed into a tiny wire cage"; how a "third" of their beaks are "seared off"; and how they suffer from "an impacted egg, a prolapsed uterus, or cage-related injuries."

Animals exploited by producers that employ curious terms such as "free-range," "organic," and "humane" experience similar conditions, as Ellen learns upon contacting a large "free-range" producer of "organic" dairy and eggs. During a recorded telephone conversation, a representative of the producer confirms that steers are castrated with a "rubber band" and without anesthesia; that animals with infections are not treated with antibiotics; that these infected animals "generally [...] get destroyed [...] with a bolt to the head"; that the "floor space" requirement per chicken is "three square feet"; that chickens "never see their mothers"; and that they are "hung upside down on a conveyor" as their heads "are run through" electrically-charged water.

Miller Wolfson also presents comprehensive accounts of how the consumption of animal-based food harms human health and of how the production of animal-based food harms the environment. Utilizing Campbell's *The China Study: The Most Comprehensive Study of Nutrition Ever Conducted and the Startling Implications for Diet, Weight Loss, and Long-Term*

Health (2004) as a launching point, Miller Wolfson highlights the prevalence of scientific studies demonstrating "the connection between meat and dairy consumption and disease." Flashing articles by Edward Giovannucci and Michelle Cotterchio et al. across the screen, Miller Wolfson acknowledges the proven links between prostate cancer and dairy consumption and between colon cancer and red and processed meats. She also acknowledges that the vegan population is 26 percent less likely to die from heart disease. Utilizing Lyman's lecture at Vegetarian Summerfest as a launching point, Miller Wolfson describes animal-based food production as "extremely inefficient and polluting," explaining that "animal-protein production releases much more carbon dioxide than plant-protein production." She exhaustively traces how energy is expended in animal-protein production, a process that requires the energy to grow and harvest feed grains, to transport these grains to farms, to operate these farms, to transport farm animals to slaughterhouses, to operate these slaughterhouses, and to process and store animal flesh. Furthermore, farmed animals produce methane, which, according to the United States Environmental Protection Agency, is "23 times stronger than carbon dioxide at trapping heat in the atmosphere." Miller Wolfson acknowledges that "switching from the standard American diet to a vegan one for one year would reduce [...] carbon dioxide emissions more than switching from a normal car to a hybrid." She also addresses the decline of clean water, the plight and collapse of ocean species, and the historical roots of human consumption of other animals.

In addition to excelling as an informative documentary capable of stimulating fruitful discussion, *Vegucated* is also entertaining. Miller Wolfson is as funny as she is intelligent and passionate. One of her comedic highlights occurs during her narration of her pre-vegan days, when she wondered if veganism would prompt her to join the Animal Liberation Front. Enacting her imagination, Miller Wolfson sneaks into a store donning a head covering and liberates a stuffed animal. Brian provides a funny moment during a week one shopping tour when he tries on a vegan leather jacket and satirizes hegemonic masculinities: "There ain't nothin' girlie about being a vegan. [...] If I had this jacket, I'd be, like, the most desirable man in the city." He jokingly explains that he "would look like a bad boy," but that potential admirers would find him "sensitive" because of his veganism. A stand-up comedian, psychiatrist, and single mother of two children, Ellen delivers one of the funniest lines of the documentary. While on a cruise from New York to London during week four, she expresses satisfaction with the vegan food options on board: "Can I remain a vegan? 'Cause I swear [...] it's like being a nun at an orgy." Beyond

the humor, *Vegucated* is also entertaining because the audience feels the emotional investment of Miller Wolfson and the personal experiences and struggles of Tesla, Brian, and Ellen. At the conclusion of the six-week challenge, all three participants have to differing degrees advanced toward veganism, and while these results may not be permanent because individuals can advance and regress at any time, the presentation of results at the conclusion of the documentary is an emotional moment for an audience that is made to care about the three participants, their leader, and, of course, all of the animals – human as well as nonhuman – veganism can save.

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JCAS: AUTHOR GUIDELINES

Editorial Objectives

The Journal for Critical Animal Studies is open to all scholars and activists. The journal was established for the purpose of fostering academic study of critical animal issues in contemporary society. While animal studies are increasingly becoming a field of importance in the academy, much work being done under this moniker take a reformist or depoliticized approach that fails to mount more serious critique of underlying issues of political economy and speciesist philosophy.

JCAS is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on animal liberation philosophy and policy issues. This journal was designed to build up the common activist's knowledge of animal liberation while at the same time appealing to academic specialists to address the important topic of animal liberation. We encourage and actively pursue a diversity of viewpoints of contributors from the frontlines of activism to academics. We have created the journal for the purpose of facilitating communication between the many diverse perspectives of the animal rights movement. Thus, we especially encourage submissions that seek to create new syntheses between differing disputing parties and to explore paradigms not currently examined.

Suggested Topics

Papers are welcomed on any area of animal liberation philosophy from any discipline, and presenters are encouraged to share theses or dissertation chapters. Because a major goal of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies is to foster philosophical, critical, and analytic thinking about animal liberation, papers that contribute to this project will be given priority (especially papers that address critical theory, political philosophy, social movement analysis, tactical analysis, feminist, activism and academia, Continental philosophy or post-colonial perspectives). We especially encourage contributions that engage animal liberation in disciplines and debates that have received little previous attention. The following are a few topic suggestions:

The reviewing process

Each paper submitted is initially reviewed for general suitability for publication. All submissions will be read by at least two members of the journal's editorial board.

Manuscript requirements

The manuscript should be in MS WORD format, in 1.5 line spacing and 12 point Times New Roman. Good electronic copies of all figures and tables should also be provided. All manuscripts should be run through an American English spell check prior to submission.

As a guide, we ask that regular essays and reviews be between 2000-8000 words, and have limited endnotes. In exceptional circumstances JCAS will consider publishing extended essays (up to 15,000 words). Authors should supply a brief abstract of the paper (of no more than 250 words).

A brief autobiographical note should be supplied which includes full names, affiliation, e-mail address, and full contact details.

References to other publications must be in Harvard style and carefully checked for completeness, accuracy and consistency.

You should cite publications in the text: (Best, 2006) using the first named author's name or (Best and Nocella, 2006) citing both names of two, or (Best et al., 2006), when there are three or more authors. At the end of the paper a reference list in alphabetical order should be supplied:

For books: Surname, Initials (year), Title of Book, Publisher, Place of publication. e.g. Gray, J. (2002), Straw Dogs, Granta Books: London

For book chapters: Surname, Initials (year), "Chapter title", Editor's Surname, Initials (Ed.), Title of Book, Publisher, Place of publication, pages. E.g. Greenbrier, T. (2006) "Against Civilization, For Reconnection to Life!", in Best, S. and Nocella, A.J. (Eds) Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth, AK Press, Oakland, pp. 198-203.

For journals: Surname, Initials (year), "Title of article", Journal Name, volume, number, pages. e.g. Cudworth, E. (2008), "'Most Farmers Prefer Blondes': The dynamics of anthroparchy in Animas' becoming meat", Journal for Critical Animal Studies, pp. 32-45.

For published conference proceedings: Surname, Initials (year of publication), "Title of paper", in Surname, Initials (Ed.), Title of published proceeding which may include place and date(s) held, Publisher, Place of publication, Page numbers.

For unpublished conference proceedings: Surname, Initials (year), "Title of paper", paper presented at Name of Conference, date of conference, place of conference, available at: URL if freely available on the internet (accessed date).

For working papers: Surname, Initials (year), "Title of article", working paper [number if available], Institution or organization, Place of organization, date.

For encyclopaedia entries (with no author or editor): Title of Encyclopaedia (year) "Title of entry", volume, edition, Title of Encyclopaedia, Publisher, Place of publication, pages.

For newspaper articles (authored): Surname, Initials (year), "Article title", Newspaper, date, pages.

For newspaper articles (non-authored): Newspaper (year), "Article title", date, pages.

For electronic sources: if available online the full URL should be supplied at the end of the reference, as well as a date that the resource was accessed.